ENHANCING DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN A NEW
DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL MARKET APPROACH

DISSERTATION

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ABSTRACT

Why do national legislatures of modern democracies resemble the top of

the stratification system instead of looking more like the society as a whole? In

any given social stratification system, political resources separate the advantaged

from the disadvantaged through unequal access to adequate substantive

representation -- that is, representation of interests. Empirical evidence suggests

that when descriptive representation is enhanced -- a condition in which the

composition of the legislature more accurately mirrors the demographics and

experiences of the citizenry -- the disadvantaged improve their substantive

representation. In this dissertation, I argue that the domination of parliament by

middle aged men of the upper class is due to the dysfunctional, unbalanced

relationship between voters and the politicians, and to the disagreements among

parliamentarians on what, if anything, to do about it.

I examined the extent to which countries can enhance descriptive

representation in the absence of any formal government policy designed to

guarantee descriptive representation. As a guiding framework, I use the concept

of political market, defined as an institution that governs the distribution of

representation and other political goods. This framework provides a spectrum of

political market types, ranging from government interventions at one end to

laissez-faire market solutions at the other. In a political market, voters demand and parties supply demographic types of candidates under varying social structural constraints.

I focus on post-communist Poland 1991-2005, a market solution country whose disadvantaged groups include women, farmers, the lower class, and extreme age groups of young and old. Using cross-sectional and panel data sets of voters, electoral candidates, and parliamentarians, my analyses suggest that the market solution orientation in post-communist Poland was ineffective in its attempt to achieve descriptive representation for the disadvantaged. Specifically, a survey of parliamentarians shows that they are divided on which groups should get descriptive representation and on the best method of bringing it about. As learned from a public opinion poll, voters express preference for descriptive representation as an ideal. Matched panel data of voters for 1993, 1997, and 2001 elections with appropriate data on electoral candidates demonstrate that the disadvantaged tend to vote for parties who provide candidates demographically similar to them. However, voting behavior as a visible means of expressing demand was not consistent enough to produce descriptive representation in the parliament. Parties frequently do not provide a reasonable slate of demographic types of candidates and often do not respond appropriately to voter demand. In essence, the Polish political market is a cacophony of political leader discord, insufficient information transfers, electoral volatility, and voter inconsistency that, left on its own, became an inhospitable place for descriptive representation of the

disadvantaged. I conclude with an assessment of reasonable progress for the

market-solution countries of Europe and suggestions for future research.

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2.   Sanderson, Stephen K., D. Alex Heckert and Joshua Dubrow. 2005. "Militarist, Marxian, and Non-Marxian Materialist Theories of Gender Inequality: A Cross Cultural Test." *Social Forces* 83 (4): 1424-1442.

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INTRODUCTION

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middle aged men of the upper class is due to the dysfunctional, unbalanced

relationship between voters and the politicians, and to the disagreements among

parliamentarians on what, if anything, to do about it.

Although equal representation for all is the promise of democracy,

women, the poor, and other disadvantaged groups have never seen this promise

fulfilled. In every democratic country, a stratification system supported by

political institutions maintain inequities in both opportunities and outcomes, often

based on ascribed characteristics of its most disadvantaged citizens. Political

dynamics within parliaments and between advantaged and disadvantaged groups influence a wide range of legislative outcomes from the health and welfare of individuals to regional development. As such, some argue that the solution to class, status, and power inequalities lies in adequate, and equitable, political representation for all. *What can political institutions do to reduce representational inequalities and how do we know if the solutions will work?*

Despite a trend towards demographic and experiential diversity in the political elite, it is axiomatic that disadvantaged groups of gender (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003), race and ethnicities (Swain 1995), and other social groups (Norris and Lovenduski 1993; Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998) are numerically and substantively underrepresented in the national legislatures of modern democracies. Thus far, our understanding of how and why this is comes from a burgeoning yet fragmented array of research. Micro- and macro-level studies of women's and ethnic minorities' political representation dominate the empirical field while normative defense of descriptive representation of various groups dominates the theoretical field, with little direct communication between the two (a trend also noticed by Bird 2003 and Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005: 407). In descriptive representation, the composition of the representative body more accurately mirrors the demographics and experiences of the citizenry (Mansbridge 1999: 629; Pitkin 1972: Chapter 4). Despite discussing similar subjects, empirical studies rarely focus on alternative avenues for how descriptive representation can be achieved whereas theoretical debates rarely provide critical assessments of the burgeoning empirical literature

on how descriptive representatives are recruited, voted on, and act once in office[1] (but see Mansbridge 1999: 630).

As a means to explain how micro-level actions of voters and parliamentarians construct the composition of a national legislature, many scholars co-opt the economic language of market dynamics, where supply and demand for types of candidates governs a nation's state of descriptive representation (Cannon 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). The implication is that when supply of descriptive candidates increases, voters will vote for them, and descriptive representation will be achieved. Use of market imagery creates a state policy continuum with government intervention at one extreme and laissez-faire market solutions at the other. While the concept of a political market is a useful theoretical guideline, its empirical parameters are more often assumed than tested. I outline the political market theory in Chapter 1.

Despite the vast literatures for both government intervention and market solutions for implementing descriptive representation[2], subjects of research are usually limited to only women or ethnicities, with little substantive discussion bridging both (but see Bird 2003). To my knowledge, no one has attempted to empirically examine market solutions as a means to reduce political resource inequality for more than one group at a time, let alone for major social cleavages such as class and extreme age groups of young and old.

Research into government intervention centers mainly on constitutional and electoral law quotas and reserved seats for women and ethnicities (see also Htun 2003). A conclusive answer as to whether government intervention, in and

of itself, enhances descriptive representation does not exist, as so much depends on the type of law implemented and how it is enforced (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005). For example, reserved seats can actually serve to reduce women's progress in gaining representation above the level set for reservation. In addition, quota management can be used against women's interests when party leaders are more interested in recruiting docile descriptive representatives who do not challenge the status quo (Dahlerup 2002). Government intervention for ethnicities follows a similar logic. Active descriptive representation policy for ethnicities is a potential source of securing political stability, especially during the formation of heterogeneous countries born of ethnic conflict, and can be achieved through electoral support for ethnic parties and formal guarantees of political representation (Htun 2004; Juberias 2000). Government intervention for ethnicities, however, can have negative, unintended consequences, depending on how the law was written, implemented, and enforced, and how it is perceived by other ethnic groups (Stein 2000).

Research into market solutions is largely limited to the effectiveness of voluntary party quotas for enhancing women's representation and government support for ethnic party competition without electoral guarantees (Caul Kittilson 2006; Juberias 2000). Voluntary party quotas for gender have been shown to increase women's representation, though like other types of descriptive representation policy, success depends on the form and magnitude of the quota, along with the sanctions for compliance. Though endorsement of gender quotas is widespread in the women's representation literature, there is disagreement as to

the necessity of quotas. Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) argue, "Major historical leaps in women's parliamentary representation can occur without quota provisions" (27). Jane Mansbridge, a noted descriptive representation scholar, presents a contrary view; "… as I write, significant representation by gender cannot be achieved in any existing polity without some form of quota" (2005: 622).

Quotas, however, are not the entirety of market solutions. A range of non-government action, such as party level affirmative action, social movement pressures, and changing ideology, all have the possibility to increase descriptive representation for the disadvantaged (see Chapter 1). Thus, in order to understand whether market solutions can enhance descriptive representation for the disadvantaged, we need to explore beyond just party quotas and analyze the entirety of the political market as a feasible mechanism for change.

The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the extent to which countries can enhance descriptive representation in the absence of any formal government policy designed to guarantee descriptive representation. Linking attitudes and behaviors of political leaders and voters to the demographic composition of parliaments, I employ the concept of a political market as a micro to macro level mechanism to explore the determinants of how new democracies create their state of descriptive representation in the national legislature for disadvantaged social categories: women, farmers, lower classes, and extreme age groups of young and old. Most of my analyses focus on Poland between 1991 and 2005, but I also discuss political markets and the status of descriptive

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representation in other post-communist democracies in some detail. I employ a variety of cross-sectional and panel data sets of voters (NORPOL 2005, POLPAN 1988-2003), parliamentarian candidates (POLCAN 1986-2001), and parliamentarians (Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005) as described in Chapter 2.

The Problem of Political Resource Inequality in Eastern Europe

In communist Eastern Europe, state suppression of conflict between and among gender, social class, and other social cleavages inhibited nation-wide debates over equitable distribution of economic, political, and cultural resources. In the aftermath of state breakdown, new democracies now contend with such conflict, along with the ensuing debate over *who gets what and why* (Slomczynski 2000; Slomczynski and Janicka 2004; Tucker 2002; Tworzecki 2003). Over time, governance solutions in the wake of profound social transformations must incorporate the multitude of voices if the political situation is to maintain stability.

Elections are the strongest link between masses and political elites and are the primary mechanism through which political leaders understand mass interests. Thus, repeated elections are supposedly designed to enable the masses to achieve one or more of the following goals: (a) sanction directly the political elite by either voting for or against the extension of incumbents' term in office and (b) vote for the political leaders that best represent their interests (Manin et al. 1999). East Central Europe suffers from rampant electoral volatility (Lawson 1999: 32-33), caused in part by social cleavages translating their dissatisfaction into vote choice during subsequent, and frequent, economic downturns (Tavits 2005). If

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political stability is a result of parties rooted in social cleavages (Elster et al. 1998: Chapter 7; Lipset and Rokkan 1967) , then adequate gender, class, ethnic and other social groups' representation in national legislatures in the course of repeated, free, and fair elections is crucial.

Descriptive Representation as a Solution to Inequality

Representation is usually said to have three major forms (Manin et al. 1999; Pitkin 1972; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005). Formal representation refers to the system of regulations through which representatives arrive. Substantive representation refers to the realization of citizen interests in policy outcomes. Finally, there is descriptive representation, referring to the correspondence between the demographic composition of legislative bodies and that of the citizenry. Descriptive representation is a political resource along which social cleavages are stratified.

To reduce representational inequality, many governments, political leaders, social justice advocates, and researchers champion the concept of descriptive representation. Proponents of descriptive representation assert that those elected officials who share similar demographic and experiential characteristics of their constituencies have the sufficient empathy to evaluate and construct representative policy (Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Young 1990). In this sense, political structures encourage representation by empathetic demographic insiders. In contrast, delegative representation makes no provisions for demographic representation, relying instead on the stewardship of sympathetic

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demographic outsiders (Birch 2001). In practice, descriptive representation attempts to ameliorate inequitable social conditions by providing historically marginalized groups opportunities to become political elites. In so doing, proponents assert, descriptive representation safeguards the interests of the disadvantaged.

Epistemology of Descriptive Representation

Descriptive representation is more of a concept than a theory, designed to stimulate praxis rather than merely academic research. Addressing inequitable political representation, theoretical debates focus on the tenability and "philosophy and ethics" of descriptive representation as a governance solution, especially in light of the current state of disadvantaged group representation (Chaney and Fevre 2002: 897). Thus, it refers to both an ideal and a reality; the ideal being the governance solution, the reality being the degree to which the legislative body represents the demographics and experiences of the citizenry.

While my research does not delve into the philosophy and ethics of descriptive representation, it is important at the outset to acknowledge some of its criticisms, noting that scholars such as Mansbridge (1999, 2000) and others offer well-reasoned responses (see also Phillips 1995; Dovi 2002). To answer the question of *does it matter?*, I address the worth of descriptive representation in terms of whether demographics and experiences of the legislators influence citizens' political engagement and substantive representation.

Descriptive representation has been criticized on various grounds (for a review, see (Mansbridge 1999). Most common is that descriptive representation would not lead to substantive representation, such that demographic qualities bear little to no relationship to deliberative capabilities (Mansbridge 2000: 101). Others argue that by overemphasizing group differences through claims of supra-representational abilities, descriptive representation erodes the bonds among legislators whose job it is to produce policies for all, rather than a demographic subset, of their constituency (Bird 2003).

Many other complaints focus on the difficulties of implementing descriptive representation. Choosing which groups from a multiplicity of genders, races, ethnicities, religions, age groups, physical handicaps, and social classes are worthy of descriptive representation could be so complex that random or arbitrary assignment to legislative bodies is the only reasonable way (Andweg 2003: 149; Kymlicka 1995). Some fear that implementation of this form of representation would lead to a selection of less qualified legislators drawn from, among other places, the bottom of the talent pool. Akin to this is the argument that descriptive representatives vary as much within their group, including multiple social identities such as Muslim lower class woman, or young Silesian émigré, etc., as they do between groups. In its implementation, descriptive representation oversimplifies a complex set of demographics, leaving some subgroups underrepresented, thereby undermining the very purpose for which it was intended.

Counter to these criticisms, most proponents assert that descriptive representation is *not* a call for an exact microcosm of the citizenry, "such that children represent children, lunatics represent lunatics" (Bird 2003). Instead, the goal is (a) substantive representation through making the legislative body demographically closer to the citizenry and (b) situation specific, in that selection of groups in need of representation should be made after careful, rational deliberation and under particular conditions (Dovi 2002; Mansbridge 1999).

Perhaps the most convincing counter to criticisms, and to demonstrate the importance of studying the subject, is by assessing whether the demographics of the representative make a measurable difference in the representation of the disadvantaged (Mansbridge 2005; Ogmundson 2005: 319-323). Any impact of descriptive representation could be felt in two main ways; (a) raising constituents' political engagement and/or (b) descriptive representatives' impact on legislative processes.

While some find that descriptive representatives make little difference in either of these areas (Lawless 2004; Swain 1995), others show that descriptive representatives do have a measurable impact. In terms of raising constituents' political engagement, whites and blacks are more likely to contact representatives of the same race (Gay 2002) and women are more likely to become politically active in states with competitive and visible women candidates (Atkeson 2003). Some explain this phenomenon in terms of legitimacy, in that "constituents are more likely to identify with the legislature and to defer to its decisions to the

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extent that they perceive a significant percentage of 'people like themselves' in the legislature" (Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler 2005: 413-414).

As for impacting legislative processes, research is mixed on whether demographic characteristics influence roll-call behavior, but is more definitive on policy introduction (for a review, see Swers 2002: 7-17 and Reynolds 1999: 548). Partisanship seems to have a larger impact on roll-call voting than demographic ties to their constituency (e.g., Latino dominated districts exert little influence on their Latino representatives (Hero and Tolbert 1999). As for gender, net of partisanship, women legislators used to consistently vote more liberally than men, though this behavior has attenuated over time (Welch 1995). Blacks consistently vote more liberally than whites and support more Black issue bills, a phenomenon dating back to Reconstruction (Cobb and Jenkins 2001). One cross-national study of wealthy, industrialized countries found that greater percentages of women in legislative positions positively impacts foreign policy in terms of providing development assistance (Breuning 2001).

Stronger impacts are felt in terms of policy introduction. Swers' (2002) study of the policy impacts of women legislators strongly suggests that women are more likely to introduce women's issues and feminist bills into legislative consideration than their male colleagues (see also Thomas 1994). Others find that Blacks are more likely to introduce Black issue bills and work harder for their passage than whites (Cannon 1999: Chapter 4; Whitby 2002), though some find the results somewhat mixed (Tate 2003: Chapter 4). In Eastern Europe, descriptive representation of disadvantaged groups influence the form and

magnitude of policy, but primarily through ethnic political parties (Chiribuca and Magyari 2003).

All told, it appears that descriptive representation does matter in that demographic groups both raise constituents' political engagement and impact the legislative process. It should be noted, however, that because disadvantaged groups have only recently entered the political elite (Zweigenhaft and Domhoff 1998), research on the direct impact of descriptive representatives is in its early stages.

More Limited   *More Extreme*

Embracing Affirmative Action (USA)   Reserved Seats (India)
                                                                                   Constitutional Quotas (France)

        Race-Conscious Redistricting (USA)
                                                   Lower Electoral Vote Thresholds (Lithuania)
                                                     Voluntary Party Quotas (Poland, Hungary)
                                                           Electoral Law Quotas (Bosnia)

Fig. 0.1 Spectrum of Policy Types to Enhance Descriptive Representation in National Legislatures

Descriptive Representation in the Political Market

Debate on how best to achieve descriptive representation produces a wide spectrum of policy types (see Figure 1). Half of the countries in the United Nations have some descriptive representation policy within their political market (Dubrow 2005). Examples of government intervention in the political market include "selective" forms of descriptive representation policy (Mansbridge 1999: 632-33) such as race-conscious re-districting, lower thresholds for ethnic minority parties (Juberias 2000: 35), the establishment of representative councils for consultation on certain types of legislation, quotas mandated by electoral or constitutional law, and reserved seats. Examples of market solutions include affirmative action or quotas voluntarily adopted by political parties.

Most post-communist countries have some version of descriptive representation in their political markets, with the majority having voluntary party quotas for women (see Table 0.1)[3]. No country in East Central Europe has ethnic reserved seats or ethnic quotas, though all of them have at least one party that voluntarily adopted gender quotas. Post-Soviet states have little descriptive representation policy, with Lithuania being the only exception. Balkans are split on the degree to which descriptive representation policy has taken hold. For Southern Europe, only Romania has policy. For the former Yugoslavia, all countries have both ethnic and gender policies.

Countries	Policy Type	Which Groups?
East Central Europe		
Poland		
	G(v)	Women
Czech Republic	G(v)	Women
Hungary	G(v)	Women
Slovakia	G(v)	Women
Post-Soviet States I: Eastern Europe		
Belarus	None	N/A
Moldova	None	N/A
Ukraine	None	N/A
Post-Soviet States II: Baltic		
Estonia	None	N/A
Latvia	None	N/A
Lithuania	G(v)	Women
Balkans I: Southern Europe		
Albania	None	N/A
Bulgaria	None	N/A
Romania	E, G(v)	Hungarians, Roma, and Women

Continued

Table 0.1. Descriptive Representation in Post-Communist European Countries

Table 0.1 continued

Balkans II: Former Yugoslavia

Bosnia and Herzegovina	E, G(n,v)	Bosniaks, Serbs, Croats, and Women
Croatia	E, G(o), CLA	Hungarian, Italian, Czech, Slovak, Ruthenian, Ukranian, Germans and Austrians, Women, and Citizens Living Abroad
Macedonia	E, G(n,v)	Women
Serbia and Montenegro	E, G(n)	Serbs, Montenegrins, and Women
Slovenia	E, G(v)	Hungarians, Italians, and Women

[a] A= age, CLA = citizens living abroad, D = disabled, E = ethnicity or religion, G(n) = gender (national law only), G(o) = gender (other type of government intervention), G(v) = gender (voluntary party quotas only), G(n,v) = gender (national law and voluntary party quotas), O = occupation based, SP = special consultation with various social groups, U = university education, Y = youth

Poland's first post-communist era descriptive representation policy was in 1991, granting electoral law exceptions to German ethnic organizations to become political parties, thereby increasing their ability to gain seats in the Lower House of parliament, or *Sejm* (Juberias 2000: 41-43). Later, in 2001, three political parties voluntarily adopted 30 percent gender quotas for candidate lists (see Chapters 3 and 5).

Why Poland?

Poland is a crucial case for addressing the questions raised in this dissertation. Electoral success of disadvantaged groups depends upon the socio-political context, including the history of interactions between and among social cleavages and pace of social change. Poland is among other post-communist countries that experienced radical social change and is now adopting Western European style economic and political systems. As a testament to the perception of economic and political stability, European Union granted Poland membership in 1999. Yet, studies on a wide-variety of topics find that Poland's post-communist status sets them apart from Western Europe. Thus, Poland, as a market solution country who shares some elements of West and a lot of post-communist Europe, is typical enough to suggest how Western European countries would compare and yet is still emblematic of many post-communist situations.

Outline of Dissertation

The outline of the dissertation is as follows: In Chapter 1, I define the political market, including actors and assumptions based on dynamics of supply and demand, and detail the contextual factors that shape the market as a whole. In Chapter 2, I detail the data sets used in the dissertation.

Chapters 3 through 6 empirically examine how a laissez-faire political market in a new democracy works. In Chapter 3, I examine the determinants of attitudes of parliamentarians to understand the extent to which the supply side is motivated to produce and is capable of producing a descriptively representative

legislature. In Chapter 4, I analyze the attitudes of voters to understand the intellectual foundations of the demand for descriptive representation and whether these are actually connected to voting preferences. In Chapter 5, I study actual voting behavior between 1993 and 2001, determining the extent to which voters signal demand for descriptive representation. In Chapter 6, I examine the macro-level situation to determine whether key assumptions of market solutions are actually met in Poland's political market.

Finally, in Chapter 7, I summarize the preceding chapters in light of the theory presented in Chapter 1. I discuss the concept of reasonable progress and the extent to which market solutions can produce a descriptively representative legislature. I then discuss the generalizability of the Polish case to understand descriptive representation for post-communist Europe as a whole.

Notes

1. Indeed, scholars cannot even agree on what to call this concept; though descriptive representation is the most common term, it is also known as compositional, functional, microcosmic, mirror, passive, self, social, statistical, and symbolic representation (see Keiser et al. 2002; Lawless 2004; Mansbridge 2000: 100, footnote 1; Norris and Franklin 1997).

2. Despite that market imagery and descriptive representation are topics of concern, the literature currently does not explicitly define its problems in terms of government intervention and market solutions.

3. Determining which disadvantaged group is included in descriptive representation policy has a theoretical basis (see Dovi 2002); empirically speaking, who gets policy differs from country to country and region to region (Htun 2004; Dubrow 2005). The array of social groups with such representation is diverse, including women, ethnicities and religions, age, educational, indigenous, linguistic and occupational groups, the disabled, and citizens living abroad. Some, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, have national laws requiring quotas for both women and ethnic candidates. Others, such as Ireland, have no national laws for women candidates, but do have provisions for occupational and educational groups. Women are more likely than any other group to have descriptive representation policy. Ethnic minorities are somewhat less likely, and class and age groups fare even less well. Only seven countries, Ireland, Mozambique, Rwanda, Suriname, Tajikstan, Tunisia, and Uganda extend descriptive representation to class-like groups of occupation and/or educational categories. Only two countries have policy for age groups (both Rwanda and Uganda set aside seats for youth).

CHAPTER 1

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

In this chapter, I discuss the concept of a political market as a theoretical

mechanism to explain how micro level behavior produces macro-level outcomes.

Although political market imagery is attractive, most likely because the

assumptions of market dynamics are well known and well tested in other areas of

research, the actors and their dynamics within political markets as espoused in

other researchers often are either ill-defined or ill-suited to be mutually

compatible. Indeed, political market is often used as analogy and metaphor rather

than theory (Udehn 1996: Chapter 3). Use of the concept of a political market is

decidedly situational, depending wholly on the phenomenon under study. Any

student of political markets, then, would be foolish to attempt to standardize the

term. Nonetheless, the concept of a political market remains a theoretically

fruitful means of understanding social phenomena, as it provides one of the only

ways to link micro-level behavior to macro-level outcomes in the social sciences

(see also Coleman 1990).

Though combining political and economic concepts to form theories of

social behavior are common, including the use of the term "political market," few

explicitly define what they mean (Udehn 1996: Chapter 1). Political markets and

the their attendant concepts of supply and demand have been used as theoretical

frameworks for such diverse subject matter as the origins of the American Civil

War (Reid Jr. 1977), interest group influence (Hayes 1981), and the rise of

conservative social movements such as the Ku Klux Klan (McVeigh 1999). Since

Becker 's *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* (1976), researchers have

used market language of supply and demand to explain social phenomena such as

occupational attainment (Kaufman 2002), marriage (Cherlin 1992), religion (Gill

2001), and crime (Becker 1976). Economists examining political processes in the

context of public choice theory are most likely to use the term political market,

but few discuss it substantively (Wittman 1995: 1). In *The Myth of Democratic

Failure* (1995), Donald Wittman, an American economist, asserts the primacy of

the market in writing, "Most controversies in the social sciences are ultimately

arguments over the nature of the market" (1). Even in his book, which makes

extensive use of economic theory of supply and demand to defend democratic

political markets as efficient means of wealth maximization, at no point is the

term political market strictly defined. Consistent with the vagueness of the term,

Wittman (1995) conceives of multiple political markets, each with their own

actors, all operating at once (3).

Since the goal is to understand how micro-level political market dynamics

produces a given state of descriptive representation, I need to construct a political

market as a link between micro-level behavior and macro-level outcomes. Supply

and demand dynamics need to be well defined, as well as their constituent levels

of analyses and the actors within them. Moreover, social structural, contextual factors need to be clearly delineated as both conceptually distinct yet theoretically integrated into the actions of the various actors. Additionally, the concept should be durable enough to be comparable across time and space.

Recently, market language and the analogy of a political market has been used to explain variations in the representation of disadvantaged groups (Cannon 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997; Mackay 2004; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Few attempts have been made to empirically examine the contours of the political market and attention is mainly focused on women's representation, rather than descriptive representation for other social groups[1] (but see Norris and Lovenduski 1993).

Conceptions of the political market are similar to the more well-known labor market. In studies of the labor market, the supply side is generally conceived as those factors that influence the kind of job aspirants available. Demand side consists of the employers who seek types of job aspirants. In the political market, especially when used to explain candidate emergence, the supply side are those factors such as candidate resources and motivation (Mackay 2004) that influence the kind of candidate aspirants available; the demand side as the parties who seek types of candidates.

Following previous use of market imagery, definitions of who or what influences supply and demand vary substantially from study to study. In macro-level studies of women's representation, macro-political and economic forces define supply and demand and govern the dynamics of the market. In explaining

cross-cultural variation in women's representation in national legislatures, Paxton and Kunovich (2003) define the supply side as structural factors, such as education levels and workforce participation of women, and the demand side as political parties and electoral systems.

Previous uses of the concept of a political market as a micro-macro mechanism are ill-suited to my purposes. Micro-level studies seem to use supply and demand as all factors that contribute to candidate emergence and selection. In explaining descriptive representation in the European Parliament, Norris and Franklin (1997) conceive of a "political market-place;" the supply side are candidates and their characteristics, including motivations and political capital, and the demand side are attitudes of political gatekeepers and party rules. In explaining Black minority representation in the U.S. Congress, Cannon (1999: Chapter 3) defines the supply side as individual politicians, the demand side as voters and their social contexts.

Cannon aside, voters are rarely considered as important actors in the supply and demand dynamic. A contrast with how labor markets work is illustrative. The key differences between the labor market and the political market are the factors that potentially influence supply. Labor market employers rarely have to consider how the public at-large thinks about hiring decisions and thus have a great capacity to conceal discriminatory hiring practices. Parties, on the other hand, must consider public, or voter, reactions. Moreover, voter demands are vital for party survival and hence must be significant in influencing supply.

Thus, my conception of the political market is more similar to that of Cannon (1999: Chapter 3), who includes voters into the supply and demand dynamic. Including the voter forces a change in the entire concept, defining voters as those who demand descriptive representation and political leaders as those who control the supply of demographic types of candidates. This change allows researchers to ask new questions concerning the ability of market solutions to produce descriptive representation and the extent to which voters play a role in this process.

Theory Proposition

A market can be defined as an institution that governs distribution of resources (Carruthers and Babb 2000). A political market is an institution that governs the distribution of representation and other political goods using the concepts of supply and demand.

This leads to the following proposition:

State of descriptive representation at the macro-level is a function of the political market such that micro- and meso-level actors and their interactions determine supply and demand for types of candidates under varying contextual restraints.

Levels and Their Actors

Three levels of analyses, each with their own actors, comprise the political market (Table 1.1).

	Levels		
	Micro	Meso	Macro
Actors	Legislators	Political Parties	Legislature
	Candidates	Social Change Organizations	
	Voters		

Table 1.1 Levels and Actors in a Political Market

At the micro-level, individuals are the units of analysis. Actors include legislators, candidates, and voters. For both the meso- and macro-levels, organizations are the units of analyses. Influencing both micro-level behaviors and the state of descriptive representation is the meso-level, comprised of political parties and social change organizations. At the macro-level is the legislature, whose demographic composition is a product of both micro and meso-level actions. Influencing all actors at all levels is the social structural, or contextual factors. These factors are discussed below.

Actors of the supply side are individuals in the political institutions, e.g. political leaders, including political party leaders and the rank and file legislators. Political institutions influence supply by impacting the structure of opportunities in the political market, providing the contexts necessary for candidates of all demographic stripes to emerge (Kunovich and Paxton 2005; Norris and Franklin 1997; Wilcox et al. 2003: 44). Political leaders' attitudes towards descriptive representation heavily influence the supply of available descriptive representatives (Cannon 1999; Norris and Franklin 1997). Political elites are capable of holding strong attitudes toward descriptive representation as a governance solution (Chaney and Fevre 2002), lending support for the contention that these influential subgroups help foster attitudes, positively or negatively, towards descriptive representation.

Actors of the demand side are individual voters. Voter demand is measured in two ways; (1) attitudes towards descriptive representation in theory and (2) voting behavior through demographic cues. Attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory are the intellectual foundations of behavior outcomes, influencing propensity to vote for descriptive representatives. The second demand signal, voting behavior, assumes that individual traits on the part of the candidate cues voting behavior which in turn signals to parties a demand for types of candidates. While the intellectual foundations of demand are concealed from suppliers, vote choice is visible (see Chapter 4).

Market Rationality

Market language as used in explaining socio-political phenomena has its roots in sociological rational choice theory (RCT), economics' public choice theory and the assumption of economic rationality in actors' approach to political decisions (Buchanan 1968; Downs 1957; Hechter and Kanazawa 1997; Kiser and Bauldry 2005). As a multilevel theory, RCT assumes that individuals are the starting point, though influenced by macro-level conditions (see also (Coleman 1990: 5). In essence, RCT assumes Becker's (1976) *homo economicus*, where individuals engage in utility maximization, selfishly seeking to increase benefits and minimize costs in any exchange situation. Thus, rational action is that which provides the greatest personal good with the least bit of bad.

RCT has been criticized on many fronts (for a review see Green and Shapiro 1994). There are two main criticisms of RCT's main assumptions; the stability of preferences and the capability of individuals to make rational decisions based on available information. I address each in turn.

I assume relative stability of preferences across time which, for my purposes, is reasonable. I present what Hechter and Kanazawa (1997) call a "thick" model of rational choice. As opposed to "thin" models, thick ones "specify the individual's existing values and beliefs" (Hechter and Kanazawa 1997: 194). For disadvantaged groups, whose structural position is heavily determined by their lack of political resources, preferences are dependent on whether they are voters or political leaders. As explained and tested in later

chapters, preferences for both are for descriptive representation for their particular

social group. Thus, women prefer women representatives, farmers prefer farmer

representatives, young people prefer youth representatives, and so on. However,

demographic intersectionality and within-group heterogeneity of social and

political attitudes cause variation in preferences. Thus, my dissertation provides

tests of the extent to which, and the conditions under which, preferences are

stable.

I also assume that individuals, be they voters or parliamentarians, have

sufficient information to realize their preferences, with some key qualifications. I

assume a bounded rationality within institutional constraints (Ingram and Clay

2000). This leads to two qualifications. First, assuming an open-information

environment, politicians are aware of voter sentiment towards descriptive

representation through voter behavior and have the possibility of reacting in a

supply and demand appropriate fashion (see Chapters 3 and 6). Also, in the

absence of perfect information, I argue that both have just enough information to

realize preferences, e.g. voters can determine demographic types of candidates,

even in the post-communist context (see Chapters 4 and 5).

Second, in a political market, hidden information can damage the

effectiveness of the electoral process to produce a descriptively similar

legislature. Thus, I argue that it is exactly the deficient information possessed by

both demanders and suppliers that can fuel political market ineffectiveness (see

Chapters 6 and 7). However, there is reason to support the contention that even if

there was perfect information, descriptive representation without government

intervention would be difficult to achieve. Thus, the extent to which the political market is rational is an empirical matter addressed in this dissertation.

Dynamics of Supply and Demand

Dynamics of supply and demand should function such that if voters signal demand, political leaders would furnish supply proportional to the demand. Thus, supply of demographic types of candidates should be directly related to demand for those candidates.

How demand influences supply is a theoretically thorny problem. Some previous researchers consider voter demand to be an inadequate way of influencing supply. Demand for women representatives as expressed by the voting public, for example, has been referred to as unorganized, diffused and as a general function of attitudes toward the role of women (Wilcox et al. 2003: 43). While demand by voters is not signaled so clearly as that of social movement groups working specifically for descriptive representation, the degree to which the signal is unorganized and diffused is an empirical matter, as is the basic assumption that demand is signaled within elections at all (see Chapters 4 and 5).

Thus, in the political market as I define it, supply of candidates is partially driven by demand of voters, which is antithetical to current literature on candidate emergence (Fox and Lawless 2004; Norris and Lovenduski 1993, 1995). Candidate selection by parties is largely secretive (Kunovich and Paxton 2005).

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Some qualitative evidence suggests, however, that political leaders exercise prejudice against certain types of candidates:

> People start with prejudices about the candidates. In the old days, they used to band them and say, 'We're not having anybody under 40, nobody over 50, or we're not having a lawyer, or we're not having somebody from the south-east,' or whatever it might be. Whatever prejudice they decided to start with knocked out a whole lot of people many of whom might have been exactly what they really wanted. (A Conservative member of the British parliament, as quoted in Norris and Lovenduski 1993: 379).

Norris and Lovenduski (1993) argued that examining supply side explanations for candidate emergence, defined as those factors that influence the propensity of people to apply, is more fruitful than examining prejudice on the part of political leaders. Some assume prejudice, they argue, by looking only at the outcomes of elections, a questionable strategy considering that supply side factors may be more influential.

I argue, however, that candidate emergence is at least partially due to voter demand for types of candidates, a situation that can be gleaned by doing exactly what Norris and Lovenduski (1993) caution against; examining outcomes (379). If parties are rational, then they seek to maximize seat allotments. If vote outcomes are the sum of rational decisions, then party reactions are also the sum of rational decisions. Assuming parties know how voters vote, which is likely considering the extent to which exit polls are taken in modern industrialized nations, parties are aware of which demographic types are voting for them (or not). Thus, demand increases from a particular voting demographic should lead

to supply increases for that demographic's type of candidates, a situation gleaned from examining vote outcomes.

In various theories and statistical models throughout the dissertation, I incorporate the idea that candidate demographics are one of many factors contributing to party supply and voter demand. Voting and voter demand for types of candidates are primarily driven by three relatively interrelated factors; policy, accountability, and demographics of the candidate. Policy preferences in terms of partisanship and economic voting dominate all recent theoretical models of vote demand[2] (for a discussion of the post-communist context, see Chapter 5) (Brooks and Brady 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000). Accountability, or the sanctioning of governments, is often measured in terms of policy preferences, though it includes other factors such as the influence of a parliamentarian's roll-call voting history (Przeworski et al. 1999; Zielinski et al. 2005). Finally, demographics of the candidate have recently been shown to be a factor in the voting calculus (for a full review of "demographic cues," see Chapter 5). As disadvantaged groups have only recently penetrated the spheres of the political elite, examining the contribution of individual qualities of candidates to the vote calculus is a young -- but rapidly maturing-- literature, and its contributions are just beginning to be understood.

Market Success and Failure

For laissez-faire political markets to produce a descriptively similar legislature, two main assumptions need to be met (for a test of these assumptions, see Chapter 6). Political market analysis assumes that parties are responsive to voter demands. I address whether a particular political market is capable of producing a descriptively similar legislature in light of the relative capability of suppliers to recognize the demand signals and react in a rational fashion. Another principle concern is the extent to which there is a choice of descriptive representatives from which the voting public can choose. Political market analysis assumes that every major social cleavage, gender, social class, and age being primary demographics, are available on the ballot. Political markets would not be able to produce a descriptively similar legislature if voting ballots are overly demographically homogenous.

Market success and failure is dependent on the extent to which these assumptions are met. If a group loses descriptive representatives while signaling preferences for descriptive representatives of their type, and there is no government intervention on their behalf, then purely market solutions to representational inequality contribute to political market failure.

Contextual Forces

Contextual forces, as suggested by cross national studies of women's representation, consist of three main categories; structural, political, and

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ideological (Kenworthy and Malami 1999; Paxton and Kunovich 2003). As they

condition the political market, understanding macro level forces provide a much

needed context in which to understand the micro-level processes. For the

purposes of my dissertation, macro-level categories must include peculiarities of

the post-communist situation; Poland, in particular.

Structural

Structural forces are typically measured as socioeconomic indicators. For

variation in women's representation, percent women active in the economy has

been a substantial predictor.

In understanding descriptive representation of a variety of social groups in

Eastern Europe, structural factors must take into consideration radical social

change. In communism, the state forced a place in the occupational structure for

gender, class, and age groups. Mobility was possible, yet a class structure

managed to emerge, fully capable of reproducing its most privileged strata

(Slomczynski and Lee 1993). At the intersection of gender and class, advantages

and disadvantages in upward mobility accrued to sons from different occupational

origins. From the rural village came the most disadvantaged. A combination of

parental attitudes, resources, and a relatively homogenous village educational

structure in which the social composition of elementary school was heavily

weighted towards students whose parents' educational levels and resources are

low led to disadvantages. Village education, competing loyalties between the

urge to participate in non-family enterprises and the family's insistence that the

son stays led to occupational inheritance rigidities. Those with a better relative advantage came from white-collar and intelligentsia milieu who came from backgrounds that enabled them access to elite economic and political class systems (Connor 1979).

Communist ideology of the elimination of gender and class differences had some impact on composition of its national legislature (Matland and Montgomery 2003). In communist Poland, proportion of women in the legislatures, particularly at the local level, was relatively high (though still below 50 percent (Regulska 1998; Titkow 1998). This is not to be confused with holding real power, however, as women were severely under-represented in the more powerful Party apparatus (Nelson 1985). As classes arose from political segmentation of the labor market under the nomenklatura system (Slomczynski and Lee 1993), class composition of the communist national legislature was difficult to measure. Age groups, rarely a consideration in descriptive representation research, have not been counted.

In postcommunist Poland, the disadvantaged became those whose position in the stratification system was previously at a relatively higher level, namely women, lower class, farmers, youth, and the elderly (Heyns 2005; Domanski 1996; Slomczynski 2000, 2002). Overall, Poland's overall level of inequality, as measured by the gini coefficient (in this case, measured by per capita income) increased from 27.5 in 1989-90 to 35.3 in 2001-2002 (Heyns 2005).

Women lost labor market protection, though their labor-force status was always second to that of men and traditional gender roles remained throughout the

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communist and post-communist contexts (Heyns 2005: 180-3; Siemienska 1985). Women in Poland have higher unemployment rates than men and experience occupational segregation similar to that of other women in Western Europe (Lobodzinska 2000).

Forced urbanization reduced farmer status, and post-communist economic restructuring has exacerbated urban-rural stratification (Heyns 2005: 184). During the Communist-era, farmers had semi-private ownership of their land. Contracts with the state provided protections from the global agricultural market and economic downturns caused by bad weather. After state breakdown, farmers were exposed to market forces and due to funding and ideological shifts on what to do with the agricultural sector, farmers lost the security of statist attitudes toward the peasantry.

Solidarity's gradual defeat had the unintentional effect of bringing in a statist, post-communist party to power while decreasing the ability of the lower class, communism's proletariat, to regain any lost status (Ost 2005). Unemployment is high for all disadvantaged groups, but the lower class in particular.

Introduction of and rising unemployment, coupled with the reduction of a strong welfare state had an impact on the age structure of Poland's stratification system. According to 2004 statistics, 55 percent of the unemployed are under 35 years of age, while the median aged Pole is 37. As for the elderly, pension systems have recently been reformed, usually toward private accounts, with the

effect of lowering pension guarantees[4] (Heyns 2005: 183). Together, youth and old became members of the disadvantaged.

Political

Type of electoral system exerts a strong influence over minority representation. In the case of women, proportional representation systems lead to increases in the number of female political elites (Moser 2001; Kunovich and Paxton 2005). Research on electoral system and ethnic representation in post-communist Europe is less conclusive (Juberias 2000; Stein 2000).

Proportional representation systems are said to increase descriptive representation for women and ethnicities (Matland 2002; Moser 2001; Juberias 2000). In a proportional representation system, voter attitudes towards descriptive representation may influence their likelihood to vote for parties with the most descriptive representatives, thereby increasing their supply. According to Norris (1987), "Under this system, if [central party organizations] are committed to including more women, they have that option. As parties want to put forward an attractive slate of candidates, they will try to create a balanced ticket by including women and men" (129, as quoted in Kentworthy and Malami 1999: 237). After experimenting with various institutional systems, in 1993 Poland settled on proportional representation (Chan 2001). Disadvantaged group representation in terms of class, age, and gender remained low throughout the transition period and after (see Chapter 6).

Despite the alphabet soup of party names in post-communist elections and considerable party fluidity in Poland between 1993 and 2001(Slomczynski & Shabad 2002; Zielinski, et al. 2005), Polish voters were able to determine one party from another, expressing rightist and leftist party identifications (Tworzecki 2003) (for further details on parties, see Castle & Taras 2002; Slomczynski & Shabad 2002; Szczerbiak 2001).

Economic platforms range from statism to economic liberalism. Post-communist successor parties, such as Poland's SLD, generally hold statist positions. Political leaders are former Nomenklatura members and current leftists strong for a welfare state that approximates the relative economic security of the communist era. Economic liberals favor market transaction and limited government interference in economic affairs, arguing that economic security is best handled by entrepreneurs under a laissez-faire government.

As Poland is predominantly Catholic, religious party platforms range from anti-clerical to Catholic traditionalist[5]. Anti-clerical parties champion strict separation between church and state. To anti-clericals, religious influence in political affairs is largely incompatible with liberal and pluralist modern democracies. Catholic traditionalists favor Catholic fundamentalist readings of the Christian bible as the basis for social action while arguing that religion provides a sound ideological basis for democracy and a strong civil society (Inglis 2000).

Table 1.2 provides a description of post-communist Poland party ideology by party, 1993 – 2001 (for names of all parties discussed in this dissertation, see

Appendix A). Party ideology changed to a significant degree that the groupings between 1993 and 1997 do not match 2001 very well. Thus, I use Slomczynski and Shabad's (2002) schema for the 1990's and Castle and Taras (2004) for 2001.

	Election Years			
	1993[a]	1997[a]	2001[b]	
Parties			*Economic*	*Religious*
SLD	PC	PC		
SLD-UP			2.75	3.25
PSL	POP	POP	2.75	1.25
UD	LSD			
UP	LSD			
UW		LSD		
AWS		CHR		
PO			0.25	2.25
SO			3.25	1.25
PiS			2.00	0.75
LPR			2.75	0.25

[a] LSD = Liberal/social democrats, POP = Populists, CHR = Christian nationalists, PC = Post-communists adapted from Slomczynski and Shabad (2002).
[b] The higher the score, the more statist or anti-clerical, adapted from Castle and Taras 2004:114).

Table 1.2 Descriptions of Post-Communist Poland Party Ideology by Party, 1993 - 2001

In the 1990's, four major party families emerged. Liberal/social democrats were rightist in orientation, espousing free market reforms and anti-lustration policies. Populists are frequently nationalist, seeking unity for in-groups and exclusions of out-groups. Populists want protections from globalization factors for Polish native workers. Christian nationalists are Catholic traditionalists; economically, they can be left or right, though they tend towards free market

reforms. The Post-Communists are parties that used much of the resources and personnel of the old Communist party, typically changing their name to "socialist" and espousing statist and anti-clerical ideology.

Party context in 2001 is adapted from Castle and Taras (2002: 114, Figure 4.1). Castle and Taras created a party map along two dimensions; economic from statists in the east to economic liberals in the west, and religious from anti-clericals in the north to Catholic traditionalists in the south. In broad strokes, party platform can be derived from party label placement in a particular quadrant. In identifying the proper quadrant, some arbitrary decisions had to be made. For example, Samoobrona (SO) is squarely in the south-west, placing them as statists and catholic traditionalists. SLD and UP formed a coalition, where SLD is largely in the economic liberalist side and UP is clearly in the statist side. Both lie near the anti-clerical pole. Taking the average, SLD-UP is statist and anti-clerical[6].

To get a more sensitive measure of party platform, I used Castle and Taras' schema to determine the extent to which a party is statist or anti-clerical. Although Castle and Taras clearly state that party label placement is approximate, the distance from one party to another along a particular axis reflects empirical reality.

To do this, I re-guided the map with each axis running from zero to four[7]. Because party labels did not fall neatly within whole units, I averaged the scores that border the party label. For example, SO falls between 3 and 3.5 on the economic axis and 1 and 1.5 on the religion axis, giving SO a score of 3.25 and

1.25, respectively. Note that while inter-party distance can be inferred in the two-dimension space, the metric is of no particular value other than to make finer distinctions between parties.

Ideological

Although ideological factors used to be measured in terms of percent of dominant religion (e.g. Roman Catholic and Muslim meant low levels of gender equality attitudes), a recent study vastly improved upon this measure by using the World Values Survey (Paxton and Kunovich 2003). Attitudes towards gender equality had a strong impact on women's representation, such that positive attitudes towards women's equality lead to greater women's representation in national legislatures.

Regional and country peculiarities, however, shed light on variations in the relationship between gender attitudes and women's representation. Asian countries, for example, have a surprising number of women political leaders, yet do not rank high in gender equality attitudes (Fleschenberg 2005: 2). Poland, as most other post-communist countries, falls according to the hypothesis; they rank low on both gender equality attitudes and women's representation in the national legislature.

Previous experience with descriptive representation may impact current level of disadvantaged group representation. Reports of descriptive representation backlash in post-communist Eastern Europe are common (Fischer 1998; Matland and Montgomery 2003). In Romania, for example, resentment towards Elena

Ceasescu's push for more women representatives may have damaged their chances in the post-communist era: "… the Ceasescu campaign to promote women left them disorganized as a social group and tarnished the image of any politically engaged woman" (Fischer 1998: 176). Similar sentiments have been expressed for past policies in Lithuania (Krupavicius and Matonyte 2003), Hungary, (Montgomery and Ilonszki 2003), and Poland (Siemienska 2003); see also Chapter 3).

Notes

1. Sometimes, researchers offer market imagery but fail to define all the actors in the political market. In explaining women's representation, Wilcox et al (2003) defines the demand side as either social movement organizations or voters and doesn't explicitly define the supply side (42).

2. Demand for demographic types of candidates is akin to a policy preference. As seen in Chapter 3, parties differ in their approach to implementing descriptive representation. Party willingness to supply demographic types of candidates is a form of descriptive representation policy. These policies are designed to resonate with voters, with the outcomes of attracting some and repelling others. Voting for demographic types of candidates is a highly visible way of demonstrating support for this type of descriptive representation policy. It is possible that other types of descriptive representation policy short of providing demographic types of candidate may influence vote choice. Thus, an alternative formulation to the voting hypothesis is that disadvantaged voters vote for the party that provides the best descriptive representation policy. Though such an exploration of alternative descriptive representation policy is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is an avenue for future research.

3. Note, however, that supply and demand dynamics within the political market do not necessarily operate exactly like that in the labor markets studied by economists (but see Wittman 1995). For example, while votes can be the equivalent of monetary currency and representation as the good sold by suppliers, more research and theoretical work outside the scope of this dissertation would need to be done to determine the applicability of standard economic concepts such as elasticity and Pareto optimization.

4. Data on unemployment come from the Central Statistical Office in Poland: http://www.stat.gov.pl/urzedy/poznan/publikacje/rocznik_pow/rynek_pracy/05p0 5_05.pdf Accessed April 20, 2006. Heyns (2005) argues that generous pensions were the source of increasing aggregate inequality, and that this situation was recognized by governments and international organizations, e.g. World Bank (183). In 1996, Poland had one of the largest pension systems in East Central Europe, spending 16% of GDP on them, 2% more than average.

5. The term Catholic traditionalist is an unfortunate choice, as it really refers to degree of conservative fundamentalism. I use it to be consistent with the party platform schema of Castle and Taras (2003).

6. POLCAN combined SLD and UP parliamentarians, forcing me to average the scores between them in order to use POLCAN properly.

7. Procedures were as follows. Taking a ruler, I measured the map where the north-south line is 3.10 inches and east-west is 3.15. I drew lines at every half inch, numbering such that the higher the score, the more statist and the more anti-clerical for economic and religious axes, respectively. Though the axes are not exactly equal, they are reasonably close. With the map now a grid, Castle and Taras' party labels fall into cells. In attributing a value for a particular dimension, I applied the following two rules; (1) if the party label is mostly in one cell, then that cell is the score and (2) the lowest possible score rules, such that if the party label is half in one cell, the lowest possible score was attributed to the party.

CHAPTER 2

DATA

In this chapter, I describe the data sets used in this dissertation. Because I used a lot of datasets, Table 2.1 serves as a quick reference, providing synopses and where I use the data. I placed information on variable measurement in chapters as appropriate.

Descriptive Representation Policy Data Set

To understand the relative popularity of descriptive representation cross-nationally, I compiled a data set of every country recognized by the United Nations (U.N.), recording their founding date and their descriptive representation policy as of January 2005 (N = 158). Two publicly available secondary sources are its primary referent; IDEA Quota Database for Women available via the Internet and Mala Htun's article, "Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity Groups" published in *Perspectives in Politics* (2004). Names and founding dates for countries are from the U.N. website.

Because IDEA and Htun have different definitions of what constitutes descriptive representation and because their focus is on a more limited set of

Name	Description	Chapter
Descriptive Representation Policy Data Set	Descriptive representation policy in all U.N. countries (N = 158) from various sources, including articles, books, and government and academic websites. Details type of policy (e.g. quotas, reserved seats, special councils, lower electoral thresholds) per social group (e.g. women, age, occupation, disability, citizens living abroad, and others) and, when possible, year of enactment.	**1, 7**
Polish Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005	Survey of attitudes of Polish parliamentarians in the Sejm on democracy, descriptive representation, and party discipline (N = 86). Survey conducted June - July 2005 by sociology and political science departments at The Ohio State University. Includes open and closed ended questions, with some matching NORPOL 2005. Data merged with POLCAN but names of respondents not publicly available.	**3**
POLCAN	Universe of Polish candidates for the Sejm and Senat 1991 – 2001. Includes gender, occupational background, age, and district, along with party, list position, percent vote, and electorate status per election year (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001).	**3, 5, 6**
NORPOL 2005	Survey of Polish citizens (N = 4000) conducted in April 2005 by Norwegian and Polish institutes. Includes demographics and attitudes on democracy, descriptive representation, political ideology, and a wide variety of other topics, including whom they voted for in 2001 and their current preferred party.	**4, 6**
POLPAN	Panel study of Polish citizens 1988 – 2003 (N = 1700 per wave). Includes demographics and attitudes on democracy, descriptive representation, political ideology, and a wide variety of other topics, including for which party they voted in all elections.	**5, 6**

Table 2.1 Description of Data Used in this Dissertation

social groups (women and ethnicities, including religion), I supplemented the data with information culled from various publicly available websites, including Bird (2003), Psephos: Adam Carr's Election Archive, Electionworld.org, and countries' government websites.

Thus my data covers the most up-to-date information on which country has what descriptive representation policy for what groups as of January 2005. I attempted to get information on the year in which the policy was enacted, but as of yet, that portion of the data is incomplete. Because I lack expertise in all of the U.N. countries, there is a chance that in some countries there is descriptive representation policy for particular groups that I have yet to discover and that some policy may now be obsolete.

I collected all data using facilities at The Ohio State University. There was no specific funding for this project.

Polish Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005

The "Polish Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005" is a survey of attitudes of Polish parliamentarians in the Sejm on democracy, descriptive representation, and party discipline (N = 86) conducted June - July 2005 with a response rate of 19 percent. Despite the low response rate, the WebSurvey is representative of the 2001 Polish Sejm (See Table 2.2). The publicly available webpage of the Sejm provided a sampling fame of potential respondents. From this website we gathered name and email information.

Variable	WebSurvey[b]	POLCAN
Gender		
Women	20.9	20.2
Men	79.1	79.8
Social Class		
Lower	0	1.1
Farmer	7	2.8
Middle	25.6	27.8
Upper	67.4	68.3
Age		
Young	4.7	8
Middle	87.2	85.4
Old	7	6.5
Party[a]	100b	100
Percent of Total # Districts	93	100
List Position		
1 – 3	66.3	67.2
4 - 6	16.2	15.43
7 and up	17.5	17.37
N	86	460

[a] SLD, AWS, UW, Samoobrona, PiS, PSL, PO, LPR, Mniem.

[b] To ensure confidentiality, the exact percent for each party who responded to the WebSurvey cannot be revealed. However, response rates per party closely match that of POLCAN.

Table 2.2 Comparison between WebSurvey and POLCAN

The questionnaire consisted of a total of 10 questions, seven closed-ended

and three open-ended. A research team constructed a web page where

parliamentarians, invited to participate via email, could access the survey. The

survey was in Polish. The survey was on one webpage, as opposed to multiple webpages, meaning that respondents had the opportunity to pick and choose which questions they want to answer, much like a paper and pencil survey. Respondents had the opportunity to use their mouse or keyboard to mark their answers. They did not have to respond to a question in order to proceed further with the survey, such that they could stop at any time and still have all previous responses recorded. For closed ended questions, respondents were forced to choose a response once they made an initial mark. If the respondent never made a mark indicating a response for a particular question, they were not forced to choose a response. For open-ended questions, respondents had a theoretically infinite amount of space to write a response.

The WebSurvey was conducted and housed using facilities in the Department of Sociology at The Ohio State University and was written by Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow, Kazimierz M. Slomczynski, and Natalie Kistner. Colin Odden and Rob Feldman of the Sociology Research Lab provided computer-related technical expertise.

POLCAN

POLCAN is a universe of parliamentarian (*sejm*) candidates from the 1991, 1993, 1997, and 2001 national legislature elections in Poland. Data was collected from a variety of sources, including the official election report (*Wyniki Wyborow do Sejmu*), the official webpage of the Polish parliament (*Strona Internetowa Sejmu*), and the annual statistical almanac (*Rocznik Statystyczny*).

Data includes information on sex, age, current occupation, district, electoral status (elected or not elected), number of votes received, sejm chamber contested, party affiliation at year of election, and position on sejm electoral list.

NORPOL 2005

NORPOL 2005 is a survey of Polish citizens conducted in April 2005 (N = 4000). It includes a wide range of topics, including culture and political attitudes. It also includes demographics and attitudes on democracy, descriptive representation, political ideology, and which party they voted for in 2001 and their current preferred party.

The institutional members of the NORPOL project are the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), the Polish Academy of Science, the University of Tromso and the University of Trondheim. Funding for the project comes from the EU Candidate Countries Program of the Research Council of Norway, with support from the Norwegian Foreign Ministry.

POLPAN

POLPAN is a panel survey data set conducted in Poland by various Polish research organizations, including the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (IFiS). Data starts in 1987-88, with subsequent waves completed in 1991, 1993, 1998, and 2003 (Slomczynski 2000). Respondents were chosen by means of random sample and were interviewed in-person and in Polish. These data reflect a very wide array of topics, motivated

primarily by a desire to understand the transition from communism to capitalist

democracy. For more information see Slomczynski (2000, 2002).

CHAPTER 3

HOW THE POLITICAL MARKET WORKS PART I: POLITICAL LEADERS'
ATTITUDES TOWARD DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN THEORY
AND PRAXIS

In this chapter I ask, *what influences parliamentarians' attitudes toward*

descriptive representation in theory and praxis? I use a unique data set, the

Polish Parliamentarian WebSurvey 2005, to analyze how demographic

characteristics and party context influence parliamentarian attitudes toward (a)

descriptive representation with respect to gender, social class, and age groups and

(b) parties voluntarily adopting gender quotas.

Analyzing attitudes of political leaders is vital in understanding how the

political market works from the supply side. In a theory of the political market,

political institutions - electoral and party rules, as well as the culmination of

political leader decisions - largely determine the supply of representatives with

specific demographic characteristics. Political institutions influence supply of

these representatives by impacting the structure of opportunities in the political

market, providing the contexts necessary for candidates of all demographic stripes

to emerge (Norris and Franklin 1997; Wilcox, Stark, and Thomas 2003: 44).

Parliamentarians are particularly important political leaders. Through

interacting with the media and creating legislation they directly influence

descriptive representation debate and policy direction. Parliamentarians' rational arguments for and against descriptive representation thusly shape the demographic composition of the parliament. Underlying the supply of descriptive representatives, then, are parliamentarians' attitudes toward the importance of the legislators' demographics.

Since Poland is still a young parliamentary democracy, analyzing both parties and individual parliamentarians is the best way to understand how these actors influence political market dynamics. This approach is in contrast to arguments that examining parties in a parliamentary democracy is the best way to understand policy formation. In that view, parties in multi-party democracies exercise more control over individual members than vice versa (Parikh 1997: 20). However, "in young democracies, the rules of the game… are still amenable to alteration by actors seeking advantage" (Castle and Taras 2002: xix; Kitschelt 1992: 9-10). Therefore, despite the power of parties, focusing on parliamentarians seems appropriate in studying new democracies as individuals still enjoy considerable influence.

Analyzing politicians' attitudes toward a wide variety of disadvantaged groups leads to a fuller understanding of the intellectual foundations of descriptive representation policy as actually believed by the policy-makers (in contrast to academic defenses such as that by Phillips 1995: Chapter 3). Recent studies of this kind focus on the candidate emergence process. Some focus on the lack of high ranking positions held by disadvantaged groups in party power structures (Caul 2001; Chiva 2005: 982; Siemienska 2003: 230; Montgomery and

Ilonszki 2003: 114). Others focused on parliamentarians' attitudes toward gender

equality (Norris and Franklin 1997) and party ideologies (Chiva 2005). Most of

these studies focus exclusively on women's under-representation (but see Norris

and Lovenduski 1993).

In concert with attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory,

attitudes toward praxis could have substantial consequences. Part of the influence

parliamentarians wield in is in supporting policy that could facilitate descriptive

representation, such as reserved seats, quotas, lower electoral thresholds for ethnic

parties, and the like. The bulk of the literature focuses on gender quotas and their

ability to increase women's representation (Caul Kittilson 2006; Krook 2004).

When examining individual legislators, few studies of women's quotas – outside

of Western Europe- assess the relative strength of parliamentarian demographics

to party ideology. In examining parliamentarian attitudes toward voluntary party

quotas for women, I test whether descriptive representatives' support for quotas

stops at the party line.

Theoretical Orientation and Hypotheses

Fundamental to the argument that rationality governs the political market

for descriptive representation is that, in the minds of parliamentarians, arguments

for and against descriptive representation is part of a calculus for vote

maximization. I assume that parties and parliamentarians think and act in a

rational manner such that parties seek to maximize the number of seats in the

parliament and parliamentarians seek to get elected or re-elected (Downs 1957: 24-31; Lawson 1999; Pappi 1996). Indeed, vote maximization is a common explanation of variations in women's representation in parliament, such that parties will only place women on a ticket if they feel it won't lead to a loss or if they figure the seat is lost anyway, and are attempting to seem egalitarian (Matland and Montgomery 2003; Palmer and Simon 2005).

Demographic characteristics of the parliamentarians themselves and political ideology as exemplified by party platforms influence the rational decisions of parliamentarians. Experiences born from the social significance of their demographic characteristics inform the thoughts and, presumably, the actions of disadvantaged group representatives. These thoughts are moderated to an extent by political ideology, such that economic liberals might think differently about the issues than statists.

The degree to which demographic types of legislators deviate from party context illustrate the extent to which parliamentarians are motivated to act, whenever possible, as descriptive representatives. Thus, despite the attitude of the rest of the party, descriptive representatives may support the ideals and policies to achieve descriptive representation. Similarly, some parties may be more likely than others to espouse descriptive representation rhetoric.

Do Descriptive Representatives Think Like Descriptive Representatives Should?

A fundamental premise of the descriptive representation argument is that parliamentarians will act in accordance with their demographic and experiential characteristics (Mansbridge 2000, 2003: 523; Young 1990: 184-188). Of course, not all representatives act according to their demographic characteristics but the empirical tendency is in such a direction (for a discussion on representational diversity within disadvantaged groups, see Dovi 2002: 730-731). Although the exact mechanism that triggers descriptive representation thoughts and actions from some and not others is not known[1], we can hypothesize that those from a disadvantaged background would empathize with the plight of similar candidates seeking to become political elites.

Hypothesis 3.1: Parliamentarians from the ranks of the disadvantaged would be more likely to favor descriptive representation than those from the advantaged.

The Influence of Party Ideology

Any model of attitudes toward descriptive representation theory or praxis must take into account party context. Research on how demographics influence legislation in light of party context provides mixed results. On the one hand, evidence that parliamentarians vote according to their demographic characteristics and not along party lines is inconclusive; on the other, women parliamentarians are more likely to introduce policy different from that of their male colleagues,

regardless of party context (for a discussion, see Introduction). However, no one argues that attitudes toward descriptive representation or quotas are completely divorced from political ideology. It is incumbent upon the researcher to reveal the extent to which party contexts influence these attitudes.

Political ideology can be read in the party platforms. In post-communist politics, particularly that of Poland, platforms align primarily along economic and religious dimensions (Castle and Taras 2002: 113-4). I assume that parliamentarians choose parties that align with their attitudes on economic and religious matters. Thus, party platforms both reflect and reinforce parliamentarian attitudes. Diversity of opinion within parties is expected (for a description of the platforms, see Chapter One).

Statists - and post-communist successor parties, in particular - are more likely to champion descriptive representation than economic liberals. Two main reasons explain this: (a) compatibility with leftist ideology of encouraging social diversity and (b) affinity for strong government intervention in reducing social inequality. Communism produced some of the world's highest levels of descriptive representation for a wide variety of groups (Montgomery 2003:2) (Krupavicius and Matonyte 2003: 84). Insomuch as post-communist successor parties reflect the ideals of communism (but not as it was actually practiced), descriptive representation is compatible with their intellectual foundations. Statism, as aligned with leftist ideology, is typically defined as a "principle of pursuing the interests of those who are socially weak" (Rueschemeyer 1999: 4). Further, statists' emphasis on state, rather than market solution, as the means to

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reduce social inequality is compatible with the ideals of descriptive representation in theory and, especially, in praxis.

Economic liberals are typically conservative and rightist in ideological orientation and are the most likely to reject descriptive representation in theory and praxis. Conservatives and rightists typically focus on individualized, rather than structural explanations for social inequality. Arguments for rejection of affirmative action by conservative rightists in the United States and India support this contention (Parikh 1997). Economic liberals should be most hostile to praxis, as quotas are seen as de-emphasizing individual initiative for solving social problems, even though adoption is voluntary.

Hypothesis 3.2: The more statist the party is in economic platform, the more likely the parliamentarian is to support descriptive representation in theory.

Hypothesis 3.3: The more statist the party is in economic platform, the more likely the parliamentarian is to support descriptive representation in praxis.

Catholicism in post-communist Poland is really two integrated parts; the religion itself and the Church as a coherent set of social change organizations. Communism is also two integrated parts; the socialist ideology itself and the Communists as political actors. Much of the literature focuses on the dynamic relationship between state socialism as carried out by the Communists and the Church (Chrypinski 1990; Mach 2000; Ramet 1990).

Thus, understanding Catholic traditionalism in post-communist Poland as it was influenced by the communist past can be read as four distinct, yet interrelated dyads; socialism versus religion, socialism versus the Church, the Communists versus religion, and the Communists versus the Church. Each one of these dyads influences political leaders' thinking.

In this dissertation, I regard Catholic traditionalism in post-communist Poland as an ideology informed by its central teachings and its almost fifty year dynamic with the Communists. Catholic traditionalism serves to influence political leaders' thinking about both the ideals and policy alternatives of descriptive representation.

Essential to Catholicism is a reliance on tradition, and in this sense all practicing Catholics are traditionalists (McGovern 1990: 28). Communism was largely incompatible with Catholicism for precisely this reason. Catholics regarded communism as a revolution upturning their highly regarded traditions while the communist party did all they could to minimize the influence of local religious organizations and the Vatican (Chrypinski 1990; Mach 2000). Catholicism should not be read as monolithic, however. Catholicism has a complex relationship with post-communist politics, informed by its central teachings and its history with the previous, communist regime (Ramet 1990). Differentiation within its following on views pertaining to the economy, cultural values, and the role of the state in intervening on behalf of the stranger and the poor (Matthew 25: 31-46) exacerbate this complexity. Diversity of Catholic social thought ranges from integralists, or extreme conservative fundamentalists,

to liberation theologists, who take Marxian language in advocating for the proletariat and combine it with the Catholic canon (McGovern 1990: 38-40; Ramet 1990: 9-10).

Taking into account the level of diversity within Catholicism, modern Catholic traditionalist parties tend to be conservatives and, hence, predictable in the degree to which they espouse Catholic social teachings. There are two major reasons why this is so. First, liberation theology was stronger in Latin America than Eastern Europe and never took root in Poland. Note, however that the highly popular, and Polish, Pope John Paul II at times espoused liberation theology, albeit without the Marxian language (McGovern 1990: 41-44). In addition, Poland tends toward the fundamentalist Vatican I teachings as opposed to the attempts at integrating modern life with Catholic teachings emphasized by Vatican II.

Thus, research expectations can be gleaned from the degree to which a party leans toward anti-clericalism. Anti-clericals emphasize liberal values over conservative ones and would be the most likely to champion the modern notion of diversity and equality between social groups as a political good (Kymlicka 1995). Though essential Catholic teachings on concern for human dignity and principles of justice would, *prima facie*, place Catholic traditionalists at the forefront of descriptive representation, Poland's religiously conservative history would make them less likely to support it in either theory or praxis. In particular, the Catholic teaching of "the need for state intervention balanced with a concern to limit state control" (McGovern 1990: 28) combined with a conservative outlook and a

history of resisting communist ideals of manufacturing diversity within the political sphere spells difficulty for descriptive representation to take an intellectual hold.

This is especially evident in the case of voluntary quota adoption for gender. Considering the history of their stance on the gender division of labor, Catholic conservatives would be the least likely to favor gender quotas to increase the percentage of women parliamentarians. Espousing a belief that women are central to domestic spheres is largely incompatible with placing an equal ratio of women to men in parliament.

Note, however, that Christian rightist conservative parties are likely to claim demographic representativeness, especially in terms of gender. These parties court women's vote by appealing to the religious variables in the vote calculus while at the same time claiming to see individuals as discrete entities free to think and act independently of their social group context. Despite this, Catholic traditionalist parties still bank on the influence of group processes. Women, they argue, are more religious than men, and will be more likely – as a group - to vote along religious lines (Krupavicius and Matonyte 2003: 94-95). However, they espouse the worldview that the individual should be seen above and beyond their social context. As one woman in a Christian conservative party in Lithuania said, "It appears that for our party [gender parity] is not a problem. We have enough women working in important positions because of their professional qualities, not because they are women" (Krupavicius and Matonyte 2003: 95).

Hypothesis 3.4: The more anti-clerical the party is in religious platform, the more likely the parliamentarian is to support descriptive representation in theory.

Hypothesis 3.5: The more anti-clerical the party is in religious platform, the more likely the parliamentarian is to support descriptive representation in praxis.

Economic and religious dimensions converge. Thus, I expect statist anti-clericals to be the champions of descriptive representation and economic liberal Catholic traditionalists to be its main opponent.

Hypothesis 3.6: Interaction of increasing statism and increasing anti-clericalism produces more support among parliamentarians for descriptive representation in theory and praxis.

Support for Quotas: Demographics, Party, or Both?

Much of empirical analysis on support for quotas is focused on meso-level action of parties and their willingness to adopt gender quotas. A major question is whether descriptive representatives are acting like descriptive representatives as hypothesized. Leftist ideology is said to be a prime determinant, as is percent of women in party leadership (Caul Kittilson 2006; Krook 2004). However, whether demographics of the parliamentarian or party ideology matters more is not well understood.

Whether demographics of the parliamentarian or their ideology are more important could have profound consequences on how descriptive representation is implemented. If determinants of attitudes toward quotas for women are primarily demographics based, then an increase in women should lead to an increase in the probability that quotas become policy. In this scenario, parties may change, but so long as there are steady increases in women's representation, quotas become more and more likely to be adopted. However, if attitudes toward quotas are primarily party based, then an increase in women parliamentarians would not necessarily increase the probability of quotas becoming policy. Instead, support for quotas would be dependent on which party is in power at the time.

In a political market, then, an increase in descriptive representatives does not necessarily entail a change in descriptive representation policy. Parties in power could favor both an increase in descriptive representatives and market solutions, e.g. not wanting quotas.

In postcommunist Poland, the idea of voluntary gender party quotas began with its adoption in 1994 by UP, a statist, anti-clerical party, who instituted a 30 percent quota for their candidate list (Renc-Roe 2003). In the 1997 election, UP failed to clear the 5 percent threshold and thus the quota did not place women in parliamentary seats.

In 1999, statist, anti-clerical party SLD-UP coalition and economic liberal, anti-clerical party UW both adopted 30 percent gender quotas for candidate lists (Siemienska 2003). Opposition to the quota among SLD's parliamentarians was focused on (a) the ability of the party to fill that many list positions with women

and that (b) the decision was not voted on by the rank and file legislators, but rather forced upon them by the SLD's party leadership (Renc-Roe 2003: 17). UW decided upon the gender quota through "research into its electorate," deciding it a way to boost the female vote. Moreover, the party leadership wanted to place "at least one woman in the top three places on each list" (Renc-Roe 2003): 18). Intra-party opposition to the gender quota among UW was similarly strong, despite that the decision was subject to a party-wide vote. (Renc-Roe 2003: 18). SLD won the 2001 election in a landslide while UW failed to gain a single seat.

Data, Variables and Methods

In this chapter, I matched two data sets: Polish Parliament WebSurvey 2005 and POLCAN (see Chapter 2). The WebSurvey featured a series of questions regarding descriptive representation in theory and praxis, including closed and open-ended questions. As for descriptive representation as an ideal, the main question asks, "How important is it that the composition of the Sejm reflects the composition of society according to proportions of [genders] [social classes] [generations]?" Responses range from very important (scored 4) to very unimportant (scored 1). The open-ended question for this question asks, "What arguments for and against the idea that the Sejm should mirror the composition of the society are voiced in your parliamentary club?"

For quantitative analysis, responses were given a value where the higher the score, the more important the respondent feels descriptive representation is for

that social grouping. Demographics include gender (women = 1), social class, and age (young 21-35, middle 36-59, old 60 and above).

Social class of candidates is constructed from the occupation reported in POLCAN. With the help of a Polish sociologist, I qualitatively analyzed the available occupations, noting a hierarchy of occupations that fall into four main categories; high, middle, low, and farmer. High occupations include highly skilled positions such as professors of economics and managers of corporations. Middle occupations include (a) lesser skilled positions that require moderate levels of education, such as technicians, and (b) those that retired. Low occupations include factory workers and other lower skilled positions (but not craft workers). Farmers are identified as those working in an agricultural and animal husbandry fields (excluding agronomy professors and zoologists).

As for praxis, two questions targeted the idea of voluntary party quotas. First, the question reads, "Some parties and other social groupings have established a specific threshold (bottom limit) for the proportion of women who, on their behalf, should seek Sejm membership. Is this initiative good or bad?" Respondents had a choice of two: "good" (scored 1) or "bad" (scored 0). The open-ended question asks "Why?" immediately after the responses, providing an opportunity for open-ended response.

Party context in 2001 is adapted from Castle and Taras (2002: 114, Figure 4.1). See Chapter 1 for how I constructed the variables.

I use qualitative data culled from answers to the open-ended questions to further explore the intellectual foundations of parliamentarians' stance on

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descriptive representation in theory and praxis. I hypothesize that parliamentarians will provide much the same arguments about descriptive representation as academics (e.g. Mansbridge 1999; Phillips 1995; Pitkin 1972). However, I also hypothesize that answers vary along demographics and party platform dimensions as outlined in the theory section above. I also hypothesize that support for market solutions to enhance descriptive representation will also vary along the lines of the above theory.

Findings

Intellectual Foundations of Descriptive Representation Theory

Table 3.1 shows the distribution of responses for the question of whether the Sejm should reflect the citizenry in terms of gender, social class, and age. While, in general, parliamentarians believe that it is important for parliament to reflect the demographic composition of society, a hierarchy of preferences emerges. Generations garnered the highest level of support (63.8%), followed closely by social class (60.1%) and, in the distance, gender (48.7%). Social class, however, had the highest level of support in terms of strength of attitude, with almost a third (31.3%) responding that it is very important.

How important is that composition of Sejm reflects composition of society according to proportions of …	Very important	Somewhat important	Somewhat unimportant	Very unimportant	Mean[a]	Std Dev	N
		In percentages					
Gender	15.4	33.3	34.6	16.7	2.47	0.95	78
Social Class	31.3	28.8	30.0	10.0	2.81	1.00	80
Generations	25.0	38.8	28.8	7.5	2.81	0.90	80

[a] Scored 4 for "Very important" to 1 "Very unimportant"

Table 3.1 Distribution of Variables

Data supports the theory that party ideology should have a profound influence over attitudes toward descriptive representation (Table 3.2). As predicted, statists are much more likely than economic liberals to support descriptive representation for gender, and only slightly so for generations; however, economic liberals are more supportive in terms of social class. As for religion, anti-clericals are more supportive of descriptive representation for all disadvantaged groups in the study, with the strongest difference for gender. Difference in attitude toward social class is not significant, but it is in the predicted direction.

	Percent who say that Sejm should reflect…			
Platform Type	**Gender**	**Social Class**	**Generations**	N
Economic				
Statist	53.4	42.9	64.4	58
Economic Liberal	35.0	65.5	61.9	20
Difference	18.40†	-22.60*	2.50	
Religion				
Anti-Clerical	62.5	62.5	72	48
Catholic Traditionalist	26.7	54.8	50	30
Difference	35.80**	7.70	22.00*	

** $p<0.001$ * $p<0.05$ †$p<0.10$ (for two-tail test)

Table 3.2 Party Platform and Opinion That It Is Important for Sejm to Reflect Citizenry

Data are more consistent for the effect of demographic characteristic on attitude that the Sejm should reflect the citizenry (Table 3.3). In short, representatives with appropriate demographic characteristics are acting as assumed by theory. Women (88.2%) are far more likely than men (37.7%) to believe it is important for the Sejm to reflect gender. Farmers (100%) are more likely than other social classes (57.3%) to believe it is important for social class, and the young (75%) believe it is important than the middle aged (63.4%) for the Sejm to reflect generations. Difference between old and middle aged is not significant and the difference is not in the predicted direction.

| Categories of Parliamentarians | Those who say that Sejm should reflect … | | | |
	%	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Gender				
Women	88.2	3.18	0.81	17
Men	37.7	2.28	0.90	61
Difference Women and Men	50.5*	0.90*	-0.09	
Social Class				
Farmers	100	3.60	0.55	5
Other Social Classes	57.3	2.76	1.00	75
Difference Farmers and Other Classes	42.7	0.84*	-0.45	
Generations				
Young	75	3.50	1.00	4
Middle	63.4	2.76	0.86	71
Old	60	3.00	1.00	5
Difference Young and Middle	11.6	0.74†	0.14	
Difference Old and Middle	-3.4	0.24	0.14	

* $p < 0.001$ †$p < 0.10$ (for two tail test)

Table 3.3 Opinion That It Is Important that Sejm Reflects Composition of Citizenry

To determine whether descriptive representatives hold these attitudes while controlling for party ideology, I conducted an OLS regression with the dependent variable as degree of support for descriptive representation for particular groups.

Table 3.4 shows that even controlling for party ideology, descriptive representatives still think like descriptive representatives as indicated by theory. Older women are much more likely to support descriptive representation for gender. The effect is stronger with increasing anti-clericalism. That these factors are important are evident in that this limited OLS model predicts 37 percent of the variance. Farmers are more likely than any other grouping to hold the attitude that the Sejm should reflect social classes, but the overall model is not very predictive. Youth is positive and significant at the .10 level, and the effect is stronger with increasing anti-clericalism.

	Gender			Social Class			Generations		
	b	S.E.	B	b	S.E.	B	b	S.E.	B
Demographics									
Woman	0.79***	0.23	0.35	0.07	0.30	0.03	0.28	0.25	0.13
Farmer	0.35	0.41	0.09	0.90†	0.53	0.22	0.67	0.44	0.18
Upper Class	0.02	0.22	0.01	-0.01	0.28	0.00	-0.22	0.23	-0.12
Young	0.38	0.41	0.09	0.21	0.53	0.05	0.77†	0.44	0.19
Old	0.80*	0.39	0.21	0.01	0.49	0.00	-0.08	0.41	-0.02
Party Platform									
Economy	0.08	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.13	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.07
Religion	0.31***	0.08	0.38	0.11	0.10	0.12	0.25**	0.09	0.31
Constant	1.32***	0.34		2.31***	0.43		2.12***	0.35	
R^2	0.37			0.07			0.20		
N	77			78			79		

*** p<0.001 ** p<0.01 * p<0.05 †p<0.10 (for two tail test)

Table 3.4 OLS Regression: Should Sejm Reflect Composition of Society on Parliamentarian Demographics and Party Platform

The open-ended question on party debate, answered by every woman and 56 percent of men, reveal disagreement on the form and magnitude of the debate on descriptive representation. Within the same party, responses ranged from, "There was no such discussion," to, "There's no argument. My party is for it," to, "There are no opposing arguments," while others within the same party clearly articulated "for" and "against" positions.

There is also diversity within parties on "for" and "against" statements. When a parliamentarian mentioned only one side of the debate, I interpreted that as that parliamentarian's primary position on the matter, but still part of the overall party debate. Some clearly stated that part of their answer is the "for" argument and another part the "against" argument, which I interpreted as being part of party debate. For example, one parliamentarian stated that, "The Parliament does not have to mirror society" and offered no alternative views. Another from the same party stated that, "It is obvious to my party that the representatives that make up Parliament should be a direct reflection of the make up of society," clearly defining the pro-descriptive representation view and offering no others. Thus, interpretation is a matter of combining all possible arguments within a party to determine what arguments, as opposed to other arguments, structure party debate.

In regards to the intellectual foundations, some parties and parliamentarians have the same arguments as academics. Thus, many of the criticisms expressed in Chapter 1 -- that descriptive representation does not necessarily lead to substantive representation, that it encourages rule by the less

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capable, that it over-emphasizes subgroups and under-emphasizes the need to legislate for all groups, and that it is too difficult to determine which disadvantaged groups should be eligible for descriptive representation -- are expressed by the parties and parliamentarians themselves.

Statements by parliamentarians provide evidence that this is how some parties intellectualize the topic. Some parliamentarians argue that descriptive is not the same as substantive representation. A male parliamentarian from an economic liberal, anti-clerical party said that the "against" argument is that descriptive representation should be about "the need to apply substantive criteria (competence, leadership qualities, etc.)." A parliamentarian from an economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist party said that, "The Parliament ought to represent the voters based on their opinions, not because they belong to a particular social group."

Others argued that descriptive representation encourages the rule of the less capable of the citizenry. A woman parliamentarian from a statist, anti-clerical party summed up the "against" argument as, "We can't allow poorly educated representatives become a majority." A male parliamentarian from the same party echoed this claim, saying, "Certain candidate requirements should be defined such as education and experience within the framework of the national administration," and did not offer a counter-argument. A parliamentarian from a statist, Catholic traditionalist party placed it in context of a return to the communist system;

"If we accept the idea that the make up of Parliament is to mirror that of society it would mean that we are returning to the time of socialist realism, where a 32-year old teacher with 3 children from a small town could become a representative. This is nonsense."

This same representative also made what is perhaps the most common complaint; that descriptive representation is antithetical to the job description of national legislators in that it over-emphasizes sub-groups at the expense of all.

"This is a question based on the premise that the Parliament should be either this way or that way. I do not agree with this premise. The Parliament is a legislative body, whose aim is to create laws for all citizens, not for the special interests of any social, ethnic, religious, etc group. The state stands for all equally, whether they are red-headed or blond."

A parliamentarian from the same party echoed this point, saying, "The Parliament has to reflect national interest. In this light, 'reflecting' class, age, professional or any other interests is of no significance." Other parties mentioned the need to represent everyone. One from an economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist party said, "It is only important that the politicians strive for the good of all the people, not just a particular social group." One from a statist, Catholic traditionalist party argued that the demographic structure of society has nothing to do with legislation, saying,

"The Parliament has to represent the interests of the whole society, and not reflect its structure. What is discussed in the Parliament is the programs and solutions, not structures. Those are two different and separate things."

Some parliamentarians argue that it would be too difficult to determine which disadvantaged groups should be eligible for descriptive representation. A

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male parliamentarian from a statist, anti-clerical party said, "There is no way to define what proportions of certain social elements should be reflected [in Parliament]. If we tried to define this, it would undoubtedly lead to attempts of manipulation."

A popular argument is that that the parliament already reflects society (a wildly inaccurate claim based on the evidence in Chapter 6). A male parliamentarian from a statist, anti-clerical party said,

> "The Parliament does reflect the make up of the society. This is an artificial problem that perhaps is of interest for scientific research and nothing more."

A female parliamentarian from the opposite end, an economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist party, echoed this point; "The candidates listed on the ballot reflect the make up of the whole society (in respect to age, education, profession)." I noticed that she did not list gender.

One female parliamentarian from a different economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist party summed up all the arguments against descriptive representation in a fairly succinct manner:

> "In the eyes of the Constitution, all citizens are equal independent of their gender, age, social background, income, etc. This being the case, no one should be given special favor. Secondly, the principles of proportional and equal representation are already written into the Constitution. Furthermore, the current make up of Parliament approximates that of the Polish society."

Proponents of descriptive representation theory espouse arguments that descriptive representation is needed to legitimize democracy and that demographic characteristics matter in legislative behavior.

Parliamentarians' assessments of party debate reflect these arguments. For example, a male parliamentarian from a statist, anti-clerical party wrote in a yelling fashion (all capital letters), "BECAUSE IT IS CHARGED WITH REPRESENTING ALL OF SOCIETY, NOT JUST THE ELITE." One male parliamentarian from a statist, Catholic traditionalist party argued that, "They're inclined to be 'for.' Parliament should be a democratic institution, and the foundation of democracy is the rule by the people, thus by representatives." He added a point raised by critics, however, that determining who gets descriptive representation is a difficulty; "The proportions of how that representation is made up is a separate question. But this is why we have elections." A male from a statist, Catholic traditionalist party echoed the stability theme, saying, "The proportional representation of Parliament can be a source of stability for the political policies that it itself puts into effect." One male statist, Catholic traditionalist connected it to the foundations of democratic legitimacy and human dignity:

> "This is probably an unobtainable utopia, but it is necessary to legitimately settle questions that impact society, so that society can continue to develop and live in dignity."

Another theme of pro-descriptive representation arguments is that demographics of the legislator matters for substantive legislation. One male

parliamentarian from an economic liberal, anti-clerical party argued that descriptive representation leads to "familiarity with the problems connected with a wide variety of issues." A male parliamentarian from a statist, anti-clerical party echoed this point, saying, "Parliament often makes decisions regarding the problems of particular social groups rather than all the citizens of the country. The representatives of these particular interests can better recognize the dangers and problems that result from these decisions."

Others argue that descriptive representation is necessary to help the disadvantaged of society, but linked it to an economic philosophy;

> "Looking out for the interests of the poorest social groups, those that do not have the power to break out of deprivation, and fighting against the liberalization of the economy as well as the deepening of social differences." -- Male, statist, Catholic traditionalist party.

Others also descriptive representation to economic issues, as one female statist, anti-clerical put it, "financially weaker candidates definitely have less of a chance in the fight for the seat."

Many made references to the political market, arguing that elections are a sufficient way to produce descriptive representation. Responses were typically, "The make up of the Parliament and Senate is decided by democracy, even if it is wobbly and not established," "Why discuss this? It's the voters who decide the make up of the Parliament and that is way democracy works," "Election results are conclusive…", "The Parliament is chosen in elections by the citizens, and as such it assembles representatives of various classes and societal strata from all

regions of the nation," and "This is the realization of the election program…"
Not one woman made this argument.

Thus, it appears that party debate over the intellectual foundations for descriptive representation are much the same as the normative debate waged by academics, with two key differences. First, some parliamentarians believe that descriptive representation has already been achieved. Second, many feel that market solutions in the form of the electoral process are the most optimal ways to achieve descriptive representation.

Descriptive Representation Praxis

Table 3.5 illustrates the how parliamentarians feel about voluntary party adoption of gender quotas. A higher percentage of women (41.2%) than men (34.9%) support quotas, but the difference is not significant. As predicted, statists (52.6%) are much more likely than economic liberals (9.1%) to support gender quotas. Predicted differences between anti-clericals (43%) and Catholic traditionalists (17.2%) are similarly large.

	%	N
All	40	80
Gender		
Women	41.2	17
Men	34.9	63
Difference Women and Men	6.3[a]	
Party Platform		
Statist	52.6	57
Economic Liberal	9.1	22
Anti-clerical	54.0	50
Catholic Traditionalist	17.2	29
Combined Party Platform		
Statist, Anti-Clerical[b]	68.4	38
Statist, Catholic Traditional	21.1	19
Economic Liberal, Anti-Clerical	8.3	12
Economic Liberal, Catholic Traditional	10.0	10

[a] p= 0.32

[b] Respondents in this category have a 30% gender quota as of 2005. No other category has a gender quota.

Table 3.5 Opinions that Gender Quotas for Parties are Good

Combining party platforms indicate that it is economic, rather than religious ideologies that are more important factors in determining support. Two aspects are worthy of note. First, all statist, anti-clericals' parties adopted gender quotas, which may influence the results. Second, there is a substantial division within parties that already have gender quotas, as almost a third feel that these quotas are bad. Thus, the direction of possible bias is indeterminate.

Parliamentarians are thus influenced by social context, but have a substantial degree of autonomy in opinion formation.

To determine whether party platform remains significant when controlling for gender, I employed logistic regression. I control for gender (woman = 1) and list position, where the higher the number, the lower the parliamentarian was on their party list in 2001. As in the disadvantaged group hypothesis 3.1, list position should be positively associated with believing that quotas are good.

Factors that influence the attitude toward descriptive representation in theory are likely, but slightly different than those that influence the attitude in praxis, but the two attitudes are highly correlated ($r = .435$, $p<.001$). Thus, the question about whether the Sejm should reflect genders captures much the same attitude about voluntary party quotas for gender and is left out of the equation. It is important to note that the attitude that the Sejm should reflect gender is strongly correlated with economic and religious platform, but the relationship is not linear.

Table 3.6 contains the logistic regression analysis. Model fit is significant, with a relatively high Cox and Snell R-squared (0.34).

	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Woman	1.05	0.73	2.86
Party Platform			
Economic	0.96*	0.47	2.60
Religious	0.94***	0.29	2.56
List Position in 2001	0.06	0.07	1.07
Constant	-5.45***	1.42	0.00
Log Likelihood	73.77		
Chi Square	32.89		
Cox and Snell R2	0.34		
N	79		

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 †p<.10 (for two tail test)
Note: Dependent variables are defined 1 = good, 0 = bad.

Table 3.6 Logistic Regression of Attitude that Quotas are Good on Gender, Party Platform, and List Position

All variables are in their predicted direction and, as hypothesized, party platform drives the model. Gender and list position are not significant when in the same model with party platform (Gender and list position are correlated, but very weakly; r = .207, p = .06). Economic platform is slightly more important to the model than religious platform, though the standard error is larger. The more statist and anti-clerical the party, the greater the chance that the parliamentarian will believe that voluntary party gender quotas are good.

Qualitative evidence suggests that many of the same reasons provided in regards to support for descriptive representation as an ideal are given for support for quotas. For example, some parliamentarians feel that gender should not be a variable in the candidate emergence process. A woman parliamentarian from an economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist party said, "The most important is the

value of a human being, what he/she represents. Preferential treatment leads to gender discrimination, and then what is valued is not of the quality of a person but his/her gender." A male candidate from a statist, anti-clerical party said, "If the candidate is good there should be no limits."

Many believe that the political market should decide who becomes a parliamentarian. A male from a statist, Catholic traditionalist party said, "It is the voters who make the choice, placing limits on ballots is simply a propaganda trick." A female from an economic liberal, anti-clerical party referred to the very definition of descriptive representation, saying, "The percentage of women in parliament should be decided by the voters not by the decree of the political parties." A male from an economic liberal, anti-clerical party argues that the problem will correct itself; "You can't force these things. Women will do just fine without imposing limitations."

Parliamentarians, however, are not above being misinformed. A male from a statist, Catholic traditionalist party said, "[My party] did not set limits, yet it had the highest percentage of women of any party. Fixing limits is just a form of propaganda without any justification," even though by any measure, this parliamentarian's party did not have the highest percentage of women in 2001. For those who support quotas, many parliamentarians offered similar arguments for supporting descriptive representation as an ideal. A male from a statist, anti-clerical party mentioned,

> "It's necessary to change the stereotype in Poland that politics are only for men and to make it easier for women to participate in politics. In time there will be no need for imposed limits."

A female from a different statist, anti-clerical party said, "Because the world is comprised of equal numbers of men and women," a common theme.

Damaging to the survival of quotas is the form and magnitude of discord within parties that already have gender quotas. A male from the same statist, anti-clerical party said in support for quotas, "There aren't too many women in Polish politics, their approach to life is particularly useful during times of political instability and when society completely rejects politics." A male from the same party in opposition to quotas said, "Competence should be the only criteria, not gender." Women in this particular party (who provided a response) were unanimous in support for gender quotas; "Sometimes it is not the best candidates that make it onto the ballot," and "[quotas exist] in order to encourage participation in public life." This last quote stands in contrast to a male colleague, who said, "The decision to participate in politics should be made by women alone, and it has to stem from a real desire and ability to participate in political life!" By contrast, women in an economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist party (who commented) were unanimous in their anti-quota attitudes; "The right to political participation in a democratic nation should not be limited because of gender" and, "A person's qualifications, not gender, should determine who gets into the Parliament."

Summary and Discussion

In this chapter, I used qualitative and quantitative data to examine how parliamentarians think about descriptive representation both as an ideal and for a particular policy stance, i.e. voluntary party quota, and what influences these attitudes.

I find that separate processes are in effect. As an ideal, demographics are prime contributors to the thought process, such that disadvantaged groups such as women, farmers and youth are more likely to support it than more advantaged groups. Party has a strong influence, but it does not eliminate that of parliamentarian demographics. Much of the arguments for and against descriptive representation as an ideal are similar to that given by academics, with two key qualifications. First, descriptive representation is seen as a "natural" process of the political market. Second, many parliamentarians believe that the political market is so effective that the Sejm already reflects the demographic composition of the citizenry.

Determinants of support for descriptive representation policy - quotas, in this case- are much more party platform based. There was no significant difference between men and women on support for voluntary party quotas for women. Moreover, qualitative evidence reveals significant discord within parties, where colleagues whose party already has a quota disagree as to whether those quotas should be there in the first place.

Much of our understanding of how parliamentarians process descriptive representation comes from the literature on women's (under) representation. Through analyzing parliamentarian attitudes, we can ascertain whether arguments about women's representation are part of a more general argument about the rationality of descriptive representation in the minds of parliamentarians. It also allows us to ascertain whether popularity of a particular disadvantaged subgroup is the most valid indicator of whether that subgroup is deemed worthy of descriptive representation policy by the party gatekeepers.

For example, it appears that descriptive representation for social classes is more highly valued than that for gender (Table 3.1). From this, however, we cannot assume that party gatekeepers will extend policy to lower social classes. Instead, they extend it to women via voluntary party quotas. One explanation for this is that women are better organized than the lower class. In 2001, a parliamentary women's caucus promoted the virtues of voting along demographic lines, specifically for women, and with noticeable effects (see Chapter 6) (Siemienska 2003: 232).

It appears that there are factors separate from the intellectual foundations as espoused by the policy makers themselves that lead to descriptive representation policy. Htun's (2004) general argument in this regard is that modes of descriptive representation vary by minority type and how the minority groups align with pre-existing partisan cleavages. Gender, as cross-cutting partisan lines, tend to get quotas while ethnicities, as coinciding with partisan cleavages, tend to get reservations. While women's social movements have

enabled gender quotas as an attempt to legitimize existing democratic structures, "ethnic demands for reservations have followed a quite different political logic" (Htun 2004: 445). Htun (2004) argues that ethnic reservations are a "founding compromise," rooted in consociational democratic action necessary for the very survival of the state. As such, the process that leads to ethnic descriptive representation policy is different from that of gender policy, as ethnic policy is a result of a "founding compromise" while gender arises from social movement pressure.

It remains to be seen whether social class or age descriptive representation has its own, unique path, or whether it is similar to that of women. Currently, social class and age do not get policy anywhere near the same as that for women (for age, see Slomczynski & Janicka 2004). However, descriptive representation along generational lines is most popular of the three disadvantaged categories, suggesting that there is an underlying demand for such representation. This underlying demand may enable age groups the popular support necessary to find support for the few age related organizations in Poland.

Generations' popularity may be tied to its universal and ascriptive qualities. Assuming an average life cycle, most people pass through youth, middle, and old age, accumulating life experiences along the way. Like gender, there is little one can do to escape the disadvantages of their age category. This universal experience lends each Pole a sufficient degree of empathetic understanding of the problems associated with age and age stratification. This

empathy is a necessary condition for fostering a desire for descriptive representation.

The same can not be said for social class. Given the rigidities of the stratification system, not everyone passes through the social classes over the life course. Thus, their support must come from those who acknowledge the differential experiences of social class categories. Perhaps this is why economic liberals are more likely to favor descriptive representation for social class; unlike the statists who arose from the socialist doctrine of class leveling, the economic liberals are the ideological opposite, recognizing class as a dimension of stratification inherent in all politico-economic systems. Thus, they are ideologically equipped to recognize the existence of class and class differences and are therefore more likely to support descriptive representation for them.

Findings from this chapter undermine the very assumptions many parliamentarians make that market solutions are the best way to facilitate descriptive representation for disadvantaged groups. By claiming that "elections are decisive," they fail to acknowledge their influence in controlling the course of elections and the supply of candidates (Caul Kittilson 2006).

Vagaries in market solutions are seen not only in the hierarchy of support for different disadvantaged groups, with social class at the top and women at the bottom, but the mixed attitudes toward quotas, even within parties that have quotas. Because quota support is based on party platform rather than demographics of the parliamentarian, the process of voting will not change the

way descriptive representatives emerge. It is possible that over time, the demographic composition of the legislature will change. However, if parliamentarians' attitudes are guided by party rather than gyroscopically, e.g. by their own experiences as a member of a disadvantaged group (Mansbridge 2003: 520-522), then policy changes are primarily dependent on which party is in power, rather than even incremental increases in the percentage of descriptive representatives. In the 2005 elections, economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist parties became the majority. If my findings are right, and at least 50 percent of candidates are re-elected (as was the case between 1997 and 2001 elections), then we can expect market solutions to be the favored son of Polish parliamentary democracy until 2009.

Notes

1. Some representatives are said to be "gyroscopic representatives," meaning that they need no external motivations, relying instead on their "inner" direction, to act in a predictable manner consistent with their demographic characteristics and experiences (Mansbridge 2003: 520-522).

CHAPTER 4

HOW THE POLITICAL MARKET WORKS, PART II: VOTER ATTITUDES
TOWARD DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION

In this chapter I ask, *what influences voters' attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory and praxis?* Using a unique data set, I provide an empirical demonstration of group differences of attitudes toward descriptive representation and how these attitudes are connected to vote preferences. Specifically, I address (a) the extent to which voters from disadvantaged groups demand descriptive representation, (b) the determinants of such demand, and (c) the determinants of how demand in theory is connected to demand in praxis[1]. While most studies of descriptive representation focus on attitudes toward policy such as quotas and affirmative action, to my knowledge, no one explicitly addresses attitudes toward descriptive representation as a concept in and of itself, e.g. as an ideal. Addressing the ideal allows researchers to find connections between attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory and praxis in the minds of the voter. In a political market, expression of sentiment for or against descriptive representation in theory can be understood as a measure of demand. This is not demand as in the classical supply/demand dynamic because those who control supply, e.g. political leaders, are generally not privy to the intellectual

foundation for outcome expressions such as voting. Rather, this demand is the hidden intellectual foundation itself, real but concealed, with influence over behavioral outcomes.

Praxis for the voter means that they will put their thoughts into political action. Thus, in this chapter I define praxis as any voter action that could substantially improve disadvantaged groups' descriptive representation. In keeping with the concept of a political market, I operationalize praxis as preferring to vote for parties that have candidates demographically similar to the voter.

Theory and Hypotheses

Disadvantaged Groups' Social Identity and Support for Descriptive Representation

In the political market, voters choose representatives that they believe will best represent their interests. Theorizing that descriptive representation is an outcome of political market processes, some argue that "people vote as members of communities of interest, and wish to be represented on this basis" (Kymlicka 1995: 136). If Kymicka (1995) is correct in claiming that voters tend to prefer descriptive representation both in theory and in praxis, then in a population of voters there should be greater support for descriptive representation than against. If rational voting theorists are correct, then stratified groups should have different voting strategies. In the context of descriptive representation, and assuming that

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the majority of voters in a democracy realize that the demographic composition of the legislative body over-represents advantaged groups, then the disadvantaged would be more likely to vote so as to rectify representational inequalities. Thus, disadvantaged groups would be both more likely to support the ideals of descriptive representation and to vote for descriptive representatives. Advantaged groups would be less likely to see the need for this type of strategy as previous experience with political market processes shows that electoral outcomes produce legislatures that reflect the demographics of the advantaged. In fact, advantaged groups should be more inclined than others to hold strong attitudes against descriptive representation as they most directly benefit from the status quo.

Prior research suggests that disadvantaged groups are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward both descriptive representation as an ideal and increasing their representation through voting. Disadvantaged groups are slightly more likely to express positive interest in candidates of their demographic, though the level of support varies by a host of factors (McDermott 2005; Sanbonmatsu 2004) (for a full review, see "demographic cues" in Chapter 5). In regards to gender, for example, Polish women in the 1997 election were more likely than men to vote for (a) only women or (b) a mixture of men and women. Men were more likely to vote only for men (Siemienska 2003: 230).

Disadvantaged groups also tend to hold more positive values toward descriptive representation policy. In Canada, women tend hold more favorable attitudes toward quotas for women (Gidengil 1996). In the United States, blacks are more likely than whites to support affirmative action as an ideal (Harper and

Reskin 2005: 370). However, such "descriptive representation attachment" is conditional based on consciousness of being a part of a disadvantaged group, such that the higher the consciousness, the more likely the attachment (Rosenthal 1995: 608).

 H4.1: The disadvantaged are more likely than the advantaged to believe that descriptive representation in the national legislature of their group is important.

H4.2: The disadvantaged are more likely than the advantaged to prefer parties that have demographically similar candidates.

H4.3: The advantaged are more likely to hold strong attitudes against descriptive representation than the disadvantaged across gender, social class, and generation social facets of identity.

As individuals possess multiple facets to their social identity, such as gender, social class, and age, I argue that a respondent's most salient social facet is likely to be the prime determinant of attitudinal direction and strength (for a discussion on intersecting facets comprising social identity, see (Howard 2000). Salient identity facets have been found to guide the strength of attitudes (Ajzen 2001: 37). I connect this to literature on situational ethnicity, in which it is assumed that the form and magnitude of cognitive and behavioral manifestations of ethnic identity depend on social context (Sanders 2002). On this basis I argue

that when individuals are confronted with a social situation that speaks more toward one facet than another, then the spoken-to facet will become the most salient. For example, in a class-room discussion of gender, most will think in accordance with their gender roles, as opposed to say, their race or age.

Methodologically speaking, situational facets should be present when confronted with survey questions specifically oriented toward a particular facet. Thus, those who hold a strong attitude towards descriptive representation will do so based on the question they are asked at that time. For example, a woman would answer a question about gender as a woman, not necessarily from their class or age. Thus, women will most likely be primarily concerned about women in parliament, farmer and lower class for social class representatives, and the young and old for young and old representatives, depending on the survey question.

However, *these facets necessarily interact*, influencing the overall attitude. Thus, it is necessary to control for all other facets of their identity in determining whether a member of a particular disadvantaged group forms their attitude based on their membership in that particular group.

Religious Affiliation and Attitudes toward Descriptive Representation in Theory and Praxis

Religious affiliation should also influence voter attitudes toward descriptive representation. In Chapter 3, I argued that parliamentarians are influenced by their religious beliefs. Empirical results suggested that adherence

to Catholic traditionalism decreases the probability of holding a favorable attitude toward descriptive representation. I expect this to hold for voters, as well. For gender in particular, however, the influence of Catholicism is most likely moderated by attitudes toward traditional gender roles; those who reject traditional gender roles are more likely to support descriptive representation.

H4.4: Positive attitudes toward descriptive representation should be negatively related with being a Catholic.

Support for Descriptive Representation and Attitudes toward Democracy, Political Ideology, and the Socialist Past

Attitudes toward descriptive representation are most likely connected to attitudes toward democracy, political ideology, and, in the case of post-communist countries, towards the previous socialist system. Implicit in modern democracy is the notion of representation (Manin et al. 1999). To have an attitude, one way or another, about descriptive representation is to hold an attitude toward democracy and what defines representativeness. Therefore, implicit in attitudes toward descriptive representation, strong attitudes in particular, is a concern for *who represents whom* and the best method of doing so. Democracy should be the favored state of government; otherwise, the whole notion of descriptive representation - as a necessarily democratic phenomenon - is a moot point.

H4.5: Voting for a descriptively similar party is positively related to the attitude that democracy is the best form of government.

In Poland, as in other countries, ideological stance influences political attitudes and voting behavior (Slomczynski and Shabad 2002; Tworzecki 2003). Ideological orientation should influence attitudes toward descriptive representation; in general, because leftism is associated with liberalism and liberal attitudes with multiculturalism, leftist orientation should be positively related to support for descriptive representation (Kymlicka 1995). Political leftists are typically more supportive of descriptive representation policies such as quotas and affirmative action (see Chapter 3). Leftist parties in Poland typically promote descriptive representation than more rightist parties, especially for women (Siemienska 2003).

H4.6: As political leftism increases, support for descriptive representation increases.

In Poland, attitudes toward descriptive representation should be connected with attitudes toward the former socialist system. Under communism, the disadvantaged -- gender, age, and occupational groups in particular -- had greater descriptive representation in parliament than now (see Introduction). This situation is not to be confused with having real power, as the Communist party was the *de facto* ruler, and membership in the ruling circles of the Communist

party was relatively homogenous in terms of gender, class, and age (Fischer 1985, 1998). Thus, Polish citizens, especially middle aged and up, have personal experience with how descriptive representation was forced into the parliament.

Most likely, prior experience informs current attitudes. This is evident in the quotes of parliamentarians in Chapter 3, some of which referred to descriptive representation and quotas as an undesirable vestige of the socialist era. Therefore, those who reject the socialist system most likely also reject descriptive representation. Because of the forced nature of descriptive representation policy in the socialist era, rejection of it is based more for the ideal than in attitudes toward voting for demographically similar candidates.

H4.7: Positive attitudes toward descriptive representation should be negatively related towards rejection of the old socialist system.

Data, Variables, and Methods

For the analyses, I use NORPOL 2005 data (see Chapter 2). Because I am interested in how the political market works, for all analyses below, I restrict my sample to voters, defined as those who report as having voted in the 2001 election.

For descriptive representation as an ideal, the main question is exactly the same as in Chapter 3; "How important is it that the composition of the Sejm reflects the composition of society according to proportions of [genders] [social

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classes] [generations]?" Responses range from very important (scored 4) to very

unimportant (scored 1) such that the higher the score, the more important the

respondent feels descriptive representation is for that social grouping.

For descriptive representation as a voting intention, the main question is, "How

important is it that the party you want to vote for has candidates to the Sejm who

are from the same [gender] [social class] [generation] as you?" Responses range

from very important (scored 4) to very unimportant (scored 1) such that the higher

the score, the more important the respondent feels descriptive representation is for

that social grouping.

A distribution of demographics and attitudes can be found in Appendix B.

Demographics of gender (women = 1) and age (young 21-35, middle 36-59, old

60 and above) are measured exactly the same as in Chapter 3.

Social class of respondents is constructed from occupational, or SKZ,

scores. For the sake of consistency, social class is measured the same as in

Chapters 3 and 5. I classified respondents into four main categories; high,

middle, low, and farmer.

Catholicism is measured as 1 = Catholic, 0 = other. Religiosity is an 11 point

scale where the higher the number, the more frequently the respondent attends

religious services.

Focusing on Strong Attitudes

As I am concerned in this chapter with how attitudes influence vote

behavior, focusing on strong attitudes is well suited to this study. Strong attitudes

are more indicative of later behavior, such that when someone holds a strong attitude and is given a relevant opportunity to act, they are more likely to engage in behavior consistent with that attitude (Ajzen 2001; Holland et al. 2002). Those with strong attitudes are more theoretically relevant to understanding how the political market works, as they are the most likely to vote based on their attitude toward descriptive representation, thereby disproportionately affecting demand in comparison to those with weaker attitudes.

As such, I focus on the extreme ends of attitudinal distributions. Interpretation is as follows; if a respondent indicates that descriptive representation is very important, I interpret it as a strong indicator of desire for descriptive representation. Responses of "very unimportant," too, are a strong indicator, but of animosity towards descriptive representation.

To test whether the connection between attitude toward the concept of descriptive representation is conditional upon being in a given disadvantaged group, I calculated the following interaction term: Respondent's demographic characteristic * respondent feels strongly that the Parliament should reflect the composition of the citizenry.

In the case of gender, for example, the interaction term tests whether women who believe that the Parliament should reflect societal composition in terms of gender are more likely to feel strongly about voting for parties that have women candidates. A positive and significant coefficient would signal that, net of all other factors, being a woman and feeling strongly about descriptive

representation as an ideal is a necessary condition to be more likely to feel a strong preference for voting for the party that has women candidates.

I measure attitudes toward democracy, political ideology, and socialism in the following way:

(a)   Democracy: "Is democracy always the best form of government?" Coded as democracy is always best $= 1$, non-democratic governments are sometimes better or it doesn't matter $= 0$. [2]

(b)   Political Ideology is a self-indicated score between 1 and 5 where $1 =$ extreme rightist and $5 =$ extreme leftist.

(c)   Socialism: "Would you like the socialist system to come back?" Coded as rather not or definitely not $= 1$, rather yes or definitely yes $= 0$. [3] Attitude toward traditional gender role is measured as $1 =$ strong disagreement with the following statement: "Traditional division of masculine and feminine roles in the family and public life is natural and should be respected."

Findings

Evidence for Social Desirability Effect

I begin the analyses by examining the level of importance voters place on descriptive representation as an ideal. In regards to whether the Sejm should reflect social groupings, almost 70 percent believe that the composition of the Sejm should reflect gender, 81.1 percent believe it should reflect social class categories, and 80.1 percent believe it should reflect generations (Table 4.1). The

notion of descriptive representation is extremely desirable for at least one social group, as 88 percent of all voters responded that it is somewhat or very important for gender, and/or social class, and/or generational groups to have their proportions reflected in the Sejm.

Voting for descriptively similar parties is also extremely desirable. While less than half responded that it is important for parties to have candidates of the same gender as they (44.8 percent), 76 percent believes it is important for social class and 69 percent feel that way for age generations. Close to 86 percent responded that it is somewhat or very important that the party for whom they want to vote has candidates for at least one of their demographic facets.

From the data, I suspect that the large support for descriptive representation is due to a social desirability effect, such that respondents are saying what they feel the interviewer wants to hear (Presser and Stinson 1998). It is plausible that most respondents do not want to seem insensitive to the plight of disadvantaged groups and would feign interest in representative diversity. This finding supports my decision to focus on strong attitudes only, as social desirability responses may not reflect the true state of support for descriptive representation. Note, however, while there is evidence for social desirability, a substantial proportion of voters disregard social desirability to the extent that descriptive representation is unimportant for one or more social groups.

	Very important	**Somewhat important**	**Somewhat unimportant**	**Very unimportant**			
		In percentages			Mean[a]	Std Dev	N
How important is that composition of Sejm reflects composition of society according to proportions of …							
Gender	23.7	45.5	16.8	14.0	2.79	0.96	2676
Social Class	27.7	53.4	11.3	7.6	3.01	0.83	2661
Generations	28.7	51.4	12.9	7.0	3.02	0.84	2695
How important is it that party you want to vote for has candidates to Sejm who are from the same _____ as you?							
Gender	13.7	31.1	28.8	26.3	2.32	1.00	1478
Social Class	24.9	50.8	15.9	8.4	2.92	0.86	1492
Generation	26.5	42.1	19.2	12.2	2.83	0.96	1501

[a] Scored 4 for "Very important" to 1 for "Very unimportant."

Table 4.1 Distribution of Attitudinal Variables of Descriptive Representation in Theory and Praxis

Disadvantaged Groups and Support for Descriptive Representation in Theory

Strong support for the concept of descriptive representation by disadvantaged groups is mixed, though they are more likely to desire descriptively similar parties[4]. As predicted, women are more likely than men to feel strongly about the descriptive representation of gender in the Sejm (Table 4.2) and to prefer parties that have women candidates (Table 4.3). That close to 10 percent of men feel it is very important that parties field male candidates is actually fairly high, especially considering that men dominate Polish politics at all levels. Presumably, these men would not like an all-female party.

Lower class and farmer respondents are not more likely than other classes to feel strongly about descriptive representation as an ideal, though farmers are more likely to support parties that have farmers as candidates. However, middle and upper class respondents are significantly more likely to support the concept of descriptive representation than farmers.

Of the age groupings, middle aged voters are the greatest supporters of descriptive representation in theory and praxis. Middle age respondents are more likely to support the concept of descriptive representation than the young and are also more likely to vote for parties that have middle aged candidates than the old.

According to…	Very important (%)	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Gender				
Women	27.8	2.93	0.91	1338
Men	19.7	2.65	0.99	1338
Difference: Women and Men	8.1***	0.28***	-0.08	
Social Class				
Lower Class	26.7	3.00	0.85	985
Farmers	24.5	3.02	0.83	265
Other Social Classes	29	3.01	0.85	1410
Difference: Lower and Other Classes	-2.3	-0.01	0.00	
Difference: Farmers and Other Classes	-4.5†	0.01	-0.02	
Generations				
Young	25.9	2.95	0.85	919
Middle	29	3.03	0.83	965
Old	31.6	3.09	0.82	811
Difference: Young and Middle	-3.1†	-0.08*	0.02	
Difference: Old and Middle	2.6	0.06†	-0.01	

*** p<.01 ** p<.01 * p<.05 †p<.10

Table 4.2 Opinions that Sejm Should Reflect Composition of Citizenry by Disadvantaged Group

According to…	Very important (%)	Mean	Std. Dev.	N
Gender				
Women	18.9	2.54	1.00	641
Men	9.8	2.15	0.98	837
Difference: Women and Men	9.1***	0.39***	0.02	
Social Class				
Lower Class	23.6	2.93	0.87	547
Farmers	34.8	2.90	0.86	135
Other Social Classes	24.1	2.90	0.87	810
Difference: Lower and Other Classes	-0.5	0.03	0.00	
Difference: Farmers and Other Classes	10.7**	0	-0.01	
Generations				
Young	32.3	2.99	0.92	498
Middle	29.1	2.96	0.89	557
Old	16.6	2.49	1.00	445
Difference: Young and Middle	3.2	0.03	0.03	
Difference: Old and Middle	-12.5***	-0.47***	0.11	

*** $p<.01$ ** $p<.01$ * $p<.05$ †$p<.10$

Table 4.3 Opinions that Preferred Party Should Have Demographic Types of Candidates by Disadvantaged Group

	Gender			Social Class			Generations		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Demographics									
Woman	0.45***	0.11	1.56	-0.05	0.11	0.95	0.00	0.10	1.00
Farmer	-0.25	0.21	0.78	-0.09	0.20	0.92	-0.14	0.19	0.87
Lower Class	-0.11	0.13	0.89	-0.09	0.12	0.91	-0.04	0.12	0.96
Upper Class	-0.07	0.17	0.93	0.16	0.16	1.17	0.09	0.16	1.09
Young	-0.15	0.13	0.86	-0.11	0.12	0.90	-0.14	0.12	0.87
Old	0.13	0.13	1.14	-0.05	0.12	0.96	0.27**	0.12	1.31
Catholic	0.03	0.23	1.04	-0.04	0.22	0.96	-0.44**	0.21	0.64
Religiosity	-0.01	0.03	0.99	0.04	0.02	1.04	0.05**	0.02	1.05
Attitudes									
Democracy is Best	0.07	0.11	1.08	0.28**	0.11	1.32	0.15	0.10	1.16
Leftist Political Ideology	0.07	0.06	1.07	0.11*	0.06	1.12	0.10†	0.06	1.10
Don't Want Socialism Back	-0.17	0.13	0.84	-0.23†	0.12	0.80	-0.23*	0.12	0.79
No Traditional Gender Roles	0.56***	0.18	1.75						
Constant	-1.40***	0.38	0.25	-1.41***	0.36	0.25	-1.08***	0.35	0.34
Log Likelihood	2181.636			2394.188			2461.893		
Chi Square	41.319***			16.410			26.092**		
Cox and Snell R^2	.02			.01			.01		
N	2037			2030			2050		

*** $p<.01$ ** $p<.01$ * $p<.05$ †$p<.10$

Table 4.4 Logistic Regression of Strong Attitude Toward Descriptive Representation in Theory on Demographics and Selected Attitudes

Do these findings hold when controlling for other facets of social identity and attitudes toward democracy, leftism, and the socialist past? To test this, I used multivariate logistic regression to determine whether the intersection of demographics and selected attitudes influences a strong attitude that the Sejm should reflect societal composition (Table 4.4).

In general, all models conform to the results presented in Table 4.2, with some notable exceptions. For the first model, gender, model fit is satisfactory. Women, net of all relevant factors, are more likely to hold a strong opinion for descriptive representation as an ideal than any other demographic category. Contrary to prediction, being a Catholic is positive, but is not significant. Attitudes toward democracy, political ideology, or socialism are not significant, though they are in the predicted direction. Holding a strong attitude against traditional gender roles adds substantially to the probability of holding a strong attitude for descriptive representation for gender.

For the second model, social class, model fit is not significant. Only the attitudes toward democracy, political ideology, and socialism are significant predictors; all are in the expected direction. Catholicism is negatively related, but not significant. That the class demographics are not significant conforms to the results presented in Table 4.2.

For the third model, generations, model fit is satisfactory. Youth is not significant and it is in the opposite direction as indicated by theory, and is consistent with the findings in Table 4.2. Being old is a significant, positive predictor of holding a strong attitude. However, being a Catholic is negative and

significant, drowning out the combined effects of being old, increasing religiosity, and increasing leftism. A negative attitude toward the socialist system accentuates the Catholicism effect[5].

Assessing the Connection between Attitudes and Vote Intentions

To ascertain whether there is a connection between attitudes toward descriptive representation as a concept and whether it is important to vote for parties that have descriptive representatives, I performed two types of analyses. In the first, I graphed responses to the survey questions about descriptive representation as an ideal and voting for descriptively similar parties (Fig. 4.1).

Figure 4.1 reveals that for all attitudes, the relationship between theory and praxis is linear and positive. For example, increasing attitudinal strength towards descriptive representation in theory for gender is strongly related to increasing attitudinal strength towards preferring parties with candidates of the same gender.

To determine whether this relationship exists when controlling for demographics and relevant attitudes, I employ multivariate logistic regression where 1 = very important that respondent's preferred party has candidates of the same demographic (Table 4.5).

Fig. 4.1 Relationship Between Attitudes Toward Descriptive Representation in Theory and Praxis

	Gender			Social Class			Generation		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Demographics									
Woman	0.69**	0.25	1.99	0.05	0.15	1.06	-0.22	0.15	0.80
Farmer	0.08	0.34	1.08	0.47	0.31	1.60	0.42	0.26	1.52
Lower Class	0.33	0.22	1.39	0.12	0.21	1.13	0.13	0.17	1.14
Upper Class	0.09	0.28	1.09	0.30	0.20	1.35	0.18	0.21	1.20
Young	0.14	0.21	1.15	0.10	0.16	1.11	0.46*	0.19	1.58
Old	-0.16	0.22	0.85	-0.21	0.17	0.81	-0.99***	0.27	0.37
Catholic	-0.30	0.37	0.74	-0.76**	0.28	0.47	-0.20	0.28	0.82
Religiosity	0.11**	0.05	1.12	0.11***	0.03	1.11	0.08	0.03	1.08
Attitudes									
Sejm Should Reflect...									
Gender	1.68***	0.26	5.37						
Social Class				1.22***	0.19	3.38			
Generations							1.40***	0.22	4.05
Interactions									
Woman * Sejm Gender	0.16	0.35	1.18						
Farmers * Sejm Farm				1.17*	0.56	3.23			
Lower Class * Sejm Lower Class				0.16	0.30	1.18			
Young * Generations							-0.02	0.32	0.98
Old * Generations							0.11	0.37	1.11

Continued

Table 4.5 Logistic Regression of Vote for Demographically Similar Candidate on Selected Independent Variables

Table 4.5 continued

Democracy is Best	-0.53***	0.19	0.59	-0.04	0.14	0.96	0.22	0.14	1.24
Leftist Political Ideology	0.21*	0.10	1.24	-0.04	0.07	0.96	-0.12†	0.07	0.88
Don't Want Socialism Back	0.28	0.22	1.33	0.21	0.18	1.23	-0.18	0.17	0.84
No Traditional Gender Roles	0.07	0.30	1.08						
Constant	-4.16***	0.69	0.02	-1.92***	0.48	0.15	-1.61***	0.48	0.20
Log Likelihood	880.293			1329.573			1345.859		
Chi Square	148.204***			130.764***			163.262***		
Cox and Snell R^2	.11			.10			.12		
N	1272			1282			1295		

***p<.001 **p<.01 *p<.05 †p<=.10

In general, results indicate that there is a strong positive relationship between attitude toward descriptive representation as a concept and the desire to vote for parties with descriptive representatives. For all models, strong attitude toward descriptive representation as a concept is the most robust predictor of attitude toward voting for descriptively similar parties.

For women, the dependent variable asks whether they prefer parties that have women as candidates. As for men, the dependent variable asks whether they prefer parties that have men as candidates. As such, I analyze the results according to male and female perspectives.

In the first equation, model fit is satisfactory. Results indicate that women who hold a strong positive attitude that the Sejm should reflect genders are more likely to feel it is important to vote for parties with women candidates. Catholicism is negative but not significant. Increasing religiosity increases the probability of holding a strong attitude toward descriptive representation in praxis. Because the interaction term is not significant, being a woman is not a necessary condition for holding this attitude. Gender role attitude is not a significant predictor.

Though the attitude that democracy is the best form of government is negatively related to voting for descriptively similar parties, the effect is weaker than the other significant variables (b = -0.53). For example, women who hold this attitude are less likely to vote for descriptively similar parties, those who also report that the Sejm should reflect genders are still more likely to vote for descriptively similar parties. Increasing leftism reduces the democracy effect by

almost half (b = 0.21). For men, all else being equal, holding an attitude that democracy is not always the best form of government substantially reduces the probability of holding a strong attitude.

For each social class, it asks whether it is important that their preferred party has candidates of their particular social class category, such that farmers are asked whether their party should have farmers, lower class respondents are asked whether their party should have lower class candidates, and so on.

In the second equation, model fit is satisfactory. All social class categories are positive but are not significant. Catholicism is a strong, negative predictor of holding a strong preference for parties having candidates of a similar demographic (b = -0.76). However, increasing religiosity (b = 0.11) attenuates the effect and holding a strong attitude toward descriptive representation for social classes in theory (b = 1.22) washes the Catholic effect out completely. The interaction effect for farmers and descriptive representation in theory is positive and significant; being a farmer who is strong for descriptive representation for farmers is a necessary condition for holding a preference for parties with farmer candidates. None of the other attitudes are significant, though attitudes toward democracy, political ideology, and socialism are in the opposite direction as indicated by theory.

For generations, each person is asked whether it is important that their preferred party has candidates of their particular generation. Like class, it is left up to the respondent to determine to whom the question is referring; presumably, most people have a sufficient idea as to their generation.

In the third equation, generations, model fit is satisfactory. Contrary to descriptive representation in theory, youth are more likely to hold a strong attitude toward descriptive representation in praxis. Being old decreases this probability. Catholicism is negative but not significant. Holding a strong attitude for descriptive representation in theory for generations is a strong and positive predictor for holding this attitude in praxis. Increasing leftism is significant but negative, such that the more leftist, the less likely a voter would hold a strong attitude for descriptive representation for generations in praxis.

Summary and Discussion

In this chapter, I examined the intellectual foundations of the demand for descriptive representation in post-communist Poland. I argued that the determinants of attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory and praxis consist of the interplay between demographics and related attitudes of the respondent.

Through analyzing a unique data set that, to my knowledge, is the first to empirically demonstrate the demand for descriptive representation in theory, e.g. as an ideal, and analyzing the extent to which it is connected to preferences for parties that have descriptive representatives, I have come to the following three conclusions.

First, there is widespread support for descriptive representation in the voting public. The disadvantaged are more likely than the advantaged to support

it in theory and praxis. Specifically, all disadvantaged groups other than the lower class are more likely to support descriptive representation in either theory or praxis. Women, as opposed to men are the most consistent supporters of both. Lower class is conspicuous in its lack of support for descriptive representation in either theory or praxis.

Second, although demographics are contributors to demand, the intersection of Catholicism and attitudes toward democracy, political ideology, and the socialist past at times influence the strength and direction of strong attitudes for descriptive representation. Catholicism tends to reduce the probability of strongly supporting descriptive representation in theory (for generations, most likely a reaction against youth) and praxis (for social class only). Leftism increases the probability of holding a strong attitude toward descriptive representation in theory and praxis (for gender), but decreases the probability of strongly preferring parties with candidates from the same generation. Rejection of socialism matters only for attitudes toward descriptive representation in theory. Additionally, rejection of traditional gender roles increases the probability of holding a strong preference for descriptive representation of gender.

Third, descriptive representation in theory and praxis are strongly connected. Support for descriptive representation as an ideal has a linear and positive relationship to support for preferring parties with descriptive representatives. These attitudes hold even when controlling for demographics and relevant attitudes.

Considering the uniqueness of the data, some unanticipated findings

emerged that require some explanation. Once again, descriptive representation

for generations is popular. As in the case of parliamentarians, I argue that the

universal experience of age, combined with its ascriptive quality, makes it more

likely for Polish citizens to support descriptive representation in terms of

generations (see Chapter 3).

Differences in support between age categories show these life experiences

in action. Middle age Poles are more likely to support descriptive representation

than the young most likely because they have accumulated enough experience

with the political system to recognize the benefits. However, youth organizing

has the possibility to increase support for descriptive representation among the

youth.

Older Poles are less likely to see the need for voting for candidates of their

generation. This may be a backlash against the older demographic that dominated

the Communist political party in Poland, as older candidates may be seen as

former Communist party members and remnants of the worst of the socialist past.

It may also reflect a desire for the infusion of "new blood" into Poland's politico-

economic system.

Perhaps the most discrepant finding is that the disadvantaged social

classes of lower class and farmers are both less likely than to strongly support

descriptive representation in theory, and the lower class is less likely to support it

in praxis. One explanation is the history of disengagement of the disadvantaged

classes from the political system, where their representation has always been

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unequal. However, considering the large popularity of the Solidarity movement and the elevated status of the lower class during the Communist era, Polish lower class has not been as disengaged from politics as in other post-communist countries. Perhaps the gradual diminishing of the lower class from politics over the past 16 years -- led by the dissolution of the Solidarity movement (Ost 2005) -- was sufficient enough to substantially disengage the lower class from the political scene.

Notes

1. I am not able to test the impact of attitudes on actual voting conditions as explored in Chapter 5 since the NORPOL 2005 data used in this chapter are not compatible with existing POLCAN data, which stops at the 2001 elections. Further NORPOL 2005 does not provide voting districts (it only has the 16 administrative districts adopted in 1999) However, I argue that if there is a clear connection between attitudes toward descriptive representation and voting preferences in 2005, then it is likely that the voting public held similar attitudes in previous election years.

2. NORPOL 2005 does not have a full battery of questions on democracy such as that presented in (Slomczynski & Shabad 2002). However, this question is fairly direct and the possible responses allow for a sufficient range of responses.

3. The relationship between being pro-democracy and anti-socialist past is positive, but barely moderate (r = .282, p<.001).

4. In separate analyses (not shown), antipathy towards descriptive representation by advantaged groups roughly reflects the pattern of support for descriptive by disadvantaged groups. Men (17.6) are more likely than women (10.5) to feel very strongly against the concept of descriptive representation in theory, but middle to upper classes and the middle aged are not more likely to feel strongly against the concept than the groups to which they are counter-posed. Not surprisingly, men (32 percent) are more likely than women (18.9 percent) to regard voting for parties that have men in them as very unimportant, as men tend to dominate politics anyway. As predicted, lower and farmer classes are less likely than the middle and upper classes to regard voting for descriptively similar parties as very unimportant. Elderly respondents are more likely to regard as very unimportant voting for parties with their age demographic than middle aged voters.

5. In a separate analysis (not shown), including the variable "Are youth needed as leaders for Poland?" scaled such that the higher the number, the greater the level of positive agreement into the same multivariate model, the coefficients of Catholicism and religiosity attenuate. This suggests that the negative effects of the religious variables are against youth in particular than against generations in general.

CHAPTER 5

HOW THE POLITICAL MARKET WORKS, PART III: DEMOGRAPHIC
CUES AND VOTER PREFERENCES FOR DEMOGRAPHICALLY SIMILAR
REPRESENTATIVES

In Chapter 4, I demonstrated that voters from some disadvantaged groups
are more likely than advantaged groups to support descriptive representation as an
ideal and that these attitudes are substantially related to voting preferences.
Moreover, some disadvantaged groups are more likely than advantaged groups to
prefer parties that have candidates who are demographically similar to them.

Under what conditions do voters actually translate preferences for
descriptive representatives into votes? In this chapter, I examine actual elections
to evaluate the conditions under which micro-level voter behavior can produce a
descriptively similar legislature. I use demographic cues theory to posit a
mechanism through which voters from disadvantaged social groups can navigate a
laissez-faire political market in pursuing increases in representation of their
groups. To do this, I merge two data sets, POLPAN and POLCAN (see Chapter
2), and empirically demonstrate how voters react to demographically similar
parties over three elections in 1993, 1997, and 2001.

Theory and Hypotheses

Over the past decade, researchers examining demographic cues built a strong record empirically demonstrating that voters have measurable reactions to demographic characteristics of candidates (Cutler 2002; Koch 2000; Rosenthal 1995; Sigelman et al. 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2002). Before discussing the link between demographic cues voting and parliamentary composition, I first define demographic cues and their empirical indicators, and then discuss what it means to vote using demographic cues in a post-communist, parliamentary democracy.

Demographic Cues

Demographic cues theory is a social psychological explanation for voting behavior as a function of demographic distance between voter and candidate. In this theory, voters' choice is, in part, a response to the demographics of the candidate, e.g. candidate's gender, social class, and age (Popkin 1994). Voters use demographic cues to infer likely policy stance and issue competence, and/or manifest some unspecified in-group attraction. For example, women are perceived as being more competent in health and education issues and men in economic and foreign policy issues (Koch 2000). Some refer to this as identity politics, though this term has taken on a much larger connotation than just voting peculiarities (Plutzer and Zipp 1996).

Although it is not clear whether stereotypes, unspecified in-group attraction, or some combination of the two are at work, demographic cues theory

assumes that there is at least some interaction between candidate and voter demographic characteristics. Specifically, for a given voter there are three possible responses to the candidate's demographics: (1) increasing the likelihood to vote for that candidate, (2) decreasing the likelihood to vote for that candidate, (3) no significant effect. Demographic cues theory models the interaction between voter and candidate as a function of demographic distance between the two.

Recent studies posit that gender and/or ethnic stereotypes condition voting choices (Sanbonmatsu 2002; Rosenthal 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2003; Koch 2000). Some empirical evidence suggests that citizens use demographic cues of candidates such as gender (Cutler 2002; Koch 2000; Rosenthal 1995; Sanbonmatsu 2002) and race (Sigelman et al. 1995) as guidelines for voting behavior. The upshot is that although economic evaluations influence citizens' vote (Brooks and Brady 1999; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000), the addition of gender, race, and ethnic background to candidate identity provides citizens with new variables to consider.

Shortcomings in the Demographic Cues Research

Amidst mounting evidence for the causal importance of voters' use of demographic cues, the research can be criticized on a few fronts.

Methodologically, the literature suffers from an over-reliance on experimental methods and lack of attention to real elections. Next, both

experimental and voter data studies generally suffer from under developed models in two ways; first, researchers either posit sub-optimal variables for class position for both voter and candidate, or do not include them at all. Second, most researchers do not include indicators that previous literature on voting behavior suggests are important, most notably economic evaluations (e.g. socio- and ego-tropic voting). Lastly, studies are focused on the United States and, to a far lesser extent, parliamentary democracies, and none in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

Experimental methods dominate much of the research. Though researchers provide some evidence on which to build theory, a focus on a limited range of respondents and candidate data restricts the generalizability of their findings. In experimental studies, the researcher asks respondents to choose between hypothetical candidates of different gender and/or race, setting equal such factors such as candidate's ideological stance and political office qualifications[1]. Earlier studies found that voters do not use gender as a demographic cue, though some used sub-optimal statistical procedures that did not allow for the proper controls and/or used convenience samples of college students (Eckstrand and Eckert 1981). Experimental methods can control for many candidate factors but cannot control social context such of that in a real voting situation, nor account for other candidate factors such as campaign expenditures, media coverage, or in depth policy stances.

Few studies using real election data include any candidate characteristics other than gender, incumbency status, and partisanship, though one included

region, language, and religion (Cutler 2002) another included ethnicity (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003), and one used a limited set of occupational cues (McDermott 2005). None, however, has combined gender, age, and social class, three of the most salient social cleavages. By not including class position, the authors ignore the social cleavages literature which strongly suggests that class position affects voting behavior (e.g. Hout et al. 1995; Manza et al. 1995)[2].

Problems with class measurement and lack of attention to economic voting are also problematic. When attempting to measure class, many researchers fail to capture the complexity of class on voting behavior. Using exit poll data from 1992, Plutzer and Zipp (1996) examined 14 U.S. elections where women ran against men. Using dichotomous logistic regression where 1 = "respondent voted for the woman candidate," Plutzer and Zipp find that, controlling for gender, race, vote choice in previous presidential election, and feminism of candidate, family income (their measure of class) is positively associated (Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Income, however, being volatile for many Americans emerging from a four-year recession in 1992, is a poor proxy for the relative stability of social class position[3]. In addition, by not including economic evaluations, scholars following their work have little indication as to whether voter attitudes towards the economy would possibly negate the demographic cues effect[4].

Moreover, few of these studies span multiple election cycles, and consequently are unable to account for differing sociopolitical environments that impact voter choice (Cook and Wilcox 1995; Dolan 2001; Paolino 1995; Plutzer and Zipp 1996). Because the set of states in any given elections cycle is

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nonrandom, using only one year of Senate election data, for example, yields a distorted sample of senate elections (Smith and Fox 2001). It is best to take into consideration multiple years to not only get a fuller sample of elections, but to test if the demographic cues effect is specific to one electoral environment (Dolan 2001). Further, evidence suggests that the demographic cues effect is only for certain types of offices (e.g. demographic cues seem to affect U.S. House elections but not Senate elections (Smith and Fox 2001). Variation in demographics among candidates varies by type of office, which may account for researchers' preference for examining House elections and finding weak or nonexistent effects in Senate elections.

Much of the literature is focused on women, with one on social class and none on extreme age categories. Thus, I look to the literature on women's representation for guidance. Women are said to be attracted to women candidates, but only when partisanship is not a factor (Cook and Wilcox 1995). Some argue that gender is a factor only in primary, not in general elections (Thompson and Steckenrider 1997). Others also find no significant gender affinity in general elections. Specifically, Matland and King (2002: 132) argue: "Voters are not automatically drawn to candidates simply because they are of the same sex; party and political positions are of greater concern when choosing a candidate to vote for" (Matland and King 2002).

Because of conflicting results, however, there is room to suggest that demographic cues matter for gender. Perhaps other facets of social identity are subject to demographic cues effects as well. In particular, social class and age are

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substantial social cleavages that possibly act as demographic cues, a point made by McDermott (1998: 914-15).

Demographic Cues in Post-Communist Democracies

Measuring the influence of demographic cues in new parliamentary democracies requires a different formulation from that found in studies of the United States. First, parliamentary democracies with proportional representation electoral systems, especially those of post-communist Europe, tend to have more than two parties and, hence, many more candidates from which to choose. Second, electoral systems differ in the opportunity of voters to select candidates from the party lists.

In Poland, after choosing a party, voters have the choice to vote for particular candidates or agree to the party list as it stands. In addition, the electoral system allows for the proliferation of parties with narrow agendas, such as PSL for farmers or LPR for Catholic traditionalists and, hence, a lot of party competition for votes. Since voters are confronted with party lists, measuring the influence of demographic cues can best be found in voting for *demographic types of parties*, rather than for demographic types of individual candidates. Thus, the key hypothesis for demographic cues in post-communist Europe is that *voters are more likely to vote for parties that are demographically similar to them.* For example, women are more likely to vote for parties that have large

proportion of women candidates, farmers are more likely to vote for parties that have large proportion of farmer candidates, and so on.

For this to be a possibility, I assume that voters are aware of the demographic make-up of candidates and their aggregate in parties and that voters are able to distinguish between demographic types of parties within their own district. Empirical evidence for this assumption comes from NORPOL 2005 (See Chapter 2). Respondents were asked, "Compare the party you want to vote for with others regarding the proportion of candidates for the Sejm who are [women] [working class] [peasantry] [young—under 35] [old—55 and older]?" Possible responses were, "Much larger, a little bit larger, about the same, a little bit smaller, much smaller." The majority of voters were able to provide a response; when faced with multiple parties, voters can statistically discriminate to such an extent that they declare their preferred party as having greater or fewer numbers of demographic types of candidates with respect to other parties.

In parliamentary democracies in post-communist Europe, however, many parties have women, farmers, lower class, young or old candidates, some embodied in the same candidate. Which party can be considered most demographically similar?

There is no theory as to how voters parse party lists in terms of demographically similar parties. The situation is analogous to that of statistical discrimination, in that those in the position to choose do so based on criteria that can be condensed into a single statistic. Tendency for employers to discriminate based on gender, race and ethnicity, or age of the applicant is an example of

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statistical discrimination (Bielby and Baron 1986). In that situation, an employer

chooses employees based on information found in resumes. The employer

expresses preferences by first creating a hierarchy of resume types along certain

criteria, such as education, experience, or even demographics.

In the case of elections, voters express preferences by first creating a hierarchy of

party list types along certain criteria. Since I am interested in the extent to which

voters use demographic cues, I assume that in addition to criteria such as political

ideology and accountability attitudes, voters also sort parties by their

demographic composition. For example, women would most likely be drawn to

parties with the most female candidates, *relative to the proportion of women*

candidates in the other parties.

Link between Demographic Cues and Parliamentary Composition

      Researchers examining demographic cues have argued that voting could

have profound influences on the present, and future, demographic composition of

the legislature. Terkildsen (1993), examining race as a demographic cue, writes:

> "Regrettably, if voters continue to base their evaluations on candidate race
> and subtle skin color differences… for determining individual qualities
> and job suitability, the elective future of African American candidates is
> pessimistic" (1051).

Others made similar statements in regards to gender (Dolan 2001; Koch 2000:

426; Sanbonmatsu 2004). However, none explicitly theorize the conditions under

which demographic cues voting influences the present and future state of

descriptive representation in the national legislature. I use findings from the demographic cues literature to posit these conditions.

In a laissez-faire political market, the descriptive representation of disadvantaged groups is partly dependent on demographic cues voting. In essence, if voters vote for candidates who are demographically similar to them, net of all other reasons to vote for a party, then they increase their descriptive representation. Specifically, because advantaged groups already have descriptive representation, it is incumbent upon disadvantaged groups to vote for parties demographically similar to them.

There are several caveats to this assertion that I address in this dissertation. First, political leaders decide on which demographic types of candidates to place on the ballot. Thus, even if voters consistently voted for descriptive representatives, the accumulation is heavily dependent on availability of candidates. Second, accumulation of demographic cues voting is also dependent on party response, such that even if voters demand demographic types of candidates, parties may respond by reducing those types of candidates in the next election. I test these situations in Chapter 6.

Further, as discussed in Chapter 1, demographic cues are just one of many reasons for voting. Below, I posit controls for statistical modeling of vote choice that is appropriate to the post-communist context, taking into account policy preferences and accountability aspects such as political ideology and ego-tropic attitudes toward economic performance.

Note, too, that voting based on demographic similarity does not necessarily lead to substantive representation, though there is evidence that it can (see Introduction). Thus, even if voters voted based on demographic similarity, this is no guarantee that descriptive representation will translate into substantive representation.

In letting the political market decide the fate of descriptive representation, the main assumption is that in any given election, voters have both the opportunity and desire to vote based on demographic cues. This assumption is dependent, however, on three conditions; electoral context, available party types, and consistency in voting preferences.

First, composition of the parliament is dependent on electoral context. In the United States, 1992 was heralded as the "Year of the Woman," and was quickly supplanted by the "Year of the Republican" in the next major election. Differences in how women campaigned for office contributed much to how voters perceived and voted for them (Dolan 2001). In Poland 2001, a bi-partisan parliamentary women's caucus working in concert with some of the most well-established non-governmental women's organizations in Poland publicly promoted the virtues of voting along demographic lines, specifically for women, and with noticeable effects (Renc-Roe 2003; Siemienska 2003: 232; Slomczynski and Janicka 2004: 419). Women's representation jumped from 13 percent in 1997 to 20.2 percent in 2001 (see Chapter 6 for a full review of the statistics). In the same election, SLD-UP and UW both adopted 30 percent gender quotas for the candidate lists. In that election year, SLD-UP returned as the most popular party

coalition (41 percent of the popular vote) and won a clear majority of seats (47

percent). UW received 3.1 percent of the vote and zero seats. In an election

where women were elected in record proportion, it is possible that significant

differences in voting behavior between men and women occur. However,

demographic cues voting in a laissez-faire market assumes that women would be

more attracted to descriptive representation of women and would be more likely

to vote for SLD-UP when that party has the most women in their district.

Second, parliamentary composition through demographic cues is

dependent on available party types, as some parties are more likely than others to

solicit and elicit demographic cues voting. For example, we would suspect that

statist parties attract women and lower class voters – groups that faced some of

the greatest status reductions after the transition and would favor a return of

statism -- and that economic liberal parties attract youth voters. We would also

suspect that Catholic traditionalist parties attract older voters. Whether all parties

equally offer demographic types of candidates is an empirical question, and there

is evidence to suggest that candidate availability is dependent on party platform

(see Chapter 6).

Third, consistency of voting preferences for descriptive representatives

plays a large role in shaping the demographic composition of the parliament.

Voters from disadvantaged groups are expected to consistently favor descriptive

representatives for laissez-faire political markets to produce, over time, a

parliament that resembles the demographic composition of its citizenry. A lack of

consistency would likely spell a lack of sustained advances in their descriptive

representation. As Chapter 3 and 4 suggest, women are more concerned about their descriptive representation than men, but lower class and extreme age categories exhibit a less consistent pattern of descriptive representation attachment.

If demographic cues voting depend on election context and party type, then these factors would have to be constant for the voters to adequately signal preferences for demographic types of parties. The extent to which these factors are volatile are revealed in the analyses.

Data, Variables and Methods

Data

Data come from POLPAN and POLCAN, as discussed in Chapter 2. To match the datasets, I calculated variables such as party characteristics from POLCAN and appended them to the respondents in POLPAN. Matching is based entirely on voivodship, or district[5]. For example, to calculate proportion of women candidates available for every POLPAN respondent in Warsaw in 1993, the proportion has first to be calculated for Warsaw in POLCAN. I then take that statistic and append it to each respondent who lives in Warsaw in 1993. I continue this process for all respondents in POLPAN, each according to their district.

Although two of the election years and two of the POLPAN waves are not symmetrical (1993 matches both datasets, but is not a source of voting questions

for 1993), this does not pose any identifiable problems. In each wave, respondents were asked who they voted for in the prior election. For example, in 1998, POLPAN respondents were asked whom they voted for in 1993 and 1997. Though there is a five year lag for the first question, respondents were able to identify the party whom they voted for in 1993 even if that party did not exist in 1997. For 1998, there is only a one year lag for the question about voting in 1997. In 2003, respondents were asked whom they voted for in 2001, a difference of only two years.

Variables

Dependent Variables

The main dependent variable is vote for a particular party, entailing several interrelated assumptions. Between 1993 and 2001, dozens of parties formed. In each election, only a few emerge as contenders for actual seats; most are limited resource, or "small-time" parties with little hope for popular election. Thus, I assume that the majority of the electorate votes at least somewhat strategically, such that individuals would be more likely to vote for parties that have a chance at obtaining a parliamentary seat. Moreover, I assume that those who vote for the top parties in any given election are qualitatively different than those who vote for fringe parties such as Party X, Friends of Beer[6], or any of the other small-time, niche parties.

To determine the top parties, I instituted a "6% rule;" only those parties that achieved at least six percent of the popular vote are considered to be a top party. My rule is more conservative than that instituted for winning seats in Sejm. After 1991, when over a hundred parties stood for election, Poland established a five percent rule, such that parties gain seats when reaching at least five percent of the popular vote.

Examining elections between 1993 and 2001, the "6% rule" well distinguishes the main parties. In 1993, I include SLD, PSL, UD, and UP as the top parties. Thus, in 1993, KPN and BBWR, who combined for slightly over eight percent of the seats, are considered fringe parties. In POLPAN, only four respondents said they voted for these parties. In 1997, AWS, SLD, UW, and PSL are the top parties (with ROP achieving 5.6 percent of the vote, 1.3 percent of the total seats, and only 15 voters claimed to have voted for them in the 1998 wave of POLPAN). In 2001, six parties are considered prominent: SLD-UP alliance, PO, SO, PiS, PSL, and LPR. A reformed AWS party achieved 5.6 percent of the popular vote, but failed to achieve any seats.

Voter knowledge of top parties was most likely diffused through the media and there is empirical evidence to suggest that campaign spending is substantively related to attaining seats in the parliament (see Appendix C). While the bulk of campaign spending is in administrative activities, a sizable proportion is typically ear-marked for political advertisement (Szczerbiak 2003). Between 1993 and 2001, the correlation between campaign expenditures and attainment of parliamentary seats increases. This is consistent with an increasing

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professionalization of party campaigning, including more sophisticated political advertising techniques to increase efficiency of media exposure (Szczerbiak 2001c). Tworzecki (2003) also found that voters will able to distinguish major from fringe parties in 1993 and 1997, though his definition of major includes those who attained 5 percent of the popular vote. Thus, it is realistic to assume that before each election, voters were able to distinguish top from fringe parties.

Key Independent Variables

Three main categories of demographics are gender, age, and social class, which are the only three that match what POLCAN provides. Belonging to a given category is denoted by 1, otherwise the value of the variable = 0. For both respondents and candidates, gender is measured dichotomously, with 1 = woman. Age is measured in three categories - young, middle, and old – in the same way as in Chapters 3 and 4. I define young as between the ages of 18 and 35, inclusive, middle age as 36 to 55, and old as any age after that.

Social class of parliamentarians is constructed in the same way as presented in Chapter 3, with high, middle, low, and farmer as categories. As in the NORPOL 2005 data used in Chapter 4, social class of respondents is constructed from occupational, or SKZ, scores. However, because of differences in SKZ variable construction, creating the social class variables differs. As not all respondents are currently employed, SKZ was attributed in the following manner; if the respondent is currently employed, then social class is the SKZ score of their

current, main job (main job is defined as that which provides the bulk of their income and health insurance, asked at the point of interview in order to differentiate from secondary job). If not currently employed, and the respondent was employed at some previous time, then the previous job is their social class. If respondent was never employed, and their spouse is employed, then their social class is that of their spouse. If none of these conditions are met, then social class is that of their father when respondent was age 14. The majority of social class attribution is for the first two contingencies. An average of 3% remained unclassified after all four are taken into account. To match POLCAN, I classified respondents into four main categories; high, middle, low, and farmer.

Following the analogy of statistical discrimination among employers, I constructed party demographic characteristic variables along a few interrelated logical assumptions. I begin with the assumption that voters who vote for top parties are qualitatively different from those who vote for fringe parties; thus, those who compare top parties do not account for the demographic compositions of fringe parties. I then assume that voters rank parties according to demographics that interest them, e.g. the thought process would be, "in my district, UP has a higher proportion of women candidates than PSL, which has a higher proportion than SLD," and so on. Next, I assume that voters make these comparisons only within their district and do not take into consideration the national proportions. For example, farmers who are interested in the top parties of 2001 will only compare the proportion of farmer candidates among the top

parties of 2001 in their district. Thus, parsing the list is necessarily a comparative process, but limited to the district in which the voter votes.

Thus, party demographic characteristics are measured dichotomously, in the following manner; for each district and for each top party, I computed the percent of women, farmers, lower class, young and old candidates. A given party is either a leading party with respect to percent of candidates of a specific characteristic (value = 1), or not (value = 0). Note that on the district level all parties have an equal chance of being the party with the largest percentage of women, farmers, lower class, young, and old candidates. For example, in Warsaw in 1993, SLD had 12.5 percent women candidates, PSL had 17 percent, and UD and UP had 11 and 20 percent, respectively. UP, then, is the party with the greatest percentage of women candidates relative to the other parties. Ties are permitted such that more than one party can have the "most" women candidates. Further, it is possible that no party in a given district has the "most" women candidates, and that all parties in that district has a zero for party characteristic. Interaction terms are computed for each pair of voter-party, so that 1 denotes the following situation: voter of a particular demographic characteristic lives in a district in which the party has the largest percentage of candidates of the same characteristic. Specific definitions of the interaction terms are discussed in the method section of this chapter.

Control Variables

Micro-level voting behavior under conditions of radical social change requires a different set of explanatory variables than that used by studies of stable democracies. As no such study has been conducted in the new post-communist democracies of Europe, hypotheses must be drawn from related research. Partisanship is far less stable in post-communist countries (Slomczynski and Shabad 2002; Tworzecki 2003), calling into question the need for a partisanship variable as a control. Although partisanship in Eastern Europe is best understood as attachment to political families rather than specific parties (Shabad and Slomczynski 1999), voters were increasingly able to distinguish between parties (Tworzecki 2003). It is important to note two aspects: (1) even when parties changed names through mergers and splinters, the top parties in each electoral cycle were recognizable to voters; (2) party ideologies varied significantly within a left–right continuum (Tworzecki 2003).

Ideological stances of parties are the most optimal indicators of how voters decide whom to vote for in unstable party environments. For example, preferences for statist parties (as defined in Chapter 3) is likely associated with viewing socialism as beneficial in some respects, while voters who prefer rightist, or economically liberal parties are more likely to view the socialist past as negative, and are more likely to support privatization of state run enterprises (Osborn 2000). Voters of anti-clerical parties are more likely to view intrusion of the church in state affairs as negative, with the opposite being true for Catholic traditionalists.

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Economic voting is as important a factor in the West as it is in post-communist Europe (Fidrmuc 2000; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Kunovich 2002). Perception of material gains and losses, i.e. ego-tropic voting, contribute to voting behavior; perception of losses would lead to a reduced probability of voting for the ruling party, and vice-versa.

In addition, religiosity and gender attitudes could be strong predictors of voting. Increasing religiosity should be positive and significant with voting for Catholic traditionalist parties. Links between gender attitudes has been shown to be strong determinants of demographic cues voting (Koch 2000; Sanbonmatsu 2002), such that the more gender egalitarian, the more likely they would be attracted to liberal parties and, to a certain extent, women candidates. Thus, in these models, attitudes toward whether women are suited for politics should be positive and significant predictors in models of vote choice in primarily economically liberal parties. Unfortunately, religiosity is only available in 1997 and 2001 and the only gender egalitarian attitude question was asked in 1997. Therefore, inclusion of these variables is restricted to the available years.

As most demographic cues researchers agree with Popkin's (1994) claim that it is necessary to control for political knowledge, I include a measure of interest in politics, such that the higher the number, the greater the interest (range 1 to 5). However, I argue that this is not a crucial variable. Demographic cues may either be a supplement to political knowledge or may be used independently as a "last resort" for low information voters. Assuming variation in political knowledge among voters, demographic cues theory only postulates demographic

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interaction between candidate and voter's characteristics, and not a specific

interaction between demographics and political knowledge. In any event, results

from studies using actual elections are mixed on whether variations in political

knowledge cause variations in the response of voters to candidates' demographic

cues, with some claiming low-information shortcut (McDermott 1997) and others

claiming lack of substantial effect (Cutler 2002).

Methods

In keeping with the majority of the demographic cues literature, I focus on

multivariate regression analysis. Restricting my sample to only those who voted

for the top parties, I employ binary logistic regression with party choice as the

dependent variable[7].

Interaction terms are the key independent variables. These terms measure

the fit of voter-party demographics. Specifically, I include the following terms:

(1)   Woman voter in the district in which the party leads in the proportion of

women candidates. If this condition is satisfied the variable value = 1, otherwise =

0.

(2)   Farmer voter in the district in which the party leads in proportion of farmer

candidates. If this condition is satisfied the variable value = 1, otherwise = 0.

(3)   Lower class voter in the district in which the party leads in proportion of

lower-class candidates   If this condition is satisfied the variable value = 1,

otherwise = 0.

(4)   Young voter in the district in which the party leads in proportion of young

candidates. If this condition is satisfied the variable value = 1, otherwise = 0.

(5)   Old voter in the district in which the party leads in proportion of old

candidates. If this condition is satisfied the variable value = 1, otherwise = 0.

For example, in 1993, with vote choice for SLD as the dependent variable,

the interaction term for women in Warsaw would be zero, as SLD did not have

the most women candidates in that district. In that same year and district,

however, with vote choice for UP as the dependent variable, the interaction term

for women is 1, because UP had the most women candidates in that district and in

that year[8].

Positive and significant interaction terms are the critical test for whether

voters from disadvantaged backgrounds are more likely to vote for the party that

is demographically similar to them. Use of interaction terms as the critical test is

relatively common in the demographic cues literature (McDermott 1997; Paolino

1995). It is popular most likely because interaction terms fit the conditional

hypotheses and are the only way to adequately test whether voter sentiment is a

function of the specific relationship between voter and candidate (party)

demographics (Brambor, et al. 2006).

Other than the simplest models and the pooled logistic regression (see

below), I employ interaction terms without the main effects. I do this for two

reasons. First, in my data, the interaction term's main effects were typically too

highly correlated with the interaction term to be included in the same model.

Including the constituent variables of the interaction term hid the effects of the

interaction term itself. Thus, I needed to remove them. I present a complete analysis and justification of this procedure at the beginning of the results section.

Second, in this chapter, I am only interested in whether being from a disadvantaged group who is in the presence of a party that is demographically similar is a positive and significant contributor to voting for that party. Thus, I am not concerned with all of the other possible situations aggregated into the residual category. For example, I want to know whether being a woman in 1993 Warsaw where UP was the most demographically similar party increases her likelihood of voting for UP. I am not concerned whether being a man in that situation would produce the same effect. Moreover, I am not concerned about whether being a woman, in and of itself, is a contributor to vote choice. Nor am I concerned about whether party characteristics, in and of themselves, contribute to vote choice. I am only concerned about whether disadvantaged groups use demographic cues in their voting behavior, which means that only the interaction term is of interest.

To understand whether voters actually use demographic cues, I begin by presenting the simplest models consisting of voting for a given party as the dependent variable, and the following independent variables: voter characteristics, party characteristics, and the interaction of the two, pertaining to each demographic group: women, farmers, lower class, young, and old. I concentrate on voting for SLD and PSL. These are the only top parties that survived all elections between 1993 and 2001, and their party platforms did not change radically during this time, although PSL adopted a far more religious stance

(Castle & Taras 2002; Szczerbiak 2001a, 2001b). This allows for both a cross-time and pooled data analysis.

In the most elementary form, the demographic cues hypothesis as it applies to post-communist Poland would be such that there is an effect of voter's characteristics and the interaction term of the voter's characteristic with the characteristic of the party. This is expressed with the equation, H_a: $\beta_1 + \beta_2 > 0$, with the null hypothesis as H_o: $\beta_1 + \beta_2 = 0$, where β_1 is the voter's characteristic and β_2 is the interaction term.

I then analyze a pooled sample of voters for all elections with SLD and PSL as vote choices with all relevant controls. Pooling data is the least conservative test as it boosts the possible N, heightening the possibility of statistical significance for the key independent variables. However, it does simulate the very real situation of mass voter interest that is attenuated by only analyzing individual election years, especially given the sample restrictions that I impose (e.g. voters of top parties only).

To address how demographic cues voting functions in separate election contexts, and to capture the majority of voter sentiment, I analyze voting for SLD year by year. As SLD was the most dominant party of post-communist Poland in terms of popular support and political capital, 1997 notwithstanding, it is clear that the majority of voters were attracted to them. Thus, a year-by-year analysis of SLD would capture a large proportion of voter sentiment.

I conclude by analyzing how party types influence demographic cues voting within election contexts. I begin with UD as an economic liberal party in

1993 to contrast with SLD, an anti-clerical, statist party, in the same year. I examine AWS in 1997, as the only Catholic traditionalist to supplant SLD as the top party. In 2001, in addition to stalwarts such as SLD and PSL, several smaller parties which would later play an important role in the 2005 elections attained seats. Two of them, PO and LPR, were emblematic of niche parties. PO was an anti-clerical, economically liberal party and LPR was a Catholic traditionalist party leaning towards the statist side. I examine votes for these parties to ascertain how pseudo-niche parties at the smaller-resource end of the parties distribution fare in terms of demographic cues voting.

Findings

Simplest Models

Table 5.1 presents logistic regressions for voting for SLD and PSL in the most elementary form capturing descriptive voting. For all elections pooled, vote choice for SLD or PSL is regressed on only the interaction term and its constituent variables of voter and party characteristics, absent of all controls.

In Table 5.1, for SLD, all results are according to the hypothesis in terms of sign of the sum of coefficients for voter's characteristic and appropriate interaction. For example, where β_1 is the voter's gender (0.10) and β_2 is the interaction of voter's gender and whether SLD had the most women candidates in their voting district (-0.08), H_a: $\beta_1 + \beta_2 > 0$. In the case of PSL, this occurs with

	SLD			PSL		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
Gender						
Voter's gender (Woman = 1)	0.10	0.11	1.11	-0.06	0.12	0.94
Party has most women	0.41***	0.11	1.50	-0.13	0.28	0.88
Interaction of V*P	-0.08	0.16	0.923	-0.17	0.41	0.84
Farmer						
Voter's class (Farmer = 1)	-0.70***	0.11	0.50	1.67***	0.34	5.27
Party has most farmers	0.07	0.23	1.08	-0.40†	0.24	0.67
Interaction of V*P	0.39	0.46	1.47	0.73*	0.36	2.07
Lower Class						
Voter's class (Lower Class = 1)	0.46***	0.09	1.58	-0.87***	0.17	0.42
Party has most lower class	-0.23†	0.13	0.79	-0.38*	0.17	0.69
Interaction of V*P	0.16	0.23	1.17	0.53	0.33	1.71
Young						
Voter's age (Young = 1)	-0.14	0.11	0.87	-0.24	0.16	0.79
Party has most young	-0.05	0.15	0.95	0.17	0.35	1.19
Interaction of V*P	0.54	0.34	1.72	-0.64	1.11	0.53
Old						
Voter's age (Old = 1)	0.15†	0.09	1.16	0.03	0.14	1.03
Party has most old	-0.64***	0.13	0.53	-0.02	0.16	0.98
Interaction of V*P	0.26	0.23	1.30	0.09	0.27	1.09

***$p<.001$ **$p<.01$ *$p<.05$ †$p<=.10$

Table 5.1 Logistic Regression of Vote for SLD and PSL on Demographic Characteristics of Voters, Demographic Characteristics of the Party, and Interaction Terms Using Pooled Data, 1993-2001

	SLD	PSL
Gender		
Voter	0.533	0.237
Party	0.583	0.688
Farmer		
Voter	0.215	0.912
Party	0.504	0.163
Lower Class		
Voter	0.356	0.459
Party	0.525	0.529
Young		
Voter	0.299	0.159
Party	0.435	0.418
Old		
Voter	0.348	0.446
Party	0.526	0.509

* All are significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test) unless otherwise indicated.

[n.s.] Not significant at the .10 level (two-tailed test).

[n/a] Variable is constant and did not produce an interaction term, e.g. either voters never voted for the party when it was most demographically similar or the party never had the most candidates of that demographic.

Table 5.2 Correlations of Interaction Terms with Their Components for SLD and PSL for All Elections Pooled, 1993-2001

respect to farmers and the old. Thus, generally, these results give some support

for the hypothesis. For similar models for 1993 - 2001, see Appendix D.

However, in determining the statistical significance of the sum of the

coefficients in this simple equation, t-tests paint a less convincing picture. Only

for farmers is the sum of the coefficients statistically significant ($t = 2.93$, $p<.01$).

In all other cases the sums of the coefficients are not significant even at p < .10

level. The partial reason for it deals with multicollinearity between the variables

involved in the equation. Table 5.2 provides the correlations between the

interaction term and its constituent variables.

Correlations between the interaction term and its constituent variables are

often strong. For example, in the case of gender the correlation of the interaction

term with voter's gender is 0.533 and with party characteristic - whether SLD had

the most women candidates in their voting district is 0.583. For SLD and PSL,

for farmers, lower class, the young and the old at least one correlation of

interaction term and the composite variable is above .5. Additional analyses – not

shown here – demonstrated that taking into account at least two demographic

characteristics increased the multicolinearity. Thus, investigation of descriptive

voting must go beyond the most elementary model. Therefore, I rely on the

interpretation of the interaction terms as independently defined variables. As I am

not concerned with all of the other possible situations aggregated into the residual

category, I interpret interactions as that which directly tests the main demographic

cues hypothesis. For example, if women in the district in which a given party

leads in the proportion of women candidates vote particularly frequently for this

party is an indication of descriptive voting *per se*.

Logistic Regression with Controls

Tables 5.3 and 5.4 present logistic regressions for voting for SLD and

PSL, respectively. Each table is similar in form. Model I demonstrates the

influence of demographic characteristics of voters, their political attitudes, and demographic characteristics of the party on district level on vote choice. Model II presents effects of control variables and specific measures of demographic voter-party similarity according to gender, social class, and age. Because both voter's characteristics and party's characteristics were highly correlated with our measures of demographic voter-party similarity, I did not include them in the same model.

In Table 5.3, in Model I, over the 1993, 1997, and 2001 elections, farmers are less likely, and the lower class and old are more likely to vote for SLD, controlling for ideology. If SLD has the most women in the district, voters are significantly more likely to vote for them. If SLD has the most old candidates, voters are less likely to vote for them. Note that the coefficient for old is larger than that for gender, suggesting that old candidates are a greater repellent to voters of SLD than women are as an attractor.

In Model II, women who live in a district where SLD has the most women candidates are more likely to vote for SLD, controlling for ideology. Lower class exhibits a similar tendency, though significance there is at the 0.10 level.

	Model I			Model II		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Voters' characteristics						
Woman	0.135	0.089	1.144			
Farmer	-0.996***	0.125	0.369			
Lower Class	0.259**	0.099	1.296			
Young	0.022	0.117	1.022			
Old	0.215*	0.097	1.239			
Party characteristics: Party leads in proportion of _____ candidates						
Women	0.270**	0.090	1.310			
Farmer	0.063	0.226	1.065			
Lower Class	-0.181	0.128	0.835			
Young	-0.085	0.144	0.918			
Old	-0.553***	0.114	0.575			
Control variables						
Urban				0.684***	0.090	1.981
Perceived Material Situation	-0.211*	0.106	0.809	-0.248*	0.102	0.780
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	1.065***	0.092	2.901	1.044***	0.089	2.841
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	-0.375***	0.107	0.687	-0.408***	0.105	0.665
Interest in Politics	0.007	0.048	1.007	0.013	0.046	1.013
Fit of voter-party demographics: _____ voter in district where party leads in proportion of _____ candidates						
Woman				0.297**	0.105	1.346
Farmer				-0.123	0.409	0.885
Lower class				0.318†	0.188	1.375
Young				0.447	0.307	1.564
Old				-0.234	0.179	0.791
Constant	-0.442*	0.187	0.643	-0.936***	0.148	0.392
Log Likelihood	3291.228			3359.827		
Chi Square	302.304***			236.491***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.11			0.087		
N	2605			2607		

*** p<.001 **p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10 (Two tailed test)

Table 5.3 Logistic Regression of Vote for SLD on Selected Variables

	Model I			Model II		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Voters' characteristics						
Woman	-0.157	0.137	0.855			
Farmer	2.528***	0.165	12.524			
Lower Class	0.288	0.185	1.334			
Young	-0.088	0.190	0.915			
Old	-0.671***	0.151	0.511			
Party characteristics:						
Party leads in proportion						
of _____ candidates						
Women	-0.263	0.229	0.769			
Farmer	0.134	0.189	1.143			
Lower Class	-0.518***	0.178	0.596			
Young	-0.176	0.385	0.838			
Old	-0.086	0.155	0.917			
Control variables						
Perceived Material Situation	-0.346†	0.191	0.707	-0.413*	0.185	0.661
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	0.158	0.134	1.171	0.121	0.131	1.129
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	-0.209	0.180	0.812	-0.202	0.175	0.817
Interest in Politics	0.012	0.074	1.012	0.025	0.069	1.025
Fit of voter-party demographics: _____ voter in district where party leads in proportion of _____ candidates						
Woman				-0.409	0.319	0.664
Farmer				2.143***	0.138	8.527
Lower class				0.095	0.269	1.099
Young				-0.468	1.088	0.626
Old				-0.468*	0.220	0.626
Constant	-2.455***	0.334	0.086	-2.429***	0.221	0.088
Log Likelihood	1649.227			1726.082		
Chi Square	372.363***			296.469***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.13			0.11		
N	2605			2607		

*** p<.001 **p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10 (Two tailed test)

Table 5.3 Logistic Regression of Vote for PSL on Selected Variables

In Table 5.4, Model I, farmers are far and away the most likely to vote for PSL. The coefficients reveal that male, middle and upper class voters are less likely to vote for PSL. Older voters are less likely to vote for PSL, but the effect is nowhere near as strong as being a farmer. Overall, where PSL has the most lower class, non-farmer candidates, voters are less likely to vote for them. However, even old farmers living in a district where PSL has the most lower class candidates are much more likely than any other demographic type to vote for PSL.

Model II demonstrates that farmers are more likely to vote for PSL when they are the most demographically similar party. Old voters are less likely to vote for PSL when they present the most demographically similar candidate list.

Electoral Context: The Case of SLD

Table 5.5 presents the election by election analysis. I focus on the interaction terms as they are the key indicators of demographic cues voting. In 1993, SLD did not field enough candidates from farmer backgrounds to construct an interaction term.

As in the pooled analysis, lower class voters in 1993 who live in a district where SLD has the most lower class candidates are more likely to vote for SLD. This is a trend repeated in 1997. In that same year, women who live in a district where SLD had the most women candidates were more likely to vote for SLD. In 2001, however, no evidence of demographic cues voting is present.

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	1993			1997			2001		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Control Variables									
Urban	0.935***	0.196	2.548	0.294†	0.160	1.342	0.755***	0.156	2.127
Perceived Material Situation	-0.289	0.238	0.749	-0.162	0.169	0.851	0.073	0.192	1.075
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	1.030***	0.189	2.802	1.052***	0.157	2.863	0.676***	0.158	1.967
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	-0.366†	0.214	0.694	-0.378*	0.177	0.685	-0.167	0.209	0.846
Interest in Politics	-0.214*	0.096	0.807	0.031	0.083	1.031	-0.066	0.080	0.936
Religiosity				-0.330***	0.074	0.719			
Church Too Influential (yes = 1)				1.104***	0.157	3.017	0.970***	0.149	2.639
Women Not Fit for Politics				0.030	0.064	1.030			
Fit of Voter-Party: ___ Voter									
In district where party leads									
In proportion of ___ candidates									
Woman	-0.368	0.266	0.692	0.541**	0.204	1.718	0.082	0.155	1.085
Farmer				-0.362	0.813	0.697	0.031	0.492	1.031
Lower	0.889†	0.455	2.433	0.547*	0.275	1.729	0.093	0.425	1.097
Young	0.278	0.613	1.321	0.245	0.537	1.278	0.816	0.619	2.261
Old	-0.160	0.424	0.852	0.046	0.265	1.048	-0.611	0.479	0.543
Constant	-0.114	0.289	0.893	-1.007*	0.452	0.365	-0.808***	0.284	0.446
Log Likelihood	782.549			1157.346			1071.742		
Chi Square	64.879***			201.871***			101.339***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.10			0.17			0.11		
N	614			1071			854		

*** p<.001 **p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10 (Two tailed test)

Table 5.5 Voting for Demographically Similar Party: SLD 1993-2001

Note that probability of voting based on demographic cues is not dependent on the total percentage of women, but rather the difference between them and the residual category. In 1997, only 38.5 percent of the women who lived in a district where SLD had the most women voted for SLD (n = 148), compared with 41.3 percent of the men in that situation. In 2001, where the interaction term was not significant, 56.4 percent of women who lived in a district where SLD had the most women voted for that party, compared with 52.1 percent of men in the same situation (z = 1.15, p = n.s.).

How Party Type Influences Demographic Cues Voting

To discover how party type influences demographic cues voting, I begin with UD in the 1993 election (Table 5.6). As an economically liberal party, UD should attract young voters who typically support economically liberal programs and tend to eschew the socialist past. While perception that socialism brought gains is negative, old voters who live in a district where UD had the most old candidates are more likely to vote for UD. The interaction terms between lower class and farmer demographics and party contexts were removed as UD did not field enough of either. Keeping them in the model would have raised the standard error, hiding other effects.

At the time, AWS was an atypical coalition between economic liberals and Catholic traditionalists. In terms of these models, AWS pulled voters interested in demographic cues in various directions. As the main economically liberal party in 1997, young voters should be attracted to them. As Catholic traditionalists, old

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	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Voter's Characteristics			
Farmer	-1.442**	0.542	0.237
Upper Class	1.401***	0.231	4.061
Control Variables			
Perceived Material Situation	0.618*	0.273	1.855
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	-1.750***	0.286	0.174
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	0.611*	0.253	1.841
Interest in Politics	0.318*	0.130	1.374
Fit of Voter-Party: ___ Voter			
In district where party leads			
In proportion of ___ candidates			
Woman	0.288	0.269	1.334
Young	-0.071	0.430	0.932
Old	0.707†	0.428	2.028
Constant	-2.323***	0.425	0.098
Log Likelihood	528.462		
Chi Square	160.985***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.23		
N	614		

*** p<.001 **p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10 (Two tailed test)

Table 5.6 Voting for Demographically Similar Party: UD 1993

and farmer voters looking for demographic similarity should be attracted to them, while women should be repelled. Controlling for attitudes, we find that while farmers are attracted to AWS when they have the most farmers, but old and women voters tend to react negatively to voting for AWS when they have the most old and women candidates, respectively.

Once again, probability of voting based on demographic cues is not dependent on the total percentage of women, but rather difference between them

and the residual category (Table 5.7). For example, in that election year, 31.8

percent of the women (n = 44) who lived in a district where AWS had the most

women voted for that party, compared with 28.6% of the men (n = 49). In a

separate regression (not shown), with the interaction term as men who live in a

district where AWS had the most women candidates, the result is also negative,

though it's not significant.

In 2001, I examine PO and LPR (Table 5.8). Model fit for both are

significant. As for PO, all ideology variables are significant and in their

hypothesized directions. Interaction terms for women, farmers, and old were

removed; no one in a district where PO had the most women voted for that party,

farm and lower class interaction terms were perfectly correlated, and PO did not

have one district where they had the most old candidates. Neither of the

remaining interaction terms, for lower class and young, are significant.

As for LPR, except for economic voting variable, all are significant and in

their hypothesized direction. Privatization had an unusually large standard error

and thus was removed from the analysis. Again, farm was removed; only 10

farmers lived in a district where LPR had the most farmers and none of the voted

for LPR, though four non-farmers voted for LPR in those districts. Interaction

term for old is positive and significant.

	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Control Variables			
Urban	0.160	0.150	1.173
Perceived Material Situation	-0.246	0.158	0.782
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	-0.697***	0.161	0.498
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	-0.177	0.161	0.838
Interest in Politics	-0.186*	0.078	0.830
Religiosity	0.460***	0.076	1.585
Church Too Influential (No = 1)	1.155***	0.158	3.174
Women Not Fit for Politics	-0.055	0.060	0.947
Fit of Voter-Party: ___ Voter			
In district where party leads			
In proportion of ___ candidates			
Woman	-0.701†	0.367	0.496
Farmer	1.105†	0.600	3.020
Lower class	0.224	0.317	1.251
Young	-0.129	0.264	0.879
Old	-0.538†	0.291	0.584
Constant	-1.333**	0.413	0.264
Log Likelihood	1269.825		
Chi Square	180.245***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.15		
N	1072		

*** p<.001 **p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10 (Two tailed test)

Table 5.7 Voting for Demographically Similar Party: AWS 1997

	PO (Economic Liberal Party)			LPR (Catholic Traditionalist Party)		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Voter's Characteristics						
Woman	0.141	0.235	1.151			
Farmer				0.274	0.466	1.315
Lower Class				0.297	0.417	1.346
Upper Class	-0.135	0.281	0.874			
Young				0.062	0.548	1.064
Control Variables						
Urban	0.938***	0.276	2.554			
Perceived Material Situation	0.898***	0.251	2.455	-0.476	0.571	0.621
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	-1.151***	0.309	0.316	-1.085*	0.451	0.338
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	0.634*	0.267	1.886			
Interest in Politics	0.394**	0.130	1.482	-0.647**	0.199	0.524
Church Too Influential[a]	-0.742**	0.239	0.476	1.922***	0.383	6.837
Fit of Voter-Party: ___ Voter in district where party leads in ___ candidates						
Woman				1.052	0.697	2.864
Lower class	-0.441	0.763	0.643			
Young	0.475	0.359	1.607			
Old				0.868*	0.400	2.381
Constant	-3.615***	0.509	0.027	-2.447***	0.657	0.087
Log Likelihood	536.437			246.361		
Chi Square	94.131***			58.300***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.10			0.07		
N	861			854		

*** p<.001 **p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10 (Two tailed test) [a] For PO, yes = 1, for LPR, no = 1.

Table 5.8 Voting for Demographically Similar Party: PO and LPR 2001

Conclusion and Discussion

In this chapter I examined how electoral context, party type availability, and preference consistency influence the process through which micro-level voting behavior produces a descriptive representative parliament in light of the main hypothesis that voters tend to vote for parties that are demographically similar to them.

There is empirical support for the main hypothesis: In every electoral context, *there is at least one demographic voter-party fit influencing the vote*. In all years, farmers voted for PSL when PSL fielded the most farmers. Moreover, other demographics than farmers contributed to descriptive representation. In 1993, lower class voters tended to vote for SLD when they fielded the highest percentage of lower class candidates. In 1997, women and lower class tended to vote for SLD when they fielded the most candidates of their demographic characteristics. In 2001, older voters flocked to LPR under conditions of demographic similarity. In no election year analyzed in this dissertation did the young vote in this manner. Thus, it is clear that disadvantaged groups desire descriptive representatives and that this desire translates into voting preferences above and beyond other factors that influence vote choice.

A counter-intuitive finding which necessitates some speculation is that youth did not vote for the economically liberal PO when it had the most young candidates. One plausible explanation is that the youth vote was split between other parties espousing economic reforms, such as SLD-UP. Considering the

high unemployment for youth, it is possible that, as a group, they were drawn to both PO's economic restructuring and SLD-UP's statist welfare protections.

Now that I've addressed the question of whether disadvantaged groups demand descriptive representation, a major question remains; under what conditions can this behavior produce a descriptively similar parliament?

Empirical results suggest that electoral context matters. A concerted campaign in 2001 to raise the proportion of women in parliament worked such that women were not more likely than men to vote for SLD-UP even when that party had the greatest proportion of women candidates in their district. It's possible that in the 2001 electoral context, this campaign served to increase men's desire to vote for women, as opposed to the context in 1997, where no such campaign was widely recognized. This finding suggests that evidence for demographic cues voting -- as mainly a function of the desire of disadvantaged groups -- attenuates during electoral contexts where social movement organizations actively promote increasing the representation of that disadvantaged group. This can happen for a simple reason; everyone else suddenly becomes more likely to vote that way. Thus, all things being equal, women became no more likely than men to vote for women. Note however, that even if demographic cues voting becomes less likely, these campaigns can help to create a descriptively representative legislature.

From these analyses, it is not clear the extent to which party type availability matters. Remember that the fit of women voter-party demographics was significant and positive for SLD in 1997 at a time when a Catholic

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traditionalist, economic liberal party (AWS) rose to power. Perhaps this is a reaction by women against AWS, or perhaps not -- the results do not point in any specific direction. Confounding the ability to understand the effect of party availability, in 2005, Catholic traditionalist rightists won the majority of seats, and women's overall parliamentary representation remained the same (See Chapter 7). Farmers exhibit preferences for farmer candidates regardless of electoral context, and for both economic liberals (AWS) and statists (PSL). Thus, the party availability hypothesis has little empirical support here.

Preference consistency matters. Demographic cues voting is inconsistent across elections, hindering the ability of laissez-faire political markets to increase descriptive representation. Not all parties had enough demographic types to give all voters the option of voting based on demographic similarity. In addition, not all demographic cues categories receive the same level of support; farmers consistently signal preferences for candidates from a farmer background, but women are inconsistent, as are lower class, young, and old. Inconsistency matters most in contexts where there are no campaigns to exhort people to vote for women, lower class, and/or young or old candidates. In the absence of a concerted voting drive or other such efforts, political markets are too volatile from election to election to sustain any momentum for disadvantaged groups to steadily increase their descriptive representation.

Akin to this is the size of the contribution demographic cues make to voting behavior and its capability of producing a descriptively similar legislature. Not all voters from disadvantaged backgrounds vote according to demographic

cues. For those who do, the contribution to overall vote behavior is dwarfed by political attitudes toward the economy, the socialist past, and the role of the Church in political life. These findings suggest that small contributions are such that it would be unlikely for voting, in and of itself, to enhance descriptive representation.

Notes

1. Studies by McDermott (1998) and Sanbonmatsu (2002) are emblematic of the experimental approach. McDermott examines two different experiments, one asking respondents to choose between a race neutral and a black candidate, and another asking to choose between a man and a woman candidate (the names of the latter being white Anglo-Saxon sounding) (1998). McDermott uses logistic regression and finds that ideology affects vote choice, as conservatives prefer both the race neutral and male candidates and liberals the black and woman candidates. Others studies corroborate McDermott's race findings (Sigelman et al. 1995; Terkildsen 1993). Using multinomial logistic regression with three candidate choices as the dependent variable (man, woman, or neutral, as either explicitly described or inferred from the candidate's description) and controlling for such factors as gender, education and gender stereotypes, Sanbonmatsu finds that men and women voters' gender stereotype affects their voting behavior (2002).

2. In addition, they rarely cite older studies that have used class position as a variable in determining voter bias against women candidates (e.g. (Bernstein and Polly 1975), where, examining aggregate precinct level data with candidate vote share as the outcome variable, lower class white precincts were the least likely to support a woman candidate.

3. Also, it is not clear whether voters' change in income between elections influences retrospective evaluations, highlighting the necessity of adding this accountability element to the model (Manin et al. 1999; Brooks and Brady 1999).

4. Of the studies mentioned, only Cutler (2002) includes a measure of economic evaluations. Cutler includes retrospective evaluation in a conditional logit analysis of Canadian survey and election data to test the hypothesis that as demographic distance between the voter and the candidate increases, the probability that the voter will choose the candidate decreases. Distances in gender, region, and language (but not religion) have significant negative effects, confirming the hypothesis. We are left wondering, however, about the possible effects even a stunted form of class position would have, as Cutler does not use occupation, income, or education in the model as controls or additional demographic distance indicators.

5. A short discussion of matching districts is relevant, as some loss of respondents occurred in the process. To begin, POLCAN's districts are based on voting districts and these districts changed between 1993/7 and 2001. POLPAN's districts follow a different administrative logic and do not match perfectly with POLCAN. In addition, Poland changed administrative districts in 1999, such that POLPAN's districts from 1988 to 1998 are different from that of 2003. Therefore, I had to fit one data set's districts to the other; for ease of calculation, I chose to modify POLPAN's districts to fit that of POLCAN. For POLPAN in

1993 and 1998, there was zero respondent loss. For 2003, however, there was a loss 1.2 percent of the cases, as some voting districts aggregated, decreasing the overall number of districts. I have no reason to suspect that this bias influences the results in any particular direction, other than increasing the degree of predicted error.

6. Yes, these are real parties.

7. MNL is a common statistical technique employed when analyzing discrete choices in multiparty systems, but it is ill-suited to my purposes. BNL, although it aggregates all the other possible vote choices into the same reference category, BNL is a logical and valid a means to test the hypothesis. See Appendix G for a full explanation.

8. In some cases, I built the models so as to minimize the standard error. At times, I could not construct an interaction term as either the party never had the most candidates of that demographic or voters never voted for the party when it was the most demographically similar. In others, the frequency of voters voting for the party who was most demographically similar was so small that the standard error was too large. For instance, in 1993, the interaction term for lower class voters in a district where UD has the most lower class candidates has a high standard error due to the situation that of the four lower class people who lived in such a district, only one voted for UD. Excluding this variable more accurately reflects the state of demographic cues voting for UD in 1993. Necessity in removing variables of this type demonstrate the degree of volatility in how the political market operates; some parties do not field demographic types of candidates, giving their supporters few opportunities to vote based on demographic cues.

CHAPTER 6

OUTCOMES OF POLITICAL MARKET PROCESSES

In this chapter, I use macro-level data to examine outcomes of Poland's laissez-faire political market process for four elections between 1991 and 2001 to determine the extent to which key assumptions of market oriented solutions are met. As discussed in Chapter 1, market oriented solutions must meet two major assumptions for laissez-faire policy to be effective in bringing about descriptive representation. First, voters must have a choice of descriptive representatives in every election. Second, parties must be responsive to voter demands.

I use a variety of tests for the assumptions, using a combination of POLPAN and POLCAN, datasets described in Chapter 2. For sake of readability, I first explain the logic of the tests. I then describe the measurement of variables for each test, presenting the results immediately afterward.

Theory and Hypotheses

Is there evidence that market solutions are an effective way of bringing about descriptive representation? Assuming that political markets -- free of government intervention – can be effective, descriptive representation for groups

that demonstrate such demand should be evident at the level of candidate and parliamentarian lists. Parliamentarians themselves claim this to be the situation, as one mentioned, "The Parliament is chosen in elections by the citizens, and as such it assembles representatives of various classes and societal strata from all regions of the nation." Others echoed similarly, "…the current make up of Parliament approximates that of the Polish society" (see Chapter 3 for details).

Relative distances between voters, candidates, and parliamentarians along demographic lines best demonstrate the dynamics of descriptive representation. Over time, these distances should diminish. If this is the case, then there is some evidence that market solutions are an effective way of bringing about descriptive representation.

Examining Assumptions of a Laissez-Faire Political Market

Candidate Availability

Should descriptive representation not be in evidence, a critical examination of the basic assumptions of market-oriented solutions is needed. For the first assumption, candidate availability, there are two possible tests. In the first test, candidates of major societal cleavages should be available to the voter. Specifically, voters, in their voting habitat (districts) should have choice of demographic types of candidates among the major parties.

Two factors complicate matters: type of electoral system and regional processes for candidate selection. In a proportional representation system such as

that in Poland, parties control list positions, where they allocate slots for different demographic types of candidates. These candidates should be available in reasonable list positions, somewhere near the top, where they have a reasonable chance of becoming parliamentarians (Kunovich 2003).

Additionally, it is possible that market processes vary by region, since even the same political parties offer one type of candidate in one district, and another type of candidate in another district. For example, for the parties in agricultural regions, there should be more farmers at the top of candidate lists available to voters. In regions with greater numbers of industrial workers, it would be reasonable to find fewer farmers but more lower class candidates at the top of the list. Thus, if the situation is such that regions have differing candidate selection processes, then examining demographic types of candidates without reference to region would be not a fair test. If the regional exception holds, then farmers, who most likely live in farming regions, actually have fair opportunities to send farmer candidates to the parliament, even if farmer candidates are not available in the non-agricultural regions.

However, not all social cleavages coincide with the region's labor market. Gender and age categories are reasonably equally distributed across all regions and should be available regardless of the region's economic situation.

Party Responsiveness

For the second assumption, party responsiveness, there should be a tangible connection between voter demand and candidate supply, in one of two forms:

(a) If voters of a particular demographic type show a tendency to vote for a party, that party will acknowledge this and either keep the same level or increase the percentage of that demographic type in the next election.

(b) If voters of a particular demographic type do not show a tendency to vote for a party, that party will acknowledge this and is free to either keep the same level or decrease the percentage of that demographic type, making room for other types of candidates.

Examining these logical statements, parties seem to be free to do nothing in response to voter demand, with the exception of decreasing candidate types in response to positive voter demand. For example, if SLD provides lower class candidates, whether voters signal demand for that type or not, SLD is free to keep the same percentage in the next election. Either way, the political market can be said to be effective.

For a more comprehensive test of effectiveness, it is necessary to account for the magnitude of supply and demand. In essence, a large demand must be met with a large supply; a small demand can be met with either a large or small supply, as the party sees fit. Thus, a proper test includes the percentage change of the voting demographic that vote for the party relative to that of the increase in

candidate availability of that demographic provided by that party in the following election.

For example, say 25 percent of women vote for Party A in election at time1 and 50 percent of women vote for Party A in the following election (election at time2). On the party side, Party A offers 25 percent women candidates in election at time1 and then offers 50 percent women candidates in election at time2. In this hypothetical situation, the increase in women voting for Party A is exactly matched by the increase in candidates by that party revealing a responsive party in an effective political market.

This assumes that parties "play the market," such that they guess as to the percentage that a particular demographic type will vote for them (based on experiences in the previous election) and react accordingly. Part of playing the market is the diffusion of descriptive representation policy for various disadvantaged groups across the party landscape. Though a full examination of diffusion is outside the scope of this dissertation, I address it in some detail in the conclusion section.

Undoubtedly, there are other factors that influence the availability of candidate types (see Chapters 1 and 3). However, my primary concern is to understand whether the assumptions of market solutions are met in reality. These other factors are only important to understand *why* the political market succeeded or failed in producing descriptive representation. Thus, to test whether it is possible for descriptive representation to emerge primarily through the electoral

process, as parliamentarians themselves suggest, and without government intervention, as espoused by some parties, I examine the form and proportionality of party response to voter demand in relative isolation from other contributing factors. Afterwards, to provide context, I include these other factors as plausible explanations for why parties responded as they did.

Tests and Their Results

State of Descriptive Representation in Poland, 1991-2001

Table 6.1 presents raw data on the representation of disadvantaged groups in voters, candidates, and parliamentarians populations between 1991 and 2001. Voter data is based on POLPAN, including voters and non-voters. Candidate and parliamentarian data is based on POLCAN.

From the data, it is clear that descriptive representation is a rarity for all disadvantaged groups, even across multiple elections. Examining Table 6.2 presents the relative distances between these populations. For each election, in the first column, I divided the population of candidates by the population of voters, revealing the distances between candidates available for descriptive representation and their constituents. In the second column, I divided the parliamentarian population by their demographic constituents. For each statistic, a score of 1 or above equals descriptive representation for that demographic.

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Ratios lower than 1 indicates that the subgroup in that election cycle does not have descriptive representation.

The first column reveals that in each election between 1991 and 2001, only youth in 1991 had descriptive representation at the party level. Youth comes close again in 1993 and never again reaches that high. Farmers, too, come close in 1991 and again in 1993, but the representation ratio declines thereafter. The lower class never came close to achieving descriptive representation at the party level.

Trends in this type of descriptive representation are similar for all groups but women. In this case, there is some fluctuation, but ratios remain below 1. By 2001, no group really comes that close (with the possible exception of the youth, with a ratio of 0.76). Women are the only demographic group to enjoy a steady rise since 1993.

The second column demonstrates how well demographic subpopulations are descriptively represented by the national legislature in Poland. Note that the standards of what constitutes descriptive representation are somewhat flexible, and do not have to be exactly one for one. For example, in the first two elections, both youth (1.01 in 1991) and farmers (0.91 in 1991 and 0.98 in 1993) have, ostensibly, descriptive representation. After 1993, however, no group even comes close to descriptive representation in the Sejm. Once again, the lower class has the lowest level of descriptive representation of all groups in this study.

	1991			1993		
	Voters[a]	**Candidates**	**Parliamentarians**	**Voters**	**Candidates**	**Parliamentarians**
Women	51.4	12.9	9.6	51.4	13.1	13.0
Farmers	14.9	10.9	13.5	14.9	13.1	14.6
Lower Class	37.4	4.7	2.8	37.4	3.9	0.4
Young	21.1	23.6	21.3	21.1	20.5	12.6
Old	27.5	8.5	6.7	27.5	9.1	5.9
N	2259	6980	460	2259	8787	460

	1997			2001		
	Voters	**Candidates**	**Parliamentarians**	**Voters**	**Candidates**	**Parliamentarians**
Women	51.2	15.9	13.0	51.1	23.2	20.2
Farmers	18.3	9.2	5.2	20.4b	3	2.8
Lower Class	35.4	3.5	1.1	38.3	4.7	1.1
Young	24.0	15.2	10.9	27.0	20.6	8.0
Old	29.2	14.5	5.4	33.1	10.1	6.5
N	2132	6433	460	1699	7508	460

[a] Based on POLPAN wave 1993.

[b] In POLPAN, the definition of farmers includes part-time farmers. CIA Factbook estimates that 16.1% worked in agriculture in 2002 http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pl.html

Table 6.1 Representation of Disadvantaged Groups in Poland's Political Market 1991-2001

	1991			**1993**		
	c/v	p/v	p/c	c/v	p/v	p/c
Women	0.25	0.19	0.74	0.31	0.25	0.82
Farmers	0.73	0.91	1.24	0.50	0.28	0.57
Lower Social Class	0.13	0.07	0.60	0.10	0.03	0.31
Young	1.12	1.01	0.90	0.63	0.45	0.72
Old	0.31	0.24	0.79	0.50	0.18	0.37
	1997			**2001**		
	c/v	p/v	p/c	c/v	p/v	p/c
Women	0.45	0.40	0.87	0.25	0.25	0.99
Farmers	0.15	0.14	0.93	0.88	0.98	1.11
Lower Social Class	0.12	0.03	0.23	0.10	0.01	0.10
Young	0.76	0.30	0.39	0.97	0.60	0.61
Old	0.31	0.20	0.64	0.33	0.21	0.65

Legend: v = voters, c = candidates, p = parliamentarians

Table 6.2 Representation Ratios of Candidates to Voters (c/v), Parliamentarians to Voters (p/v) and Return on Electoral Investment (p/c)

Trends in this type of descriptive representation are similar for all groups except for women. Women are the only group to never dip below their lowest low (0.19), leveling between 1993 and 1997 at 0.25, and rising to 0.40 by 2001. Farmers steadily lose descriptive representation, as do youth. For all intents and purposes, lower class and old remain low but relatively steady.

Adapting ratios used in Kunovich and Paxton (2005: 508-11) (hereafter K&P), who examined the role of parties in contributing to variation in women's representation, third column results can be understood in terms of party return on electoral investment. K&P argue that the women's lack of party elite positions contributes substantially to their representational inequalities both as candidates and as parliamentarians. In this context, K&P include ratios of candidates to

parliamentarians from the point of view of the party. They demonstrate that the strong relationship between candidates and parliamentarians is a result of candidate selection in the electoral process. A score of 1 means a perfect one to one relationship between that group's candidate selection and their electoral success. A score over 1 indicates that the overall percentage of a social group's parliamentarians has exceeded that of their percentage in the candidate population. Returns lower than 1 indicates that parties are receiving a negative return on their electoral investment. My results of Table 6.2 in 1993 match those found in K&P Table 1, column three (0.99).

Assumption 1: Candidate Availability

To test whether candidates of disadvantaged groups are present in all districts during election years at reasonable list positions, I used POLCAN as the data and calculated candidate availability at three levels of list positions: the entire list, at the top 50 percent, and at the top 25 percent (Table 6.3). Statistics in this table refer to the percent of all voting districts where candidates of a demographic type from the top parties are available (for definition of "top party," see Chapter 5). Districts in 1993 and 1997 are directly comparable, as they have the same number of parties. In 2001, six parties achieved over 6% of the vote, resulting in a wider competition and a greater likelihood of finding disadvantaged group category candidates.

	Entire List		
	1993	**1997**	**2001**
Women	100	100	100
Farmers	100	100	95
Lower Class	59	27	95
Youth	98	98	100
Old	94	90	100

	Top 50% of Party List		
Women	100	98	100
Farmers	100	100	100
Lower Class	31	14	82
Youth	96	82	100
Old	78	80	100

	Top 25% of Party List		
Women	96	84	100
Farmers	100	86	68
Lower Class	16	8	37
Youth	90	53	87
Old	51	51	89

Table 6.3 Percent of Districts Where Candidates of a Demographic Type are Available

Table 6.3 demonstrates that even at the least restrictive level -- the entire list -- there are a lot of districts that do not have demographic types of candidates. Even in 2001, candidate availability is not 100 percent for all groups; however, 95 percent is fairly high. For those who want to vote for the top parties, chances are they would not find a lower class candidate at any point in the list between 1993 and 1997.

At more restrictive levels of party list, the number of districts that offer candidates from disadvantaged groups drops precipitously. In 1993 and 1997, the percentage of districts that offer women candidates in the top quarter of list positions declines from a high of 96 percent to 84 percent. Women are the only group to maintain 100 percent in 2001 at each level of list restriction. Farmers in the top quarter drop from 100 percent in 1993 to 68 percent of districts in 2001. In 1997, only 8 percent of districts held a lower class candidate in an eminently winnable position of the top quarter of the list. Even in 2001, with the greatest chances for a lower class candidate to be considered by mainstream voters, only 37 percent of the districts have such a candidate.

Regional Exception

To test for a regional exception, I used data from the Central Statistical Office (CSO) for Poland and merged it with POLCAN. For 2001, regions are defined as the 16 districts created after devolution in Poland in 1999. For the data on regions, I collected three data points on percent employed in (1) agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing, (2) industry and construction, defined as mining and quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas, steam, and hot water supply, and (3) service economy occupations (referred to as "market services" and "non-market services" by the CSO), including but not limited to trade and repair, financial intermediation, real estate, personal service activities, public administration, and health and social work[1].

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To get a clear picture as to the degree to which a labor market characterizes a region, I calculated two ratios reflecting (a) agricultural region and (b) industrial region. For both, I divided them by service economy, such that agriculture is the ratio of agriculture to service economy and industry is the ratio of industry to service economy.

For the first hypothesis, that the more the labor market structure of a region is centered on agriculture, the greater the percent of farmer candidates, the relationship is actually curvilinear (Fig. 6.1). Thus, I squared the agriculture to service economy ratio. Because Pearson's r correlations indicated that farmers in the top 25 percent of their list exhibits the strongest relationship to labor force activity, I used that as the dependent variable ($r = 0.25$, as opposed to the entire list where $r = 0.03$ and the top 50 percent, where $r = 0.18$).

As Fig. 6.1 illustrates, regions with higher levels of agricultural workers do attract more farmer candidates to the top of the list, but the phenomenon peaks at low levels and then drops at the far end of the distribution. The middle line represents curvilinearity; the lines on either side are confidence intervals, indicating a greater degree of variability at the extreme end of the distribution (which is most likely due to the small n at the high end of the ratio). The quadratic R squared indicates that this relationship explains about 11 percent of the variance.

For the second hypothesis, that the more the labor market structure of a region is centered on industry, the greater the percent of lower class candidates,

the relationship is mostly driven by one outlier, Slaskie (r = 0.36 with Slaskie, r = 0.05 without this region). As such, there does not appear to be a substantial relationship between industrial regions and lower class candidates.

In sum, the regional exception only holds only for farmers in some non-linear fashion. Regions do not seem to have drastically different processes in placing demographic types of candidates on party lists. Thus, Table 6.3 is a fair test of market solution effectiveness.

Fig. 6.1 Relationship between Labor Market Structure and Candidate Lists: Agriculture to Service Economy Ratio and Farmers in Top 25 Percent of Party Lists

Assumption 2: Party Responsiveness

Table 6.4 demonstrates party responsiveness to voter demand, taking into account the magnitude of the demand and its corresponding change in supply. Each statistic is a percent change. For example, between 1993 and 1997, growth in voting for SLD by women rose by one percent, while in 1997 SLD responded with a 13 percent increase in women candidates from 1993. I conduct this analysis for only SLD and PSL because they are the only two parties that survived all elections as top parties, achieving over 6 percent of the popular vote between 1993 and 2001.

I identified increase and decrease by positive and negative signs. Proportionate and disproportionate are those situations in which the party response is about twice that of the voting behavior. For data used in constructing these data, see Appendices E and F.

Party dynamics indicating types of responses reveal the extent to which parties tend to respond appropriately to demand. I coded six types of voter-party dynamics and noted the frequency where each occurs: (a) positive proportionate response to a positive increase in voting, (b) positive, disproportionate response to a positive increase in voting, (c) positive response to a decrease in voting, (d) negative, proportionate response to a decrease in voting, (e) negative disproportionate response to a decrease in voting, and (f) negative response to an increase in voting. In an effective political market, two of the dynamics, (a) and (d), should be the most frequent type.

	1993-1997			1997-2001		
	Vote	**Party Response**	**Type**[a]	**Vote**	**Party Response**	**Type**[a]
			SLD			
Women	1	13	b	60	138	b
Farmers	49	-38	f	36	-16	f
Lower Class	-6	-21	e	48	-27	f
Young	-20	-41	e	111	115	a
Old	6	38	b	41	-12	c
			PSL			
Women	-13	11	c	2	62	b
Farmers	-19	-24	d	-19	-68	e
Lower Class	-41	-40	d	121	67	b
Young	15	-40	f	-1	53	c
Old	18	-2	f	-27	-8	e

[a] (a) positive proportionate response to a positive increase in voting, (b) positive, disproportionate response to a positive increase in voting, (c) positive response to a decrease in voting, (d) negative, proportionate response to a decrease in voting, (e) negative disproportionate response to a decrease in voting, and (f) negative response to an increase in voting.

	Vote	
	+	-
Party Response		
Proportionate Increase	a	f
Disproportionate Increase	b	f
Proportionate Decrease	c	d
Disproportionate Decrease	c	e

Table 6.4 Party Responsiveness to Voter Demand: Percent Change in Voter Demand and Party Candidates for SLD and PSL, 1993-2001

Table 6.4 reveals an erratic and, from the point of view of descriptive representation, an ineffective political market. The two types of dynamics that should be most frequent in an effective political market, a positive proportionate response to a positive increase in voting (type a) and a negative proportionate response to a decrease in voting (type d), only occur 15 percent of the time.

For 25 percent of the time, positive increases in voting were met with decreases in candidate availability. For example, this occurred for farmers increasing their vote for SLD from 1993 to 1997 and again from 1997 to 2001, which were met with a 38 percent and 16 percent reduction in farmer candidates, respectively. For the 1997 and 2001 elections, both lower class (27 percent) and old (twelve percent) lost SLD candidates of their demographic type despite an increase in voting for their party.

For 20 percent of the voter-party response dynamics, a decrease in vote was met with a disproportionate reduction in the number of candidates. For 1997-2001, farmers decreased their support for PSL by 19 percent, and were met with a reduction of farmer candidates of slightly over three times that.

Note that women were the only group to consistently sustain a disproportionate increase in response to their vote behavior. For example, between 1997 and 2001, women's vote for SLD increased by 60 percent, while percent of women candidates in SLD in 2001 rose 138 percent from the previous election. In that same time period, women's vote for PSL rose only two percent, yet PSL increased their percent of women candidates by 62 percent, slightly over

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thirty times the vote increase. Contrasted with the disproportionate decrease in

farmer candidates to a decrease in farmer votes, women's gains are extraordinary.

It should also be noted that young candidates surged for both SLD and PSL for

1997-2001, though for SLD the candidate increase was proportionate to the vote

increase. A positive, disproportionate response to a positive increase in voting

occurred in 25 percent of the dyads.

Summary and Discussion

From the empirical evidence, it appears that Poland's political market

between 1993 and 2001 was an ineffective means of producing a descriptively

similar parliament. A laissez-faire political market has two key assumptions; that

choices of demographic types of candidates are available to voters in a given

district and that parties are responsive to voter demand. Through a series of tests,

I demonstrate that these two assumptions were not met.

These results raise important questions as to why the key assumptions

were not met.   In particular, why did women's descriptive representation rise

while there was a gradual decline in availability of social class and age types?

Why was party supply response so consistently disproportionate to voter demand?

Though empirical answers to these questions are beyond the scope of this

dissertation, some theoretical explanations can help guide future research.

	Women	Lower	Farmer	Young	Old	N
Platform Type						
Economic						
Statists	25.7	3.0	5.3	14.2	12.8	3172
Economic Liberals	17.4	1.1	1.7	24.0	5.0	1511
Religion						
Anti-Clericalists	27.5	0.8	2.9	18.0	5.9	3015
Catholic Traditionalists	20.6	3.3	4.8	17	12.7	1668
Combined Party Platforms						
Statism, Anti-Clericalism	36.2	1.3	3.2	14.2	9.0	907
Statism, Catholic Traditionalism	21.5	3.7	6.1	14.2	14.3	2265
Economic Liberalism, Anti-Clericalism	17.1	0.1	2.5	22.6	2.2	761
Economic Liberalism, Catholic Traditionalism	17.7	2.0	0.8	25.5	7.7	750
Total						4683

Table 6.5 Disadvantaged Group Representation by Party Platform in 2001: Candidates

	Women	Lower	Farmer	Young	Old	N
Platform Type						
Economic						
Statism	21.2	1.4	3.2	6.9	7.7	349
Economic Liberalism	17.4	0	1.8	11.9	1.8	109
Religion						
Anti-Clericalism	24.2	1.8	2.1	8.5	5.3	177
Catholic Traditionalism	14.1	0	4.0	7.3	7.9	281
Combined Party Platforms						
Statism, Anti-Clericalism	25.5	2.3	1.9	8.3	6.5	216
Statism, Catholic Traditionalism	14.3	0	5.3	4.5	9.8	133
Economic Liberalism, Anti-Clericalism	20.0	0	3.1	9.2	1.5	65
Economic Liberalism, Catholic Traditionalism	13.6	0	0	15.9	2.3	44
Total						458

Table 6.6 Disadvantaged Group Representation by Party Platform in 2001: Parliamentarians

Part of the answer concerns the intersection of party ideology and legislative recruitment. To illustrate, I use data from POLCAN and calculated percent of disadvantaged group within party platforms for 2001.

As Table 6.5 and Table 6.6 suggest, party platform, in terms of economic and religious orientations, influence candidate and parliamentarian composition. Following the theory presented in Chapter 3, statists and anti-clerical parties are more likely than economic liberal and Catholic traditionalist parties to field women candidates. Combining party platforms reveal the same story, but suggest that the economic dimension is more important. In terms of class, differences are not so pronounced, but it appears that statists and Catholic traditionalists are more likely contributors to the legislative recruitment of farmers and lower class candidates, and are ultimately more successful in placing them in the Sejm. Predictably, age groups are mixed, such that the young is more likely to be recruited by economic liberals, with the religious dimension not as important a factor. For the old, statist and Catholic traditionalist parties are more likely to recruit them, though it is the economic dimension that is more successful in placing them in the Sejm.

In Poland, politics quickly emerged as a career choice (Shabad & Slomczynski 2002). This is evidenced by politicians seeking to escape accountability though party switching over multiple election cycles (Zielinski, et al. 2005). The careerification of politics has had a major impact on the social class and age structure of the candidate and parliamentarian populations and, hence, the ability of a laissez-faire political market to produce a descriptively

similar national legislature. Like many other post-communist countries, Poland adopted Western standards for political recruitment, in which middle to upper class males dominate Polish politics. This immediately established the middle to upper class, male dominance of politics. Growth in middle and upper class parliamentarians help explain the decrease in youth and the increase in middle aged politicians, as middle age is highly correlated with middle to upper class position.

Unlike ethnic minorities (Chan 2001) and, later, women (Siemienska 2003), in post-communist Poland the lower class was never fully considered a viable political option for legislative recruitment. This may seem strange considering that Lech Welesa, who rose from the lower class, is a hero of the Solidarity movement which facilitated the transition to capitalist democracy (Ost 1990; Laba 1991). Perhaps it was the rapid decline of Solidarity as a political force that inhibited the ability of many lower class political aspirants to inherit Walesa's stature (Ost 2005).

For women, both parliamentary and social movement pressures best explain the increase in women's representation. Much of the general argument is explained in Chapter 3, which discussed the establishment of gender quotas in post-communist Poland in light of Htun's (2004) argument on parliamentarian's views of what is acceptable descriptive representation policy and for whom. Diffusion of the candidate gender quotas that women's groups advocated for most likely had a substantial impact on the growth of women's descriptive representation over time (Caul Kittilson 2006: Chapter 4; Renc-Roe 2003).

Evidence of parliamentary pressure leading to increases in women's representation in which a unique voting drive by women parliamentarians exhorted voters to vote for women was presented in Chapters 3 and 5 (Renc-Roe 2003; Siemienska 2003). By far, women have had the most consistent, concerted pressure of all disadvantaged social groups in Poland. Youth was the only other major social cleavage studied here that had organizations within a social movement fighting for their descriptive representation (Slomczynski and Janicka 2004: 419).

Influence of Smaller Parties

In multi-party system elections, smaller, niche parties can be innovators, influencing larger, top parties by diffusing ideas in terms of what type of candidates should be available for vote. It is relatively frequent that smaller parties force ideological issues into the political market, which in turn forces larger parties to clarify their stance. Similarly, the same can be said about demographic types of candidates; if increasing descriptive representation is akin to policy (Chapter 1, endnote 2), and if it has the chance to influence who votes for whom, then smaller parties can have an effect on larger parties' demographic composition. This is called a contagion effect (Matland & Studlar 1996).

Under what conditions could smaller parties influence larger parties in this way? An empirical examination is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but some educated guesses can be made. In any case, the influence is probably small. Most

likely, smaller parties that fail to clear the electoral threshold, but still gain

between two and four percent of the popular vote, are popular enough to threaten

larger parties whose margin for error is slim. The influence can be enhanced in

conditions of heightened market uncertainty, such as when electoral outcomes for

the top parties are in doubt.

Smaller parties can also innovate by reducing descriptive representation

or, at least, slowing its progress. For example, in 2005, out of SLD's corruption

scandal (nicknamed The Rywin Affair), two of the parties from the low end of the

parliamentary seat distribution in 2001, PO and PiS, found themselves as the top

two parties. This may have had a dampening effect on SLD-UP's attempt to

increase descriptive representation, as women's representation stalled at around

20 percent, possibly due to a backlash against the post-communist parties or the

left in general.

That institutional factors impinge upon the ability of a political market to

meet key assumptions spells trouble for laissez-faire political markets to produce

descriptive representation for all major social cleavages. Examining the data, it

becomes obvious that farmers and lower classes as social groups in and of

themselves face a situation in "which the deck is already stacked institutionally

against" them (Mansbridge 2005: 629). Notably, women seem to be faring far

better than all other groups, despite the institutional disadvantages stacked against

them. Perhaps sustained social movement pressures can make reasonable

progress in laissez-faire political markets. It is important to remember, however,

that no social group other than middle to upper class, middle aged men has

consistently had descriptive representation in Poland between 1991 and 2001. In

the final chapter, I discuss the degree to which women's gains constitute a form of

reasonable progress.

1. See Table 9. Employed Persons by Subregions. Data is collected from 2004. Though the independent variable data is collected after the occurrence of the dependent variable, I hypothesize that the structure of the labor market did not change significantly between 2001 and 2004.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

In this dissertation, I examined the extent to which political resource

inequality, measured in terms of descriptive representation of social groups, can

be reduced using only market solutions. As a dimension of social stratification,

political resources separate advantaged from the disadvantaged through access to

adequate, substantive representation—that is, representation of interests.

Empirical evidence suggests that when descriptive representation is in place, the

disadvantaged attain adequate substantive representation. In post-communist

Poland, women, farmers, lower class, and extreme age groups of young and old

fill the ranks of the disadvantaged. Poland also exemplifies a market solution

country whereby the government does not intervene on behalf of the

disadvantaged to guarantee descriptive representation in the political market,

relying instead on actors in the supply and demand dynamic to provide this

service.

In Chapter 1, I defined the political market as a conduit linking micro-

behavior to macro-outcomes and outlined its basic assumptions. Political markets

operate in a similar fashion to labor markets, where supply is largely determined

by political leaders who react to demand signaled by voters. Assuming rational behavior by all actors in a political market, everyone has a significant level of concern for the substantive representation of their social group. In particular, the disadvantaged seek descriptive representation. The advantaged are more likely to be either indifferent or actively hostile to descriptive representation for all. Actors work within a relatively open information environment such that voters know the demographics of candidates and political leaders are aware of voter sentiment. However, actors act within information constraints which have the potential to dilute the effectiveness of market solutions. Social structural, contextual forces constrain the thoughts and actions of actors in the political market. In particular, the post-communist European structural, political, and ideological context exerts substantial influence.

In Chapters 3 through 6, I use various data, theory, and findings from previous research (mostly that from women's under-representation), to empirically examine how actors' thoughts and behaviors within Poland's political market between 1991 and 2001 influence descriptive representation of the disadvantaged.

I begin with parliamentarians as political leaders who disproportionately influence the pace, form, and magnitude of descriptive representation, particularly in relation to policy for candidate emergence. I separate two thought processes; that towards descriptive representation in theory, or as an ideal, and that towards praxis, in this case, voluntary gender quotas by party. I find that both demographics and party ideology influence motivations and preferences for

descriptive representation as an ideal such that the disadvantaged among them are more likely to think that descriptive representation is important. However, when considering actual solutions, demographics largely stop at the party line. Women are no more likely than men to think that voluntary gender quotas are a good thing once they filter their attitude through economic and religious party orientations. In general, statist, anti-clerical parties are more likely to support descriptive representation than economic liberal, Catholic traditionalist ones. Thus, an increase in the disadvantaged among parliamentarians may raise the overall support for descriptive representation as an ideal, but policy change is largely dependent on which party is in power at the time. Intellectually, parliamentarians have the same critiques of descriptive representation as do academics. However, parliamentarians add that the course of repeated elections is a sufficient condition to bring it about, indicating support for market solutions. Mitigating possible change in policy is the substantial degree of discord over the desirability of voluntary party quotas, even within parties that already have such policy. Finally, I note that a hierarchy of attitudes toward social categories exists such that generations have the highest level, followed by social class and then gender.

I then explore the intellectual foundations for descriptive representation support among voters to discover the extent to which they demand descriptive representation as an ideal and whether their preferences are connected to vote intentions. I find widespread support for descriptive representation for gender, social class, and generations. As with parliamentarians, a hierarchy of attitudes exists; social class is closely followed by generations, with gender relatively far

behind. As results suggest that social desirability is built into the survey, and because I want to understand the extent to which voters connect theory and praxis, I focus on strong attitudes. Except for the lower class, disadvantaged groups show strong support for descriptive representation of their group in either theory or praxis. In general, support for democracy and leftist orientation increase the probability of strongly supporting descriptive representation in theory, while rejection of the socialist past reduces the probability. Being Catholic has an uneven, though generally dampening, effect on strong support, even controlling for religiosity. Theory and praxis are strongly connected. Strong support for theory substantially increases the probability of believing it very important that parties should offer descriptive representatives. Women, farmers, and the young are more likely to support descriptive representation in praxis for their social categories.

Matching data of candidates and voters, I analyze actual elections between 1993 and 2001 to determine the extent to which voters signal demand for descriptive representatives and the conditions under which demand can manifest into achieving descriptive representation. Using a demographic cues framework in a post-communist electoral setting where parties are largely the focus of voting intentions, I find that in every election and for various parties, voters react to the demographics of parties such that under certain conditions, voters vote for the party that is most demographically similar to them. However, two main factors complicate the ability of elections, in and of themselves, to produce descriptive representation. Electoral contexts play a major role, such that a concerted

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campaign in 2001 to raise the proportion of women in parliament coincided with the return of statist, anti-clerical politics to the Sejm, producing a situation in which the descriptive representation of women increased without women being more likely than men to vote for parties who have the most women in the candidate list. Also, preference consistency matters such that the irregularity of demand signals across elections and social groups hinders the ability of the disadvantaged to build a sustained voting effort to which parties can react. In addition, regression model statistics reveal that the contribution demographic cues make to voting behavior is slight in the presence of political attitudes toward the economy, the socialist past, and the role of the Church in political life, casting further doubt on the ability of elections to enhance descriptive representation.

In the next chapter, I uncover the extent to which Poland's political market between 1991 and 2001 met market solutions' basic needs to be effective in bringing about descriptive representation. All groups except women faced decreases in descriptive representation in terms of candidates and parliamentarians between 1991 and 2001. Descriptive representation only happened three times; once for youth in 1991 and twice for farmers in 1991 and 1993. District by district, inconsistency in availability of demographic types prevails, especially farther up the candidate list where achieving a parliamentary seat is more likely. Thus, even if they wanted them, voters do not have a sufficient selection of demographic types of candidates from which to choose, especially lower class candidates. Regional differences in candidate availability were not a factor. Second, parties typically react in an inappropriate fashion to

voter demand, frequently decreasing availability of candidate types in response to increasing voter demand for those candidate types. Further, party response was often disproportionate to voter demand. Disadvantaged social classes, in particular, faced heavy decreases in candidate availability in response to their demand signals. Lack of candidate availability and parties' disproportionate response to voter demand contribute substantially to the inability of market solutions to be effective.

From the empirical evidence, a conclusion can be reached that market solutions in post-communist Poland between 1991 and 2001 were ineffective in their attempt to enhance descriptive representation for the disadvantaged. In essence, the political market is a cacophony of political leader discord, insufficient information transfers, electoral volatility, and voter inconsistency that, left on its own, becomes an inhospitable place for descriptive representation of the disadvantaged to grow. Parliamentarians are divided on which groups should get descriptive representation and on the best method of bringing it about. Although voters demand descriptive representation as an ideal and through elections, their visible demand signals are inconsistent. Parties do not consistently provide choices of demographic types of candidates and often do not respond appropriately to voter demand. If prior trends are indicative of forthcoming results, the disadvantaged face a bleak future of increasing political resource inequality and, hence, a quagmire of social stratification from which there is little hope of escape.

Reasonable Progress?

Another view of the findings suggests the possibility of progress. For at least one group, women, there has been steady increases in descriptive representation (see Chapter 6, Table 6.2). With only market solutions, women's descriptive representation ratio for parliamentarians to voters doubled from 0.19 in 1991 to 0.40 a decade later. Examining percent districts where women candidates are available, at its lowest point, 84 percent of districts in 1997 had a woman candidate in the top 25 percent of the party list. Further, parties reacted to women's vote with hugely disproportionate increases in the percentage of women's candidates. For women, at least, there are visible signs that market solutions work.

However, is this *reasonable* progress? An objective definition of what constitutes reasonable progress is difficult to formulate because of the inherent subjective nature of benchmark setting. Reasonable progress can be defined as the gradual achievement of a goal established by the attainment of predetermined benchmarks. In a doctoral program, for example, benchmarks can be defined in terms of a set number of years to complete coursework, to take the candidacy exam, to submit a dissertation proposal, to form a dissertation committee, to defend the dissertation, and to submit an acceptable formatted dissertation to the university. In many cases, the student's academic department determines reasonable progress from a set of relatively vague guidelines. For example, there may be no intra-departmental standard as to what constitutes a dissertation proposal or a set dissertation committee. In addition, personal emergencies on the

part of the student and their committee may alter when certain benchmarks must be met, depending on the perceived severity of the extenuating circumstance. Even what constitutes an acceptable dissertation varies by faculty and university. Thus, what constitutes benchmarks varies across faculty and across universities and in response to changing situations.

As for descriptive representation of the disadvantaged, there is little agreement as to when it should be attained or even if it should be attained (see Chapters 3 and 4). In the case of women, for example, descriptive representation would mean that women comprise half of the legislature. However, even those who push for quotas as a 'fast-track' to descriptive representation do not require 50 percent; gender quotas range from 5 percent in Nepal to 50 percent in France, with the average around 30 percent (Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005: 33-34, Table 1; Dahlreup and Nordlund 2004). In the case of quotas, date deadlines can be set, or not. Benchmarks vary across countries and in response to varying situations. In light of results from Chapters 3 and 4, the definition of an acceptable time frame as to when the disadvantaged should achieve descriptive representation depends on individual perception as informed by their position in the stratification system and their individual constellation of attitudes.

Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005) address the issue of reasonable progress in terms of incremental versus fast-track trends, dichotomized in terms of slow and quick routes to women's descriptive representation, respectively. Each trend type has associated with it a particular perception, or discourse, of the "future development" of women's representation, such that, "The fast track discourse

represents the impatience of today's feminists, who are not willing to wait seventy to eighty years to achieve their goals" (30). A woman parliamentarian from Lithuania discussing the need for gender quotas echoed this sentiment, saying,

> "Some time ago we thought that we, Christian Democratic women, were strong enough to compete with our peer men and that Lithuanians naturally would soon modernize their understanding about gender roles in society. But life has shown us that this hope for a 'natural' evolution will take too long" (Krupavicius and Matonyte 2003: 95).

If we want an objective way of assessing reasonable progress, it would be better to examine trends gleaned from political market outcomes. Instead of setting subjective benchmarks, trends based on a history of performance indicate the relative likelihood that a country's political market will produce descriptive representation. Thus, analyzing trend types aggregates supply and demand forces into a series of objective outcomes. Assuming the goal is a more or less demographic mirror of the citizenry, the general hypothesis is that some trend types would be more likely than others to produce descriptive representation. Because political representation statistics for women provide the best data situation in which to analyze cross-national trends in descriptive representation for disadvantaged groups, I analyzed a subset of the Inter-Parliamentary Union's Women in Politics archives for the lower houses of national legislatures between 1997 and 2006. I restrict my population to only market solution countries in Europe. I include the United States as a Western comparison to Europe, but they are not counted in the final statistics.

Analyzing each country's history of descriptive representation of women in parliament reveals five major trend types (Fig. 7.1): (a) High, steady upward

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trend as exemplified by Sweden, which starts at a large percentage and rises in a linear fashion across multiple election cycles, (b) Low to high jump, as exemplified by the Republic of Moldova, which starts at a low percentage but surges in a linear fashion to approximately twice its previous state, (c) Upward with plateaus as exemplified by Poland, which starts at a mid-range and tends to remain the same percentage across two or more election cycles, (d) Low, steady upward as exemplified by the United States, which starts at a small percentage and maintains a linear, yet barely visible rise across election cycles, and (e) Non-linear trend as exemplified by Ukraine, which may start at a large or small percentage but has the tendency to reverse the upward trend at one or more electoral points. Countries and their trend types are found in Table 7.1.

Each trend type has associated with it a likelihood of producing descriptive representation and constitutes a refinement of Dahlerup and Freidenvall's (2005) terms. Thus, I argue that trends (a) and (b) are most likely to produce descriptive representation; they are a combination of incremental track and fast-track but end up at fairly high levels of descriptive representation. Trend (c) is less certain mainly because of the frequent plateaus; although they are linear and upward, it is not clear if they will stall indefinitely. Finally, trends (d) and (e) are least likely to produce descriptive representation. Trend (d) represents the incremental track which really could take "70 or 80 years" to produce descriptive representation, if it gets there at all. Finally, trend (e) as a non-linear trend produces the greatest level of uncertainty as, historically, reverses in descriptive representation happen.

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Fig. 7.1 Trend Types for Market Solution Countries since 1992

Country[a]	Trend Type	Voluntary Party Quota?	First election year[b]	Min	Max	Median percent women in parliament	Election Cycles[b]
Austria	a	Y	1995	26.8	33.9	26.8	3
Denmark	a	Y	1994	33	38	37.15	4
Finland	a	N	1995	33.5	37.5	36.5	3
Netherlands	a	Y	1994	31.3	36.7	36	3
Spain	a	Y	1996	21.6	36	28.3	3
Sweden	a	Y	1994	40.4	45.3	42.7	3
Switzerland	a	Y	1995	21	25	23	3
Belarus	b	N	2000	10.3	29.4	19.85	2
Croatia	b	Y	1995	7.9	21.7	20.5	3
Cyprus	b	Y	1996	7.1	16.1	11.6	2
Latvia	b	N	1995	9	21	17	3
Republic of Moldova	b	Y	1994	4.8	21.8	10.9	4
Czech Republic	c	Y	1996	15	17	15	3
Poland	c	Y	1993	13	20.4	16.6	4
Andorra	d	N	1993	3.6	28.6	10.7	4
Estonia	d	N	1995	12.9	18.8	17.8	3
Greece	d	Y	1996	6.3	13	8.7	3
Italy	d	Y	1996	11.1	11.5	11.3	2
Portugal	d	Y	1995	13	21.3	18.9	4
Romania	d	Y	1996	7.3	11.2	10.7	3
Slovenia	d	Y	1996	10	12.2	12.2	3
Albania	e	N	1996	6.4	12.1	7.1	3
Bulgaria	e	N	1994	10.8	26.2	17.7	4
Germany	e	Y	1994	26.2	32.8	31.75	4
Hungary	e	Y	1994	8.3	11.4	9.1	3
Iceland	e	Y	1995	25.4	34.9	30.2	3
Ireland	e	Y	1992	12	13.9	13.3	3
Liechtenstein	e	N	1993	4	24	10	4
Lithuania	e	Y	1996	10.6	22	17.5	3
Luxembourg	e	Y	1994	16.7	23.3	20	3
Norway	e	Y	1993	36.4	39.4	38.05	4
Slovakia	e	Y	1994	14	16.7	14.7	3
Ukraine	e	N	1994	3.8	7.8	4.55	4
United Kingdom	e	Y	1992	9.5	19.7	18.25	4
United States of America	d	N	1996	11.7	15.2	14	5

Source: Inter-Parliamentary Union, Women in Parliament archives, accessed April 25, 2006.

[a] **Bold** indicates post-communist country.

[b] Based on available data.

Table 7.1 Market Solution Trend Type by Country for Europe and The United States

In the past decade, how effective have market solutions been in Europe? In general, market solution countries provide an uncertain future for descriptive representation for women. In terms of frequency, over one third (36 percent) of market solution countries in Europe have a high likelihood of producing descriptive representation (Table 7.2). Trend type (a) has a fairly large median minimum (31 percent) and maximum (37 percent). Though the standard deviation is large, their minimum would be relatively high even at their lowest point (if 21 percent is the threshold between lower and higher). Fast track (b) countries end up at a relatively high percentage and are climbing at a rapid pace. Alternatively, close to 60 percent have a low likelihood. Median percent women for low, steady upward trends are about 11 percent. Trend type (e) has a slightly higher, yet still low median percent of women in parliament. Note, however, that 39 percent of non-linear cases can be considered to have relatively high descriptive representation for women. Poland, as a mid-range country with plateaus, is emblematic of uncertainty with an upward trend.

Trend type	Percent of trend type	Median minimum	Median maximum	Median percent women in parliament	Standard deviation
a	21	31.3	36.7	36	6.99
b	15	7.9	21.7	17	4.51
c	6	14	18.7	15.8	1.13
d	21	10	13	11.3	3.88
e	38	10.8	22	17.5	10.08
N	34				

Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics of Market Solution Country's Trend Types for Europe, 1992 - 2006

For market solution countries, post-communist situation is not a significant factor. A slightly larger percentage of post-communist countries with market solutions have a low likelihood (45 percent) than high likelihood (33 percent), but the difference is not statistically significant ($z = 0.67$). Thus, market solution post-communist countries are not much more likely to have low likelihoods of achieving descriptive representation than they are to have higher likelihoods. Though I do not compare market solution to government intervention countries, I note that according to Dahlerup and Freidenvall (2005: 36, Table 2), 56 percent of those countries with 30 percent or more women in parliament are market solution countries.

Generalizability: Why Poland, Revisited

General principles and guiding questions used in this dissertation can be expanded to any modern nation-state where elections are free and fair. For example, in the United States, scholars know very little about the extent to which characteristics of candidates other than their gender and race influence vote choice. While statistical procedures would necessarily change (e.g. there is no need to posit demographic types of parties in a two-party system with a first-past-the-post electoral system), the political market analogy with voters in the equation and an expanded array of disadvantaged groups – class, sexual orientation, religion, age -- is valid.

Generalizing specifics from the Polish case to other countries is largely dependent on their extent of ethnic heterogeneity. As discussed in the

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Introduction, Poland is both typical and atypical of the market solution countries of Europe. Ethnically speaking, Poland is typical of other post-communist European countries of East Central Europe, including Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, whose native population is about 90 percent. In these countries, there are no mixed market systems – i.e., both government intervention and market solutions, depending on the disadvantaged group -- that include reserved seats for ethnic minorities.

However, the situation is radically different for Balkan countries, which typically have ethnic descriptive representation policy in their political market. Those with mixed political markets may be similar to that of Poland if other groups see that descriptive representation works and voters and political leaders may be willing to extend it to other groups, as well. Alternatively, groups may be seen as very different, inhibiting the diffusion of descriptive representation across the lower end of the stratification system (Bird 2003; Htun 2004).

Future Orientation

Descriptive representation is a theoretically rich idea with long, historical roots (for a discussion see Pitkin 1972: Chapter 4). How rich and how historical has yet to be fully explored. Where should research go from here?

Using the concept of a political market as I define it has proved to be a useful way of understanding how micro-level behavior translates into macro-level outcomes. It enables researchers to understand the role of voters in the descriptive representation implementation process. In particular, evidence

suggests that power disparities between suppliers and demanders leads to increasing political resource inequality.

Future research should focus on understanding the processes that lead to descriptive representation, including the influence of institutional development on policy and political market dynamics in other countries that have more of a mixture of market solution and government intervention policies. Institutional development does not occur in a vacuum; thus, an analysis of how international pressures influence the development of descriptive representation in a particular country would shed considerable light on these processes.

Within country, or district, variation in parliamentary representational inequalities needs further exploration. Examining district variation in women's representational inequality in Romania, I found that inequality between districts is significant and remains stable across time (Dubrow 2006). After standardizing a measure of women's representation for district magnitude, I found that level of economic development is a robust predictor of representational inequality, such that the greater the level of economic development, the greater the level of women's representation. Ascertaining district level history of descriptive representation shows a fuller range of disadvantaged groups' experiences with political resource inequality.

In addition, the extent to which descriptive representation influences the construction of social stratification systems would provide needed context to understand class, status, and power inequalities. While the ethnic minority rights literature focuses on how majority and minority groups vie for political power,

such research should be extended to other major social groups such as class and age. Research should examine the political processes of inclusion and exclusion through the implementation of descriptive representation, including how descriptive representation is used as a bargaining tool in solving societal conflicts and the form, direction, and magnitude of social stratification. Post-communist Europe, as an environment of rapid social transformation, is a natural experiment in how political resource inequality manifests in modern, industrial democracies, and thus is a fertile area for beginning this research.

Understanding how societies use political resources to produce and reproduce inequalities is a basis for furthering social science knowledge and constructing policy that fulfill the promise of democracy.

APPENDIX A

POLISH POLITICAL PARTY NAMES, 1993 - 2001

Name	English	Polish
AWS	Solidarity Election Action	Akcja Wyborcza Solidarnosc
BBWR	Non Party Reform Bloc	Bezpartyjny Blok Wspolpracy Wspierania Reform
KPN	Confederation for Independent Poland	Konfederacja Polski Niepodleglej
LPR	League of Polish Families	Liga Polskich Rodzin
PiS	Law and Justice	Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc
PO	Civic Platform	Platforma Obywatelska
PSL	Polish Peasant Party	Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe
ROP	Movement for Rebuilding Poland	Ruch Odbudowy Polski
SLD	Alliance of the Democratic Left	Sojusz Lewicy Demokratycznej
SO	Self-Defence of the Polish Republic	Samoobrona Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
UD	Democratic Union	Unia Demokratyczna
UW	Freedom Union	Unia Wolnosci

Table A.1 Classification of Major Political Parties of Poland, 1993 - 2001

APPENDIX B

DISTRIBUTION OF DEMOGRAPHICS FOR NORPOL 2005 DATA

	%	Mean	St. Dev.	N
Voted in 2001	69.7	--	--	4169
Women	50.6	--	--	2907
Farmers	10.7	--	--	2907
Lower Class	37.6	--	--	2907
Upper Class	9.8	--	--	2907
Age	--	46.2	18.0	2907
Young	33.4	--	--	2907
Old	31.6	--	--	2907
Catholic	93.8	--	--	2907
Religiosity	--	9.1	2.2	2907
Democracy is Best	40.4	1.9	0.9	2907
Leftist Political Ideology	--	3.3	0.9	2119
Don't Want Socialism Back	68.2	1.9	0.9	2907
No Traditional Gender Roles	7.7	2.4	1.3	2907

Table B.1 Distribution of Demographics and Attitudes for NORPOL 2005
Data

APPENDIX C

PARTY ELECTION EXPENDICTURES AND PARLIAMENTARY
SEATS IN POLAND, 1993 - 2001

Party	Expenditure	Parliamentarians
1993		
UD	2,047,900	78
SLD	1,870,000	208
BBWR	1,504,000	18
PSL	1,488,700	168
KPN	841,300	22
UP	362,200	43
1997		
AWS	11,100,000	252
SLD	9,300,000	172
UW	7,600,000	68
PSL	3,500,000	30
ROP	1,900,000	11
KPEiR	513,000	0
KPEiR RP	123,000	0
2001		
SLD-UP	26,995,002	291
PO	16,319,017	65
PSL	9,369,290	46
PiS	4,820,840	44
Block Senate 2001	3,238,983	15
SO	534,957	55
LPR	514,841	40
German Minority	486,548	2
Others	256,392	2

Sources: For 1993 and 1997, {Szczerbiak 2003 #3141}, Tables 1 and 3. For 2001,
http://www.corruptie.org/doc/050414%20Poland%20political%20corruption.doc
Accessed May 2, 2006

Table C.1 Party Election Expenditures and Parliamentary Seats in Poland,
1993 – 2001

APPENDIX D

SIMPLEST MODELS FOR TESTING DEMOGRAPHIC CUES
HYPOTHESIS IN POLAND PER ELECTION YEAR, 1993 - 2001

		Interaction Term				
	1993		1997		2001	
	Voter	*Party*	*Voter*	*Party*	*Voter*	*Party*
Women						
SLD	0.382	0.650	0.379	0.621	0.849	0.378
PSL	0.207	0.642	0.301	0.683	0.153	0.744
Farmers						
SLD	n/a	n/a	0.189	0.573	0.290	0.469
PSL	1.00	$0.051^{n.s.}$	0.988	$0.046^{n.s.}$	0.785	0.288
Lower Class						
SLD	0.375	0.479	0.422	0.529	0.252	0.551
PSL	0.167	0.556	0.200	0.614	0.764	0.380
Young						
SLD	0.340	0.464	0.296	0.411	0.279	0.445
PSL	0.162	0.347	0.219	0.443	n/a	n/a
Old						
SLD	0.341	0.529	0.450	0.490	0.202	0.611
PSL	0.555	0.444	0.570	0.495	0.187	0.565

* All are significant at the .01 level (two-tailed test) unless otherwise indicated.
[n.s.] Not significant at the .10 level (two-tailed test).
n/a Variable is constant and did not produce an interaction term, e.g. either voters never voted for the party when it was most demographically similar or the party never had the most candidates of that demographic.

Table D.1 Correlations of Interaction Terms with Their Components for SLD and PSL, 1993-2001

	1993			1997			2001		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
Women									
Voter's gender (Woman = 1)	0.15	0.19	1.16	0.03	0.15	1.03	0.82*	0.35	2.27
Party has most women	0.18	0.27	1.20	0.57**	0.19	1.77	-0.06	0.25	0.94
Interaction of V*P	-0.67†	0.38	0.51	-0.14	0.28	0.87	-0.65†	0.38	0.53
Farmers									
Voter's class (Farmer = 1)	-1.28***	0.24	0.28	-0.33†	0.17	0.72	-0.81***	0.18	0.45
Party has most farmers		n/a		-0.37	0.53	0.69	-0.10	0.27	0.90
Interaction of V*P		n/a		0.59	0.90	1.81	0.41	0.56	1.50
Lower Class									
Voter's class (Lower Class = 1)	1.19***	0.23	3.30	0.25	0.15	1.28	0.29†	0.16	1.34
Party has most lower class	-0.50*	0.25	0.61	-0.01	0.19	1.00	0.09	0.29	1.10
Interaction of V*P	0.34	0.53	1.40	0.30	0.32	1.35	-0.36	0.50	0.70
Youth									
Voter's age (Young = 1)	-0.13	0.24	0.88	-0.21	0.18	0.81	-0.15	0.18	0.87
Party has most young	0.50	0.33	1.65	-0.07	0.24	0.94	-0.36	0.27	0.70
Interaction of V*P	-0.03	0.70	0.97	0.26	0.55	1.30	1.35*	0.80	1.30
Old									
Voter's age (Old = 1)	0.14	0.20	1.15	0.13	0.16	1.13	0.22	0.15	1.25
Party has most old	-0.38	0.29	0.69	-0.37*	0.17	0.69	-0.48	0.36	0.62
Interaction of V*P	-0.01	0.52	1.00	0.43	0.30	1.53	-0.20	0.58	0.82

n/a Variable is constant and did not produce an interaction term, e.g. either voters never voted for the party when it was most demographically similar or the party never had the most candidates of that demographic.

Table D.2 Logistic Regression of Vote for SLD on Demographic Characteristics of Voters, Demographic Characteristics of the Party, and Interaction Terms, 1993-2001

	1993			1997			2001		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
Women									
Voter's Gender (Woman = 1)	0.03	0.22	1.03	-0.06	0.21	0.94	-0.16	0.21	0.85
Party has most women	-0.01	0.51	0.91	-0.08	0.38	0.92	0.07	0.78	1.07
Interaction of V*P	0.75	0.70	2.13	-0.42	0.59	0.66	-19.25	9473.57	0.00
Farmers									
Voter's Class (Farmer = 1)	3.04***	0.26	20.91	21.20	1000+	1000+	1.58***	0.36	4.86
Party has most farmers	18.9	1000+	1000+	18.14	1000+	1000+	-0.36	0.30	0.70
Interaction of V*P		n/a		-18.65	1000+	0.00	0.15	0.45	1.16
Lower Class									
Voter's Class (Lower Class = 1)	-0.64*	0.27	0.53	-1.32***	0.30	0.27	-0.45	0.39	0.64
Party has most lower class	-1.16	1.05	0.31	-1.52	1.02	0.22	-0.28	0.25	0.76
Interaction of V*P	2.43†	1.38	11.33	-16.52	9220.90	0.00	0.05	0.49	1.05
Young									
Voter's Age (Young = 1)	-0.09	0.30	0.92	-0.52†	0.31	0.60	-0.10	0.26	0.91
Party has most young	1.01*	0.46	2.76	-0.97	0.73	0.38		n/a	
Interaction of V*P	-20.63	1000+	0.00	1.24	1.31	3.44		n/a	
Old									
Voter's Age (Old = 1)	-0.13	0.31	0.88	0.56*	0.24	1.76	-0.24	0.23	0.79
Party has most old	0.05	0.25	1.05	-0.34	0.27	0.71	1.00*	0.40	2.72
Interaction of V*P	0.24	0.48	1.23	-0.17	0.42	0.84	-0.06	0.71	0.94

n/a Variable is constant and did not produce an interaction term, e.g. either voters never voted for the party when it was most demographically similar or the party never had the most candidates of that demographic. 1000+ Number is over 1,000

Table D.3 Logistic Regression of Vote for PSL on Demographic Characteristics of Voters, Demographic Characteristics of the Party, and Interaction Terms, 1993-2001

APPENDIX E

WITHIN-GROUP VOTING BEHAVIOR AND THE AVAILABILITY OF
CANDIDATES AND PARLIAMENTARIANS FROM
DISADVANTAGED GROUPS FOR TOP PARTIES IN
POLAND, 1993 - 2001

	1993					**1997**					**2001**					
	SLD	PSL	UD	UP	N	SLD	PSL	UW	AWS	N	SLD	PSL	PO	SO	PiS	LPR	N
Gender																	
Women	31.8	11.5	14.4	1.6	494	32.3	10	11.7	37.6	546	51.9	10.2	10.2	6	5.3	5.5	532
Men	32	10.7	15.3	1.5	543	31.5	10.6	14.7	36.1	529	43.8	11.5	10.3	11.1	4.9	2.4	470
Class																	
Farmers	18	42.9	2.5	0	161	26.9	34.9	0.9	31.1	212	36.6	28.2	3	16.8	2.5	5.9	202
Lower	36.8	6.4	5.2	0.6	326	34.6	3.8	10.2	42.9	315	51.4	8.4	7.2	10.8	4.2	3.9	333
Upper	30.7	3.3	35.7	2.9	244	27.9	3.7	26.2	35.7	244	48.2	6.3	13.6	3.1	6.8	3.1	191
Age																	
Young	28.4	9.1	17.6	0	176	22.8	10.5	8.8	45.6	57	48.2	10.4	13.5	8.8	4.7	2.6	193
Old	33.1	10.8	14.4	0.7	278	35.2	12.7	9	35.7	401	49.6	9.3	7	7.2	5.4	7.2	387

Table E.1 Percentage of Party Vote within Disadvantaged Group in Poland, 1993-2001

	1993											
	W	**F**	**LC**	**Y**	**O**	N		**W**	**F**	**LC**	**Y**	**O**	N
SLD	13.4	6.1	2.3	11.1	7.4	610		16.4	3.5	0.6	11.1	4.7	171
PSL	10.9	47.5	1	10	9.8	1126		6.1	42.4	0	7.6	7.6	132
UD	18.1	3.8	1	20.3	7.6	498		21.6	2.7	0	13.5	8.1	74
UP	15.5	3.1	4.5	16.1	6.1	491		17.1	2.4	0	14.6	2.4	41
Other	12.9	9	4.8	23.7	9.5	6062		2.4	4.8	2.4	31	4.8	42
	1997											
SLD	15.2	3.8	1.8	6.6	10.2	547		18.9	1.8	0.6	6.7	8.5	164
PSL	12.1	36	0.6	6	9.6	696		0	48	0	3.7	0	27
UW	18.6	4	0	15.5	7.6	722		15	0	0	10	13.3	60
AWS	10.9	6.6	1.6	14.9	7.1	773		10	4	2	15.9	0.5	201
Other	17.3	6.5	5.4	18.3	18.9	3695		0	0	0	0	25	8
	2001											
SLD	36.2	3.2	1.3	14.2	9	907		25.5	1.9	2.3	8.3	6.5	216
PSL	19.6	11.7	1	9.2	8.8	882		0	9.5	0	0	4.8	42
PO	17.1	2.5	0.1	22.6	2.2	761		20	3.1	0	9.2	1.5	65
SO	20.5	2.9	6.8	17.9	15.2	664		17	5.7	0	5.7	3.8	53
PiS	17.7	0.8	2	25.5	7.7	750		13.6	0	0	15.9	2.3	44
LPR	24.9	2.2	4	17	20.3	719		26.3	0	0	7.9	23.7	38
Other	23.4	1.1	8.7	26.1	9.7	2825		0	0	0	0	50	2[a]

Legend: W = Women, F = Farmer, LC = Lower Class, Y = Youth, O = Old

[a] German Minority Party

Table E.2 Percent of Candidates and Parliamentarians from Disadvantaged Backgrounds by Party and Election Year

APPENDIX F

LABOR MARKET AND CANDIDATE DATA AT THE
ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT LEVEL FOR POLAND

	District	Percent Workers in Agriculture	Percent Workers in Industry	Percent Workers in Service Economy	Ratio of Agriculture to Service Economy	Ratio of Industry to Service Economy	Lower Class Candidates	Farmer Candidates	Farmer Candidates in the Top 25% of the Party List
1	Dolnośląskie	0.03	0.08	0.07	0.46	1.08	3.94	1.50	2.22
2	Kujawsko-pomorskie	0.06	0.06	0.05	1.13	1.13	6.24	5.54	4.76
3	Lubelskie	0.13	0.04	0.05	2.71	0.78	3.19	3.92	5.26
4	Lubuskie	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.51	1.05	4.76	4.29	3.64
5	Łódzkie	0.09	0.07	0.06	1.45	1.13	4.09	1.25	0
6	Małopolskie	0.09	0.07	0.08	1.05	0.90	3.89	2.37	2.78
7	Mazowieckie	0.15	0.12	0.19	0.78	0.63	4.36	2.09	1.57
8	Opolskie	0.02	0.03	0.02	1.05	1.13	3.51	4.82	9.09
9	Podkarpackie	0.07	0.05	0.05	1.61	1.17	3.09	1.80	2.22
10	Podlaskie	0.07	0.02	0.03	2.43	0.77	5.70	3.80	5.45
11	Pomorskie	0.03	0.05	0.06	0.48	0.93	3.58	3.31	2.22
12	Śląskie	0.03	0.17	0.13	0.26	1.36	8.42	1.24	1.20
13	Świętokrzyskie	0.07	0.03	0.03	2.46	0.97	4.37	3.16	4.00
14	Warmińsko-mazurskie	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.97	1.02	6.23	7.33	7.37
15	Wielkopolskie	0.10	0.12	0.09	1.12	1.32	4.65	4.01	5.00
16	Zachodniopomorskie	0.02	0.04	0.04	0.49	0.89	3.63	4.47	4.21

Table F.1 Poland Administrative District Level Data 2004 and Candidate Data for 2001

APPENDIX G

DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS AND VOTING FOR THE MOST
DEMOGRAPHICALLY SIMILAR PARTY

Introduction

The purpose of this appendix is to explore other options for modeling discrete choices – in this, case, voting for the most demographically similar party. In this appendix, I explore three main alternatives to the binomial logistic regression analysis (BNL) as conducted in Chapter 5: Multinomial logistic regression (MNL), contrast models, and conditional logistic regression (CLOGIT).

What is Discrete Choice?

A discrete choice is any preference selected from a set of independent alternatives. A discrete choice model is an econometric model that assumes choices to be mutually exclusive.

Most discrete choice models impose the IIA assumption -- Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives.

> "[IIA] implies that in a contest between a liberal and a conservative party, the entry of a second conservative party would not alter the relative probability of an individual voter choosing between the two initial parties. However… the two conservative parties are close together in issue space and hence are likely to be viewed as substitutes by voters…" (Alvarez and Nagler 1997: 57).

In this dissertation, there are there are competing reasons for whether the IIA assumption in BNL as employed in Chapter 5 influences my results. For example, in 2001, the six choices may not be completely "independent," especially when taking into account economic and religious orientations of the parties (see Chapter 1 for how these dimensions are measured). For example,

SLD-UP has an economic score of 2.75, which is exactly the same as PSL (2.75). Religiously, however, PSL has a lower anti-clerical score, as their party turned more and more towards Catholic traditionalism (SLD = 3.25; PSL = 1.25). Thus, there are also grounds to suspect that these parties are sufficiently dissimilar such that IIA is not a critical issue.

Assessing Multinomial Regression

To model discrete choice, especially in voting, many use MNL. However, Alvarez and Nagler (1998) argue that in discrete choice models, MNL and BNL posit "the same choice processes" (64). When they conducted a vote choice model, "ocular examination" revealed "that they produce consistent estimates of the same parameters" (64) -- meaning that the models look the same. Thus, MNL may have no particular advantages over BNL.

As existing statistical software for MNL forces all contextual variables into the same equation, and because I test a hypothesis that necessarily includes contextual variables specific to particular parties, MNL is a suboptimal choice. For example, in a separate analysis examining voting in 1997, I created a dependent voting variable where 1 = SLD, 2 = PSL, 3 = UW, and 4 = AWS. With the last category omitted from the analysis (AWS), I included all party characteristics and their interaction terms, along with the demographics of the respondents as measured in Chapter 5. This produces a situation in which party characteristics and their interactions that have nothing to do with a given party

category are in the same model. For example, with SLD as the dependent

variable category, contextual variables of party characteristics and interaction

terms concerning PSL and UW, along with those of SLD, are in the same model.

PSL's and UW's characteristics have no meaningful interpretation and interfere in

a non-theoretical, non-interpretable way with the variables that are of specific

interest, i.e. the SLD variables. To my knowledge, there is no statistical software

that would enable me to "block out" the party characteristics of the other parties

in MNL. Thus, MNL, which allows comparison of all the top parties without

aggregation, is ill-suited to the task at hand.

Some advocate multinomial probit (MNP) in certain cases, especially

when IIA is a problematic assumption (Alvarez and Nagler 1997). Multinomial

probit (MNP) is similar to MNL and has the added bonus of relaxing the IIA

assumption (Irrelevance of Independent Alternatives) inherent in MNL and BNL.

However, MNP produces coefficients that are not-intuitive and, hence, difficult to

interpret, and has been shown to not have any other particular advantages over

MNL (Dow & Endersby 2004).

Examining Two Legitimate Possibilities: Contrast Models and CLOGIT for the 1997 Election

Contrast Models

Contrast models are a legitimate option, but in addressing the main hypothesis in Chapter 5, they are not a substantial improvement over the BNL models. To conduct a contrast model, I would break the top parties into pairs, truncate the sample to only those who voted for one of the two parties in each pair, and employ a series of BNL regressions. For example, SLD/PSL, which captures only those who voted for SLD or PSL. Statistically, this would work, even though theoretically, the model is counter-intuitive, as there is no reason, a priori, to assume that SLD voters are only choosing between SLD and PSL.

To demonstrate the main features of contrast models, I focused on SLD, PSL, and AWS -- the top three parties of 1997 -- and whether they are the most demographically similar party in terms of women candidates. All variables are defined as in Chapter 5. In terms of methods, I performed separate BNL regressions for three subsets of parties: SLD = 1, AWS = 0; PSL = 1, SLD = 0; and AWS = 1, PSL = 0. Thus, for each regression, the sample consists of only those who voted for either one of the parties within the pair. The format of presentation is also the same as in Chapter 5. First, I conducted analysis for simple models and then with all relevant controls.

Table G.1 presents the simple models. No model has a significant interaction term, consistent with the findings in Chapter 5 (see Table 5.1). Similarly, only the SLD model has a significant coefficient for party characteristic

	SLD =1, AWS = 0			PSL = 1, SLD = 0			AWS = 1, PSL = 0		
	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)	b	SE	Exp(B)
Voter's gender (Woman = 1)	-0.06	0.16	0.94	-0.30	0.23	0.97	0.92	0.21	1.10
Party has most women	0.42*	0.21	1.52	-0.07	0.41	0.93	0.01	0.59	1.01
Interaction of Voter * Party	0.69	0.31	1.07	-0.44	0.63	0.64	19.86	>1000	>1000

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10

Table G.1 Contrast Models of Voting for SLD, PSL, or AWS in the 1997 Sejm Election Without Controls

	SLD =1, AWS = 0			PSL = 1, SLD = 0			AWS = 1, PSL = 0		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Control Variables									
Urban	-0.06	0.18	0.94	-2.02***	0.33	0.13	2.80***	0.35	16.41
Perceived Material Situation	0.06	0.19	1.06	-0.05	0.35	0.95	-0.17	0.33	0.85
Socialism: Gains or Losses?	1.06***	0.18	2.90	-0.51†	0.28	0.60	-0.60*	0.27	0.55
Privatization State-Run Enterprises	-0.17	0.20	0.84	0.21	0.36	1.24	0.31	0.32	1.36
Interest in Politics	0.18†	0.09	1.19	0.09	0.16	1.10	-0.14	0.14	0.87
Religiosity	-0.52***	0.09	0.60	0.25†	0.15	1.28	0.48**	.017	1.61
Church Too Influential	1.26***	0.17	3.51	-0.55†	0.29	0.58	1.22***	0.32	3.93
Women Not Fit for Politics	0.05	0.07	1.05	-0.09	0.12	0.91	-0.03	0.11	0.91
Gender (Woman = 1)							-0.13	0.27	0.88
Fit of voter-party demographics: _____ voter in district where party leads in proportion of _____ candidates									
Woman	0.50*	0.25	1.64	-0.35	0.57	0.70	--	--	--
Farmer	0.34	0.95	1.41	1.80***	0.29	6.03	0.01	0.63	1.00
Lower class	0.43	0.31	1.54	--	--	--	1.93†	1.10	6.89
Young	0.35	0.63	1.42	-0.47	1.19	0.62	0.07	0.51	0.89
Old	0.29	0.31	1.34	0.01	0.42	1.01	-1.43***	0.43	0.24
Constant	-0.23	0.51	0.79	-1.19	0.83	0.30	-0.96	0.82	0.38
Log Likelihood	886.27			357.24			405.30		
Chi Square	202.75***			171.40***			165.91***		
Cox and Snell R2	0.23			0.31			0.26		
N	792			472			554		

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10

Table G.2 Contrast Models of Voting for SLD, PSL, or AWS in the 1997 Sejm Election with Controls

(b = 0.42, p<.05). For SLD and AWS, results are according to the hypothesis in terms of sign of the sum of coefficients for voter's characteristic and appropriate interaction. AWS, however, has an extremely large standard error, likely the result of the situation in which only 6.3% of women who voted for AWS lived in a district where AWS had more women than SLD.

Table G.2 presents the models with relevant controls for all party characteristics and for each party pair. In the PSL model, lower class party fit had to be removed. In the AWS model, women party fit had to be removed. Results are similar to those reported in Chapter 5, with a few exceptions. For SLD, party fit for women is still significant, but the interaction term for lower class is not. For AWS, farmer party fit is not significant at the .10 level, but lower class is significant at that level and old age party fit is much more significant (p<.001).

CLOGIT

CLOGIT is another possibility, but for the purposes of this dissertation, it is not a substantial improvement over BNL. CLOGIT is similar to MNL (Long 1997). Alvarez and Nagler (1997) define CLOGIT as a regression model that is "conditional on the characteristics of the choices; thus, it explicitly allows for measures of party characteristics" (56). Like MNL, it assumes IIA.

In CLOGIT, the data is set up so that person-choice observations are the units of analysis. ID's are aligned such that each group of three is presented with the three choice possibilities. The actual CLOGIT equation can be found in McFadden (1974) or Long (1997).

ID	Party	Choice	Party Characteristic	Respondent's Characteristic
1	AWS	0	3	male
1	PSL	1	2	male
1	SLD	0	1	male
2	AWS	1	3	female
2	PSL	0	2	female
2	SLD	0	1	female
3	AWS	0	3	female
3	PSL	0	2	female
3	SLD	1	1	female
Etc.				

Table G.3 CLOGIT Data Set-up

In this case we have three choices a chooser must decide among. There are two covariates: the first is choice-specific and the second is chooser-specific. To obtain chooser-specific effects we must resort to interactions.

To illustrate how CLOGIT works, I performed CLOGIT analysis using STATA statistical software. For simplicity's sake, I focus on the top three parties of 1997 – AWS, SLD, and PSL – using only one party characteristic, i.e. party similarity in terms of percent women candidates.

Data set-up begins by assigning each respondent a value of 1 for each party. After transforming the data from respondents to person-choices as the units of analysis, interaction terms are formed by multiplying the party value by any of the independent variables as measured in Chapter 5. For example, respondent's gender is multiplied by the party value for SLD and again for PSL, creating two variables.

For CLOGIT to be different from MNL, there must be at least one variable that represents the characteristic of the choices. For each group, the party characteristic that each voter considers in making their choice must be a stable pattern across each group of ID's. The party characteristic variable as measured in Chapter 5 can not be this variable because it varies by district—thus, if I used that as the conditional variable, each group of ID's would have a different pattern of party characteristics that vote choice is dependent upon.

To create an approximation of a non-district level party characteristic, I ranked AWS, PSL, and SLD according to their percentage of women candidates aggregated across districts. Nationally, SLD had the most women candidates and received a ranking of 1, PSL had the second most, and AWS had the third of the three. Thus, I make the argument that respondents base their choice on parties in part because of the national image each party has in terms of the descriptive representation of women in their candidate lists.

As you may notice, this national image variable is necessary for the CLOGIT model to be different from MNL, but it is not aligned with the theory that respondents recognize party characteristics at the district, in contrast to national level. *In my opinion, it is this artificiality which makes CLOGIT unnecessary for testing the hypothesis as stated in Chapter 5.* Nonetheless, we can still employ CLOGIT and test whether taking into consideration the "choice among the characteristic of the parties" variable matters.

	Model I			Model II		
	b	S.E.	Exp(B)	b	S.E.	Exp(B)
Nat'l Image	0.17**	0.06	1.19	0.18	0.27	1.19
Woman PSL	-1.09***	0.16	0.33	-0.27	0.25	0.77
Woman SLD	-0.02	0.15	0.98	0.34†	0.18	1.40
Party Sex PSL	-1.05***	0.28	0.35	-0.65*	0.33	0.52
Party Sex SLD	0.71***	0.14	2.02	0.48**	0.17	1.62
Controls						
Farmer PSL				2.09***	0.32	8.06
Farmer SLD				-0.27	0.27	0.77
Lower Class PSL				-0.78*	0.39	0.46
Lower Class SLD				-0.20	0.21	0.82
Upper Class PSL				-0.27	0.41	0.77
Upper Class SLD				-0.30	0.24	0.74
Young PSL				-0.07	0.37	0.93
Young SLD				0.34	0.24	1.40
Old PSL				-0.19	0.26	0.83
Old SLD				0.41*	0.19	1.51
Material Situation PSL				-0.01	0.30	0.99
Material Situation SLD				0.04	0.20	1.04
Socialism PSL				0.57*	0.25	1.76
Socialism SLD				1.08***	0.18	2.93
Privatization PSL				-0.07	0.31	0.93
Privatization SLD				-0.10	0.21	0.91
Interest Politics PSL				-0.03	0.12	0.97
Interest Politics SLD				0.20*	0.10	1.22
Religiosity PSL				-0.38***	0.11	0.69
Religiosity SLD				-0.56***	0.09	0.57
Church Influence PSL				0.54*	0.23	1.71
Church Influence SLD				1.35***	0.17	3.84
Women in Politics PSL				-0.11	0.09	0.90
Women in Politics SLD				0.02	0.07	1.02
Log Likelihood	-968.96			-716.35		
Chi Square	162.62***			562.38***		
Pseudo R2	0.08			0.28		
N	2868			2724		

*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 † p<.10

Table G.4 Conditional Logistic Regression of Party Choice on National Image,
Party Characteristics, and Relevant Controls

Thus, to test the demographic cues hypothesis, the key independent variable is the party characteristic at the district level. I multiplied party characteristic as it pertains to women candidates by the party value. For example, respondent's district level party characteristic is multiplied by the party value for SLD and again for PSL, creating two variables.

Choice among the three parties, i.e. the dependent variable, varies within each ID group. For example, in Table G.3, ID 1 voted for PSL as PSL had the second most women candidates nationally, but that same person did not vote for SLD, even though SLD had the most women candidates nationally.

Table G.4 presents two models – the first without controls, the second with controls. Thus, it approximates the type of analysis conducted in Chapter 5 and in the contrast model exercise above.

For Model I, model fit is satisfactory. The national image variable is positive and significant. More substantially, the party characteristic variable is significant for PSL and SLD, indicating that when PSL has the most women candidates in their district, this makes it less likely for PSL voters to vote for them. This situation has the opposite effect for SLD voters.

For Model II, model fit is also satisfactory. The national image variable is no longer significant when adding the relevant controls. Thus, the entire gain from an inclusion of party characteristics on the national level vanishes. While the gender variable is no longer significant for PSL, and becomes significant for SLD, the party characteristics on the district level remain significant.

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